Democracy School Framework for Western Balkans

(Albania, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Summary

The development of a Democracy School Framework for the Western Balkans is based on the recognition that democratic consolidation in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia is ongoing and varies in progress. While all three countries have formally committed to democratic governance and EU integration, persistent structural and political challenges hinder the effective functioning of democratic institutions. These include ongoing corruption risks, fragmented or overly centralised institutions, political polarisation, low levels of public trust in public institutions and increasing exposure to disinformation and informal power networks.

The EU accession process offers a crucial framework and incentive for reform, especially in areas like rule of law, public administration and good governance. However, legislative harmonisation and formal compliance with EU standards do not automatically result in a resilient democratic culture or sustainable institutional performance. Real democratic consolidation demands not only institutional reform but also strengthening political culture, accountable leadership, informed civic participation, productive engagement between political actors and the wider society etc.

Therefore, the Democracy School Framework aims to enhance both the knowledge and practical capabilities of political, civic and public sector actors while also promoting grassroots support for democracy and reinforcing political pluralism and anti-corruption reforms. The programme
intends to deepen participants’ understanding of democratic institutions, electoral systems, governance structures and integrity mechanisms, and to equip them with practical tools for political dialogue, coalition-building, public communication, policy advocacy and reform design.

While a unified modular structure is maintained across the region, the Framework incorporates country-specific case studies and simulations, reflecting the unique institutional arrangements and political dynamics of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This balanced approach
should ensure both regional coherence and contextual relevance.

Module 1: Foundations of Democracy

Topic 1: Political Culture: History, Ideas, and Values in the Western Balkans

The Objectives

Political culture shapes how citizens, elites and institutions understand and exercise authority, legitimacy, participation and accountability, thereby influencing how democracy functions in practice. It is historically constructed and socially embedded, evolving through the interaction of political and economic legacies, experiences of authoritarianism and conflict, elite behaviour, informal institutions, public trust, societal attitudes toward corruption and external incentives such as EU integration.

Although Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia constitutionally define themselves as democratic states, each demonstrates distinct trajectories of democratic consolidation, stagnation or hybridisation. These differences cannot be explained by institutional design alone and require analysis of underlying political culture and historical legacies.

This topic aims to equip participants with analytical tools to interpret political culture through established theoretical frameworks, understand how historical legacies shape contemporary governance behaviour, examine the interaction between informal practices and formal democratic rules, assess reform feasibility under cultural constraints, and critically evaluate the limits of externally driven institutional transformation. In doing so, the topic provides the conceptual foundation for subsequent modules on integrity, accountability, leadership and reform strategy.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to critically assess how political culture shapes democratic governance in the Western Balkans. They will apply key theoretical frameworks to analyze political and institutional realities in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Serbia. Participants will distinguish between formal democratic compliance and deeper cultural consolidation and evaluate the influence of informal institutions and historical legacies on reform trajectories. This analysis will enhance their strategic and leadership capacities, enabling them to formulate politically realistic, context-sensitive approaches to democratic reform.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This section should be approached as a coherent analytical progression, rather than as isolated theoretical blocks. Trainers are encouraged to use theory as a diagnostic toolkit for understanding the Western Balkans.

Introducing Political Culture: Concepts and Orientations

The session should begin by clarifying what political culture is and why it matters. Political culture refers to the pattern of orientations that citizens and elites hold toward political institutions and processes, shaping how democracy functions in practice beyond constitutional design.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) serves as the classical starting point, distinguishing between parochial, subject, and participant political

cultures. Trainers should highlight that no democracy fits neatly into one category – stable systems tend to combine participation with institutional trust and normative moderation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether their societies are characterized by distrust, dependency, polarized participation, or institutional moderation. Move from abstract definitions to observable behavior.

Why Political Culture Persists: Historical Legacies and Path Dependency

Political culture is historically layered. In the Western Balkans, contemporary political behavior reflects overlapping legacies such as Ottoman administration, Austro-Hungarian bureaucratic traditions, Yugoslav federalism, communist governance, post-conflict constitutional engineering and elite continuity after regime change.

The concept of path dependency explains why institutional trajectories are difficult to reverse. Works such as Levitsky and Way’s Competitive Authoritarianism and Florian Bieber’s The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans contextualize how historical patterns shape hybrid governance outcomes. Recent analysis by Lasˇtro and Bieber illustrates how entrenched party network’s structure access to resources and political competition.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to identify which historical layers most strongly shape political behavior in their country today.

Values, Modernization, and Cultural Change

Transitioning from history to values, Lipset’s modernization thesis provides the classical link between socio-economic development and democratic stability. Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialist value change and subsequent work with Welzel suggest that shifts toward self-expression and autonomy strengthen democracy. Recent research demonstrates that value change can also incite resistance, polarization, and populist reactions.

Empirical grounding should be drawn from the World Values Survey, enabling trainers to compare value trends in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Serbia.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants why value transformation in the Western Balkans appears slower and more uneven than in Central Europe. Encourage evidence-based reasoning rather than normative assumptions.

How Political Culture Shapes Institutions

Having explored values and legacies, trainers should demonstrate how political culture influences institutional design and functioning. Dahl’s concept of polyarchy and Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy provide institutional frameworks, while Habermas’ deliberative model adds a normative dimension of legitimacy.

Regional applications are essential. Bose’s Bosnia After Dayton (2002) is fundamental for understanding consociationalism in Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Elbasani’s work links EU-driven reforms to institutional transformation in the region.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyze whether institutional weaknesses in their country are design failures or reflections of political culture.

Political Culture and Informal Institutions

Informal institutions such as clientelism, patronage networks, personalistic authority, and elite coordination often override formal democratic rules. Helmke and Levitsky

provide the conceptual framework for informal institutions, with empirical evidence from works on state capture and international reports for Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify where informal norms contradict formal rules in their national context.

Democratic Backsliding and Hybrid Regimes

Shift the discussion from transition to regression. Levitsky and Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die (2016), and Bermeo’s work on democratic backsliding (2018) frame contemporary erosion. International democracy reports provide relevant data.

Trainer guidance: Pose the key diagnostic question – Is democratic backsliding in the Western Balkans episodic and reversible, or structurally embedded in political culture?

Encourage participants to distinguish between temporary political crises and deeper cultural patterns.

EU Integration and the Compliance – Internalization Paradox

Address the central paradox of the region: EU-driven reform often changes legislation faster than political behavior. The theoretical foundations of Europeanization and empirical evidence highlight this phenomenon.

Frame the discussion around four analytical lenses:

1. Conditionality versus ownership
2. Compliance versus internalization
3. Reform fatigue
4. Selective implementation

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to evaluate whether EU integration transforms political culture or merely reshapes incentives without changing underlying norms.

Teaching Note

Theory throughout this section should serve as a diagnostic instrument. Trainers should aim to move participants from conceptual understanding to structured diagnosis, comparative reasoning, and strategic reflection.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should guide participants through a structured comparative analysis of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Each country should be examined through five analytical lenses: historical legacy, dominant political behavior patterns, informal institutions, impact on democratic consolidation, and implications for reform feasibility. The objective is diagnostic reasoning rather than descriptive comparison.

Albania

Albania’s political culture is shaped by a legacy of authoritarian rupture. The collapse of the communist regime in the early 1990s, followed by the 1997 state crisis, weakened public confidence in formal structures and contributed to a highly polarized political environment with adversarial party competition.

Political behaviour often follows a zero-sum logic, with competition perceived as existential rather than programmatic. Institutional trust is low, and political identity aligns more with party affiliation than with issues.

Informal institutions (patronage networks and party-based recruitment) play a significant role, influencing access to public administration and state resources. Although formal rules increasingly align with EU standards, informal coordination mediates implementation.

Democratic consolidation is mixed – while EU integration anchors reform, sustainability depends on political incentives and elite consensus.

Trainers should ask: to what extent can externally driven reform processes reshape deeply polarized political culture? Participants should evaluate whether Albania’s reforms reflect cultural transformation or strategic adaptation to EU conditionality.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania demonstrates active institutional reform but limited cultural moderation, where polarisation and patronage continue to constrain democratic consolidation.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s political culture is tied to the Dayton constitutional settlement, which established consociational ethnic power-sharing. This structure has preserved peace and stability but institutionalized identity-based mobilization.

Political behavior is shaped by ethnic representation and veto mechanisms, resulting in fragmented authority and frequent decision-making paralysis. Competition centers on collective identity rather than policy performance.

Informal institutions operate through elite ethnic coordination and cross-party agreements outside transparent procedures. Formal complexity creates space for informal bargaining and selective implementation.

Democratic consolidation is ambivalent: elections are regular and institutions function, but accountability is weakened by fragmentation and diffusion of responsibility. Public trust remains limited.

For reform feasibility, trainers should encourage participants to consider whether constitutional design or political culture is the main constraint, examining whether reform requires institutional redesign, elite incentive realignment, or deeper shifts in societal culture.

Diagnostic takeaway: Bosnia & Herzegovina illustrates how institutionalised fragmentation and identity politics can stabilise post-conflict governance while simultaneously constraining effective democratic accountability.

Serbia

Serbia’s political culture reflects an incomplete break from authoritarian patterns of the 1990s. Despite democratic transition, executive centralization and personalized authority have persisted.

Behavior patterns include strong executive leadership, concentration of power, and increasing control over media narratives. Institutional checks and balances face structural pressures.

Informal institutions such as, for example, political-business networks and patronage linkages raise concerns about state capture, often blurring boundaries between legality and democratic legitimacy.

Formal democratic institutions remain intact, but international indices increasingly describe Serbia as a hybrid regime.

Trainers should assess whether Serbia’s trajectory reflects temporary political dominance or structural hybridization embedded in political culture, evaluating the relationship between elite networks, institutional autonomy, and public trust.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia exemplifies how formal democratic structures can coexist with entrenched informal networks that sustain executive dominance and limit institutional accountability.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied analysis. Approximately 40% of the session is delivered through interactive lectures introducing core theoretical frameworks, while 60% is dedicated to guided seminar work.

Seminar Component (Core Exercises) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Political Culture Diagnostic Lab (30 minutes) – participants work in country-based groups to identify dominant political culture patterns and assess how informal practices interact with formal institutions;
2. Reform Feasibility Simulation (30 minutes) – participants evaluate which reforms are politically viable under existing cultural and institutional constraints, identifying key obstacles and realistic sequencing options;
3. Plenary Reflection (15 minutes) – the session concludes with a guided discussion linking political culture dynamics to EU conditionality, reform incentives and long-term democratic development;

Integrative Closing Reflection

Participants reflect on which elements of political culture are deeply entrenched, and which can realistically evolve within one political generation, considering the roles of leadership, institutional incentives and EU – driven reform dynamics.

Key Takeaways

• Political culture shapes how democracy functions in practice, influencing citizen behaviour, elite incentives and institutional performance beyond formal constitutional design;
  • Historical legacies and informal institutions create persistent governance patterns that are difficult to change through legal reforms alone;
  • Democratic consolidation depends not only on institutional design but also on societal trust, value orientations and political norms;
  • Western Balkan countries exhibit different patterns of political culture. However, they all face tensions between formal democratic frameworks and entrenched informal practices;
  • EU integration provides reform incentives, but institutional compliance does not automatically translate into cultural internalisation.
  • Understanding political culture is essential for designing realistic, context-sensitive reform strategies.

List of Literature

1. Foundational Theory of Political Culture and Democracy

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton University Press.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183pnr2

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press. https://moodle2.units.it/pluginfile.php/785418/mod_resource/content/1/Dahl%20Po liarchy001.pdf

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six           Countries.       Yale                        University                 Press.               https://e-edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/830138/mod_resource/content/1/Lijphart%2C%20A.%20P atterns%20of%20Democracy%20-

%20Government%20Forms%20and%20Performance%20in%20Thirty-Six%20Countries%20%282012%29.pdf

II.  Modernisation, Values and Cultural Change

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge University Press.

http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/InglehartWelzel2006.pdf

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press.

content/uploads/sites/22/2018/09/Norris_Inglehart_Cultural_Backlash_Overview_Cha pter-1.pdf

World Values Survey Association. (2017 – 2022). World Values Survey, Wave 7. https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org

III.  Historical Legacies, Path Dependency and Informal Institutions

Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725 – 740.
https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/307_0.pdf

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/jia/v65i1/f_0024760_20204.pdf

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

IV. Democratic Backsliding and Hybrid Regimes

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown Publishing. https://e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/download/1884/590

Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5 – 19. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/on-democratic-backsliding/

V-Dem Institute. (Annual). Democracy Reports. https://www.v-dem.net

V. Europeanisation and EU Integration

Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press.
https://cadmus.eui.eu/entities/publication/ec360527-3186-5edb-a5cf-8ce5ee2158e8

European Commission. (2023 – 2025). Enlargement Package / Country Reports (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia).
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/index_en

VI.  Country – Specific Literature Albania

Biberaj, E. (2018). Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780429502415/albania-transition-elez-biberaj

Freedom House. Albania Country Profile. https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bose, S. (2002). Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. Hurst.
https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/bosnia-after-dayton/

Freedom House. Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Profile. https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina

Serbia

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

Freedom House. Serbia Country Profile. https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina

Topic 2: Electoral Systems, Political Representation and Political Finance in the Western Balkans

The Objectives

Electoral systems and political finance frameworks significantly influence the nature of political competition, the representation of citizens, and the functioning of democratic accountability. These frameworks determine how votes are converted into political power, shape party systems and political incentives, regulate access to political resources, and impact the integrity and fairness of democratic processes.

In the Western Balkans, political competition is often polarized, institutions remain fragile and informal networks wield considerable influence. Electoral design and political finance regulation play a crucial role in supporting democratic resilience. Although regular elections are held in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Serbia, international monitoring bodies routinely highlight structural integrity issues, such as misuse of administrative resources, unequal and biased media access, opaque and weakly enforced campaign finance rules, politicized electoral administration and persistently low public trust in representative institutions.

While Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Serbia operate under different electoral frameworks, all three countries demonstrate structural vulnerabilities in political representation, party competition, and political finance oversight. These weaknesses cannot be attributed solely to legal provisions but arise from the interaction between electoral rules and deeper political dynamics, including political culture, informal institutions, party incentive structures, media environments, and the uneven influence of EU integration.

Therefore, this topic equips participants with analytical tools to:

• Understand how electoral systems shape political power and party competition;
• Assess how electoral design influences representation patterns, political incentives, and government formation;
• Examine how political finance frameworks affect transparency, integrity, and risks of corruption or state capture;
• Analyze how informal practices and media environments interact with formal electoral rules;
• Evaluate the feasibility of electoral and political finance reforms within Western Balkan political contexts.

By grounding participants in these institutional dynamics, the topic provides the foundations for subsequent modules focused on integrity, accountability, and democratic leadership.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to critically assess how electoral systems and political finance frameworks shape democratic governance in the Western Balkans. They will use institutional and comparative frameworks to analyze electoral and party system dynamics in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, evaluate how electoral rules influence political incentives and representation, identify vulnerabilities related to informal practices, opaque financing, and media capture as well as to develop reform

approaches that are politically realistic and context-sensitive, aligned with international standards.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic) Electoral Systems: Concepts and Democratic Functions

Electoral systems determine how votes are translated into seats and shape the structure of political competition. They influence the number of viable political parties, the inclusiveness of representation, incentives for coalition-building, and the stability of governments.

Trainers should introduce the three core electoral system families:

1. Majoritarian systems
   1. Proportional representation systems
   1. Mixed systems

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify which system their country uses and assess how it shapes party strategies, voter behavior, and coalition dynamics.

Representation, Party Systems and Electoral Incentives

Electoral rules influence political representation and the behavior of political actors. They affect party system fragmentation, political polarization, incentives for cooperation, representation of women and minorities, and patterns of government formation.

Recent representation data reveal important disparities:

1. Albania – women constitute approximately 35% of MPs (2025),
2. Serbia – 38% of MPs (2023);
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina – 23% of MPs (2022);

Analytical frameworks such as Duverger’s Law (1954) and Lijphart’s distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracies (1999) are useful for understanding how institutional design shapes party systems and political incentives.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyze who benefits and who is disadvantaged by existing electoral arrangements.

Electoral Design and Political Finance Incentives

Electoral systems and political finance are closely interconnected, shaping not only how parties compete but also how political power is accumulated and retained. The design of an electoral system affects candidate selection, campaign funding, and access to state resources. In closed – list proportional representation systems, party leaders have significant control over candidate ranking, centralizing fundraising and campaign strategy within the party hierarchy. In dominant – party systems, this dynamic is intensified, with public funding and state resources disproportionately benefiting incumbents. Highly fragmented systems, such as those with multiple tiers or ethnically segmented constituencies, create complex environments for overseeing campaign finance, enforcing reporting rules, and ensuring transparency.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyze how electoral incentives shape political finance behavior.

Political Finance: Sources, Regulation and Integrity Risks

Political finance frameworks define how parties and candidates raise and spend money, and how transparently they report these activities. These frameworks establish

permissible funding sources, reporting obligations, expenditure limits, and compliance monitoring mechanisms. Weak enforcement opens the door to illicit funding, misuse of public resources, clientelist exchanges, and political capture. International standards from organizations like OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission, GRECO, and International IDEA offer benchmarks for transparency, accountability, and integrity in political finance.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to assess how political finance practices impact electoral fairness and democratic accountability.

Electoral Administration and Integrity

The integrity of elections depends not only on formal rules but also on the capacity, independence and professionalism of electoral bodies. The credibility of the process is determined by the independence of central election commissions, the appointment process for members and the competence of local election commissions. Training, administrative preparedness, and effective dispute-resolution mechanisms are essential for reliable election management. Vulnerability to political pressure undermines the integrity of the entire electoral process.

Campaign Environment and Media In𝑓luence

Modern electoral competition takes place in an information environment shaped by media structures and digital platforms. Concentrated media ownership, unequal access to major broadcast outlets, and paid political advertising influence voter information and perspectives. Digital platforms introduce new vulnerabilities, including rapid spread of disinformation, online manipulation, and microtargeted messages that reach specific groups without broader public visibility. These factors significantly impact voter behavior and the fairness of elections.

International Standards, EU Conditionality and Reform Incentives

Electoral and political finance reforms are shaped by EU integration and international monitoring frameworks. However, formal compliance does not guarantee substantive political transformation. Key frameworks include:

• EU Enlargement Reports
• OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions
• Venice Commission Code of Good Practice
• GRECO evaluations
• International IDEA integrity standards

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to evaluate whether reforms reshape political culture or primarily alter incentives.

Teaching Note

Institutional analysis should be used as a diagnostic tool, not merely a technical exercise. Trainers should guide participants from institutional description to political diagnosis, comparative reasoning, and strategic reform thinking.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should lead participants through a structured comparative analysis of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Serbia. Each country should be examined in terms of electoral design, political competition, political finance practices, and informal institutions. The

goal is diagnostic reasoning about how institutional rules and political incentives influence democratic performance, rather than merely descriptive comparison.

Albania

Albania employs a regional proportional representation system with closed party lists. This structure concentrates authority in party leadership, which controls candidate ranking. The design reinforces hierarchical party structures, limits internal party democracy, and centralizes influence over political competition.

The parliamentary elections of May 11, 2025, saw a turnout of 44.83%. The Socialist Party won 83 of 140 seats, achieving a fourth consecutive term. The Democratic Party – Alliance coalition secured 50 seats, while smaller parties remained marginal. These elections marked the first participation of diaspora voters, with over 245,000 registered abroad.

International observers described the elections as competitive, but noted widespread misuse of public resources, pressure on public employees, and allegations of vote-buying. Patronage networks reportedly monitored voters near polling stations, demonstrating how informal practices can undermine formal safeguards.

Political finance remains a significant vulnerability. Despite formal improvements, monitoring bodies continue to report insufficient transparency of donations, weak auditing, and limited enforcement. Informal financing through business networks and local patronage structures continues to influence electoral competition and reinforce clientelist incentives.

Women currently hold 35% of parliamentary seats, indicating progress in gender representation but ongoing structural imbalances in candidate selection.

Diagnostic takeaway: Electoral reform is technically feasible but constrained by political polarization, centralized party control, and entrenched patronage networks.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s electoral system is based on the complex power-sharing architecture established by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Designed to ensure ethnic representation and prevent domination by any single group, it combines proportional representation with ethnic quotas and multiple territorial constituencies, resulting in a consociational governance model.

The general elections of October 2, 2022, had a turnout of 51.45%. These figures refer to the state-level House of Representatives, but the country’s multilayered system also includes entity and cantonal legislatures. Political representation is shaped by ethnic mobilization and territorial divisions, and the presence of multiple veto players contributes to lengthy coalition negotiations and frequent governance deadlocks.

Public trust in representative institutions remains low, reflecting perceptions of institutional fragmentation and weak accountability. Political finance oversight is divided across governance levels, with limited enforcement capacity and inconsistent transparency standards.

Informal practices, such as patronage networks, politically motivated public-sector employment, and opaque links between political actors and state resources, continue to influence electoral competition. Women hold around 23% of parliamentary seats, highlighting persistent gaps in gender representation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Electoral reform faces structural constraints due to institutional design, identity-based political incentives, and fragmented oversight mechanisms.

Serbia

Serbia uses a nationwide proportional representation system with closed lists. Although this model is formally designed to promote pluralism, it operates within a political environment characterized by dominant-party competition, executive centralization, and personalized political authority.

The parliamentary elections of December 17, 2023, saw a turnout of 58.77%. The ruling coalition won 129 of 250 seats, consolidating its parliamentary dominance and reinforcing executive control. International observers found the elections technically well administered but conducted on an uneven playing field. They reported media bias, misuse of public resources, pressure on voters, and campaign irregularities, highlighting the gap between procedural compliance and substantive electoral fairness.

Political finance regulation exists in law but is weakly enforced. Oversight bodies face challenges in capacity and independence, while opaque funding channels and blurred boundaries between state and party resources persist. Informal political-business networks and patronage structures strongly influence campaign financing, media ownership, and access to public resources.

Women hold 38% of parliamentary seats, reflecting the impact of gender quotas but not necessarily broader political pluralism.

Diagnostic takeaway: Institutional reform is possible but constrained by dominant-party incentives, executive concentration of power, and entrenched informal governance networks.

Methodology

The topic employs a blended learning approach, combining conceptual foundations with applied institutional analysis. Approximately 40% of the session is delivered via interactive lectures and 60% through guided seminar work.

The lecture introduces models of electoral systems, representation dynamics, political finance frameworks, integrity risks, and relevant international standards. Trainers should consistently connect institutional concepts to political realities in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia through comparative examples and guided questions.

The seminar component translates theory into practice through a progressive sequence, moving participants from institutional diagnosis to strategic reform thinking.

Participants start with an Electoral Systems Diagnostic Lab, identifying how electoral rules shape representation, party competition, and political incentives. Next, they conduct a Political Finance Vulnerability Scan, analyzing funding sources, transparency gaps, oversight weaknesses, and informal practices that may distort competition.

A Reform Feasibility Simulation follows, where groups assess which reforms are technically desirable, politically feasible, and realistically sequenced within national contexts. The session concludes with a guided plenary reflection on EU conditionality, examining why electoral and political finance reforms often stall and whether external incentives can meaningfully influence domestic political behavior.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Electoral Systems Diagnostic Lab (approx. 30 min)
2. Political Finance Vulnerability Scan (approx. 25 min)
3. Reform Feasibility Simulation (approx. 30 min)

• EU Conditionality Reflection (approx. 20 min)

For shorter sessions, the first two exercises may be combined into a single diagnostic activity.

The methodology is designed to guide participants from institutional description to structured diagnosis, comparative reasoning, and realistic reform planning aligned with democratic governance principles.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which aspects of electoral systems and political finance can be improved through institutional design, and which require deeper changes in political culture, elite incentives, and public accountability?

Participants should differentiate between structural constraints, behavioral patterns, and external influences when evaluating reform prospects.

Key Takeaways

• Electoral systems shape how political power is distributed and influence party competition, representation patterns and government stability;
• Political finance rules determine the fairness and transparency of electoral competition and can either mitigate or reinforce corruption risks;
• Institutional design alone does not guarantee democratic integrity. Informal practices and political incentives significantly affect outcomes;
• Media environments and electoral administration play critical roles in safeguarding or distorting democratic processes;
• In the Western Balkans electoral reform is technically feasible but politically constrained by entrenched party interests, patronage networks and uneven institutional capacity.

List of Literature

I. Electoral Systems and Political Representation

Duverger, M. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Methuen, 1954.

https://discovered.ed.ac.uk/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991793493502466&cont ext=L&vid=44UOE_INST:44UOE_VU2&lang=en&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&t ab=Everything&query=creator,exact,United%20States.

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. https://eedu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/830138/mod_resource/content/1/Lijphart%2C%20A.%20Patterns%20of%20Democracy%20%20Government%20Forms%20and%20Performance%20in%20Thirty-Six%20Countries%20%282012%29.pdf

Norris, P. (2004). Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge University Press. https://olemiss.edu/courses/pol628/norris04.pdf

OSCE/ODIHR. Election Observation Reports.

International IDEA (2005). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA

Handbook. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-system-design-new-international-idea-handbook

II. Political Finance and Integrity of Political Competition

International IDEA (2014). Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A

Handbook. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/funding-of-political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pdf

International IDEA (2023). Combatting Corruption in Political Finance: Global Trends, Challenges and Solutions.
https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/combatting-corruption-political-finance-global-trends-challenges-and

GRECO. Evaluation Reports on Political Finance. https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations

Transparency International (2024). Standards for Integrity in Political Finance: A Global Policy Position. https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/standards-for-integrity-in-political-finance-global-policy-position

III.  Western Balkans Political Dynamics

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at:
https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

Lasˇtro C. & Bieber F. (2023). Democratic Patterns and Party Systems in the Western Balkans. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371804245_Democratic_patterns_and_party_systems_in_the_Western_BalkansDemokratiemodelle_und_Parteiensysteme_in_den_La ndern_des_westlichen_Balkans

European Commission (2023 – 2025). Enlargement Package and Country Reports. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Regional Cooperation Council (2023). Balkan Barometer. https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/key_findings_2025/2/public

IV.   Country-Specific Sources Albania

OSCE/ODIHR (2025). Albania Parliamentary Elections Final Report. https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/600028

Freedom House (2025). Albania Country Report.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/freedom-world/2025

Bosnia & Herzegovina

OSCE/ODIHR (2022). General Elections Final Report. https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/521536

Sumantra Bose (2002). Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. London: Oxford University Press, 2002.https://www.academia.edu/17802560/Sumantra_Bose_Bosnia_After_Dayton_Nationalist_Partition_and_International_Intervention_London_Oxford_University_Press_2002

Serbia

OSCE/ODIHR (2023). Serbia Parliamentary Elections Final Report. https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/563505

Freedom House (2025). Serbia Country Report.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2025

Topic 3: Human Rights, Rule of Law and Constitutional Foundations

Objectives

Human rights protection, the rule of law, and constitutional governance form the normative and institutional backbone of democratic systems. These elements define how state authority is limited, how individual freedoms are protected, and how public institutions operate within legal boundaries. In the Western Balkans, these democratic foundations are formally established but unevenly internalized, influenced by historical legacies, political culture, institutional capacity, informal practices and EU integration dynamics.

Although Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia constitutionally guarantee fundamental rights and separation of powers, significant gaps persist between formal legal frameworks and actual practice. Challenges such as weak judicial independence, politicized public administration, selective law enforcement, and the presence of informal networks affect accountability, equality before the law and public trust in institutions.

This topic equips participants with analytical tools to understand how constitutional frameworks structure state authority and protect fundamental rights. By grounding participants in these legal and constitutional dynamics, the topic provides the normative foundation for subsequent modules on integrity, accountability and democratic leadership.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to assess how constitutional design, rule-of-law institutions, and human-rights protections shape democratic governance in the Western Balkans. They will analyse institutional realities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia through comparative legal and political frameworks, distinguish between formal guarantees and actual implementation and evaluate how political incentives, institutional capacity and informal practices affect accountability. This will strengthen their ability to design realistic, context-sensitive approaches to improving the rule of law and safeguarding fundamental rights.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should be delivered as a progression from constitutional design → to rule of law principles → to human rights protection → institutional safeguards → informal pressures → international standards → reform feasibility.

Constitutional Foundations: Authority, Rights, and Institutional Design

Constitutions establish the basic framework of a political system by organizing state power, setting limits on public authority, and specifying the fundamental rights that must be protected. They enshrine constitutional supremacy and a hierarchy of norms, allocate

power among legislative, executive and judicial branches, and embed checks and balances to prevent domination by any institution. Constitutions also create mechanisms for constitutional review, define amendment procedures and enshrine a catalogue of civil, political, social, and minority rights to guide state action and protect individuals.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether constitutional guarantees in their country are substantively implemented or remain primarily formal.

Constitutional Resilience and Emergency Powers

Democratic constitutions must withstand moments of crisis when the balance of powers is most vulnerable. They typically include provisions for emergency powers and states of exception, specifying when extraordinary measures may be taken and the extent of executive authority. Safeguards such as time limits, parliamentary oversight and judicial review are established to prevent abuse. Constitutions define amendment procedures, determining the flexibility or rigidity of the constitutional order and the ease of altering it for political advantage. These mechanisms are essential for preventing constitutional capture through legal manipulation. During crises (e.g., public health emergencies, security threats, political instability etc.) judicial oversight is crucial to ensure that expanded executive authority stays within constitutional boundaries and that fundamental rights are not disproportionately restricted.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to consider whether emergency powers in their country strengthened resilience or enabled concentration of power.

Rule of Law: Principles and Practical Realities

The rule of law requires that public authority is exercised through established laws applied equally, predictably, and without arbitrariness. Core principles include:

• Laws must be clear and stable;
• All individuals must be treated equally before the law;
• State power must be constrained to prevent arbitrary action;
• The judiciary must operate independently and impartially;
• Public officials must be accountable for their decisions;
• Citizens must have access to effective remedies and enforcement mechanisms when their rights are violated.

Across the Western Balkans, these principles are often weakened by political interference in judicial decision-making, uneven or selective application of laws and institutions lacking the autonomy to resist political pressure. Informal networks and patronage structures frequently operate alongside or replace formal procedures, influencing appointments, prosecutions and administrative decisions. This results in a gap between constitutional commitments and everyday governance, undermining accountability, equality before the law and public confidence in state institutions.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants where rule-of-law failures are most visible – courts, prosecution, police, regulators, or public administration.

Human Rights Protection: Norms, Institutions, and Enforcement

Human rights protection in the Western Balkans relies on several layers of law and institutions. National constitutions provide primary guarantees, while the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) set binding regional standards. For EU candidate countries, the accession acquis,

especially Chapters 23 and 24, adds further obligations regarding judiciary, fundamental rights, justice, and security. These commitments are supported by ombudspersons, constitutional courts, and various administrative and specialized courts responsible for reviewing state action and safeguarding individual rights.

Despite a solid formal framework, practical realization of human rights protections remains uneven. Limited institutional capacity, political pressure on oversight bodies, slow and inconsistent judicial processes, and weak enforcement of court decisions frequently undermine the effectiveness of rights guarantees. These shortcomings are most visible in areas such as freedom of expression and media pluralism, minority rights and non-discrimination, fair trial standards and access to justice, protection from ill-treatment, gender equality and violence against women, and fulfillment of socio-economic rights and essential public services.

Landmark ECHR cases relevant to the region include:

• Sejdić-Finci v. Bosnia & Herzegovina (2009): The Court ruled that the Constitution and electoral system discriminate against citizens who do not belong to the three “constituent peoples” by preventing them from running for the Presidency and the House of Peoples;
• Zornić v. Bosnia & Herzegovina (2014): The Court found discrimination against citizens who refuse to identify with an ethnic group, reaffirming that political rights cannot depend on ethnic affiliation;
• Kovačević v. Bosnia & Herzegovina (2023): The Court held that the electoral system continues to discriminate on ethnic and territorial grounds, restricting equal political participation;

These cases illustrate how constitutional structures may conflict with human rights obligations.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to link rights violations to structural governance weaknesses rather than isolated incidents.

Independent Oversight and Regulatory Institutions

Democratic accountability relies not only on courts but also on a wider set of independent oversight bodies monitoring the use of public power. These include ombudspersons, anti-discrimination commissioners, data protection authorities, media regulators, anti-corruption agencies, and electoral commissions. When their independence, resources or appointment procedures are weakened, these institutions struggle to provide effective oversight and public trust in democratic governance declines.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether oversight institutions in their country function as neutral guardians or politically influenced actors.

Informal Institutions and the Erosion of Constitutional Guarantees

Informal political practices often shape how formal legal frameworks function in the Western Balkans. Patronage networks and politically driven appointments influence who holds key positions, while selective prosecution and persistent impunity weaken law enforcement credibility. Oversight bodies may become politicized, and informal veto players can block decisions that should follow legal procedures. Clientelist networks further affect administrative and judicial outcomes, allowing personal or party interests to override institutional rules. These practices erode constitutional safeguards, undermine equality before the law, and diminish the legitimacy of public institutions.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to identify where informal norms override constitutional rules in their national context.

International Standards, EU Conditionality, and the Rule-of-Law Gap

Western Balkan countries operate within dense international legal and political frameworks, including ECHR jurisprudence. However, a persistent compliance-internalization gap remains. Legal alignment often progresses faster than behavioral and institutional change. Reform fatigue, political resistance, and selective implementation limit the transformative impact of external pressure.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether EU conditionality meaningfully strengthens domestic rule-of-law practices or primarily reshapes formal legislation.

Public Trust, Legitimacy, and Political Culture

Rule of law and human rights protections depend not only on institutions but also on societal trust and legitimacy. Public perceptions of fairness, impartiality and institutional credibility influence compliance with legal norms and willingness to seek justice.

Low public trust in courts, political institutions and oversight bodies that is common across the Western Balkans weakens democratic consolidation and reinforces reliance on informal networks.

This dimension links directly to Topic 1, Module 1 on political culture, where institutional legitimacy depends on both legal performance and societal attitudes toward authority and accountability.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants how perceptions of injustice affect political participation and reform prospects.

Teaching Note

Legal and constitutional analysis should function as a diagnostic tool rather than a purely normative exercise. Trainers should guide participants from formal legal principles toward institutional diagnosis, comparative reasoning and realistic reform planning.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should guide participants through a structured comparative analysis of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia across four lenses:

1. Constitutional design
   1. Rule-of-law performance
   1. Human rights protection
   1. Informal governance patterns

Albania

Albania’s constitutional order establishes a parliamentary republic with strong formal guarantees of rights, checks and balances, and judicial independence. The justice reform launched in 2016 initiated a far-reaching restructuring of the judiciary. Vetting judges and prosecutors strengthened accountability but led to capacity gaps and case backlogs. New judicial governance bodies improved oversight but remain exposed to political pressure, and enforcement of court decisions is uneven. Media freedom is limited by economic concentration and political influence, while protections for minority and property rights are inconsistently applied. The ombudsperson plays an active role but operates with

limited resources. Informal networks continue to shape appointments and administrative decisions, weakening full implementation of constitutional safeguards.

Diagnostic takeaway: Reform momentum is strong, but long-term consolidation depends on depoliticizing institutions, improving judicial efficiency, and strengthening enforcement mechanisms.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton constitutional system combines strong human rights guarantees with fragmented governance arrangements. The division of competences across state, entity, cantonal, and local levels produces legal inconsistency and uneven enforcement. Landmark ECHR judgments (Sejdic´ – Finci, Zornic´ and Kovacˇevic´) remain unimplemented, reflecting deeper structural barriers to equality and political participation. Judicial appointments and disciplinary processes are frequently exposed to political influence, while human rights institutions lack authority and coherence for effective enforcement. Ethnic power-sharing mechanisms, designed to stabilize post-conflict governance, often override accountability and hinder institutional reform. This rigidity, embedded in the constitutional architecture, limits the country’s capacity to adapt its system to meet European standards.

Diagnostic takeaway: Constitutional complexity safeguards peace but constrains effective rule-of-law development and equal rights implementation.

Serbia

Serbia’s constitutional framework provides formal guarantees of rights and institutional checks, but governance practice is increasingly centralized around the executive. Political influence over judicial and prosecutorial appointments weakens institutional independence, while selective law enforcement and strategic case prioritization undermine equality before the law. Media freedom is constrained by political-business networks shaping ownership, financing, and editorial lines, and civil society organizations face growing regulatory and political pressure. Oversight and anti-corruption bodies have limited autonomy, reducing their ability to hold power to account. Informal governance networks blur the boundaries between public authority and ruling-party structures, eroding constitutional safeguards and public trust.

Diagnostic takeaway: Formal legal alignment with European standards coexists with informal power structures that weaken constitutional safeguards and institutional independence.

Methodology

This topic uses a blended format that connects core concepts to applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Provides constitutional, rule-of-law, and human-rights foundations, illustrated through comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%)

A sequence of applied exercises moving from diagnosis to reform strategy:

1. Rule-of-Law Diagnostic Lab – mapping institutional strengths and vulnerabilities (30 min);

• Human-Rights Implementation Scan – identifying protection gaps and enforcement challenges (25 min);
• Constitutional Reform Feasibility Simulation – assessing politically viable reform pathways (30 min);
• EU Conditionality Reflection – analyzing incentives and constraints shaping reform (20 min).

For shorter sessions, the first two exercises can be merged into a single diagnostic activity examining institutional performance and human-rights implementation together, providing a streamlined entry point into the reform simulation and EU conditionality discussion.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which aspects of rule of law and human rights protection can be strengthened through institutional reform, and which require deeper changes in political culture, elite incentives, and public accountability?

Key Takeaways

• Constitutional guarantees are meaningful only when supported by independent institutions, effective enforcement and political commitment to legal constraints;
  • Rule of law deficits in the Western Balkans stem less from legal design and more from political interference, institutional fragility and informal governance practices.
  • Human rights protection depends on both formal legal frameworks and institutional capacity to enforce court decisions and regulatory oversight;
  • Informal networks, politicised appointments and selective enforcement frequently undermine constitutional safeguards;
  • EU conditionality promotes legislative alignment but cannot substitute domestic political will and societal trust in institutions;
  • Sustainable rule of law reform requires strengthening institutional independence, enforcement mechanisms and public trust in legal processes.

List of Literature

I. Foundational Concepts on Rule of Law and Constitutionalism

Raz, J. (1979). The Authority of Law. Oxford University Press. http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/77486/1/17.pdf

Bingham, T. (2010). The Rule of Law. Penguin. https://ppotoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Lord-Bingham-The-rule-of-law.pdf

Tamanaha, B. (2004). On the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. https://ppotoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/On-The-Rule-of-Law.pdf

II. Human Rights Frameworks and International Standards

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG

ECHR HUDOC Case Law Database. https://www.echr.coe.int/hudoc-database#:~:text=The%20HUDOC%20database%20provides%20access,Committee%2 0of%20Ministers%20(resolutions).

Venice Commission (2016). Rule of Law Checklist. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)007-e

OSCE/ODIHR Human Dimension Reports. https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/human-dimension-mechanisms

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016P/TXT

III. Rule of Law, Judicial Reform and Institutional Accountability European Commission. EU Rule of Law Reports (2023 – 2025).
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en

GRECO. Evaluation and Compliance Reports. https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations

CEPEJ. Judicial Efficiency Reports. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/documentation/cepej-studies

World Justice Project. Rule of Law Index. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/

IV. Constitutional Design, Democracy and Institutional Safeguards

Ginsburg, T. & Huq, A. (2018). How to Save a Constitutional Democracy. https://scispace.com/pdf/how-to-save-a-constitutional-democracy-5g7brheqqc.pdf

Landau, D. (2013). “Abusive Constitutionalism.”“Abusive Constitutionalism.” UC Davis Law Review. https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/sites/g/files/dgvnsk15026/files/media/documents/47-1_Landau.pdf

Levitsky, S. & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York, Crown Publishing Group. https://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Levitsky%20%26%20Ziblatt%2C%20How%20Democracies%20Die_%20What%20History%20Reveals%20about%20Our%20F uture%20%282019%20–%20Penguin%20Books%29.pdf

V. Western Balkans – Rule of Law, Human Rights and Democratic Governance

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Palgrave. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

Freedom House. Nations in Transit. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit

BIRN. Judicial Reform and Governance Reports. https://birn.eu.com/

European Commission. Enlargement Reports (Albania, BiH, Serbia). https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Dem Institute. Democracy Reports – Rule of Law Indicators.
https://www.v-dem.net/publications/democracy-reports/

Kmezić & Bieber (eds.) (2017). The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion. Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. https://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TheCrisisofdemocracy.pdf

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Topic 4: Democratic institutions and executive accountability

Objectives

Democratic institutions and executive-accountability mechanisms determine how political power is exercised, supervised and constrained. They distribute authority across branches of government, subject public officials to legal and institutional oversight, and enable citizens, parliaments, courts, independent bodies, media and civil society to monitor the use of public power.

Accountability operates through complementary channels:

• Horizontal oversight by legislatures, courts and regulatory institutions;
  • Vertical accountability through elections;
  • Public scrutiny by independent watchdogs and the media.

In the Western Balkans, democratic accountability mechanisms are formally established but frequently operate unevenly in practice. Executive dominance, politicised public administration, weakened parliamentary oversight, constrained autonomy of independent institutions and the influence of informal political networks distort institutional balance. Despite differing constitutional arrangements, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia all experience tensions between formal democratic structures and political practices shaped by centralised leadership, patronage networks, institutional fragmentation and uneven administrative capacity.

This topic equips participants to analyse how democratic institutions constrain executive power, assess the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms, understand how political incentives and informal practices shape institutional performance and evaluate realistic reform options for strengthening executive accountability in the Western Balkans. It links constitutional principles to the practical integrity and governance reforms explored in subsequent modules.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to assess how democratic institutions and accountability mechanisms shape executive power in the Western Balkans. They will apply comparative institutional frameworks to analyse parliamentary oversight, independent regulatory bodies and public administration performance in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Participants will distinguish between formal mandates and actual political practices, evaluate how informal networks influence accountability and develop context-sensitive strategies to strengthen executive oversight and democratic governance.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic) This topic should progress from institutional architecture → executive-legislative balance

→ oversight mechanisms → administrative accountability → risks of executive concentration → informal practices → international standards → reform feasibility.

Democratic Institutions and Separation of Powers

Democratic governance relies on the distribution of authority among legislative, executive, and judicial branches to prevent concentration of power and ensure mutual oversight. Parliamentary, presidential and hybrid systems structure executive -legislative relations differently, influencing accountability dynamics.

In many Western Balkan countries, constitutional design formally provides checks and balances. However, executive branches often dominate legislative processes through majority control, agenda-setting authority and political leverage oversight institutions.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether executive – legislative relations in their country are balanced or structurally skewed toward executive dominance.

Parliamentary Oversight and Legislative Accountability

Parliaments are the central democratic arena for representing citizens and holding governments to account. Through questioning ministers, launching inquiries, scrutinising budgets, reviewing legislation, ratifying international agreements and overseeing the security sector, they are designed to act as the main institutional counterweight to executive power.

In the Western Balkans, these functions often operate below their formal potential. Executives frequently exercise strong influence over parliamentary agendas, limiting opportunities for genuine scrutiny. Committee systems tend to be weak and under-resourced, reducing the depth of technical oversight. Political polarisation further undermines accountability by turning oversight procedures into partisan confrontation rather than substantive examination of government actions.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether parliamentary oversight functions as genuine scrutiny or symbolic procedure.

Independent Institutions and Regulatory Oversight

Independent oversight bodies form a crucial layer of democratic accountability, providing scrutiny of executive behaviour and enforcing legal standards across the system. Institutions such as supreme audit offices, ombudspersons, anti-corruption agencies, electoral commissions, data-protection authorities, media regulators and competition bodies are designed to operate at arm’s length from government and to safeguard the integrity of public power.

Their effectiveness, however, depends not only on the mandates written into law but on the conditions under which they operate. Legal independence does not always translate into real autonomy, especially when political actors can influence appointments or shape institutional priorities. Budgetary constraints can limit an institution’s ability to investigate, monitor or sanction wrongdoing. Politicised selection processes can compromise impartiality from the outset, turning bodies meant to check executive power into extensions of it.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to evaluate whether oversight institutions in their country operate independently or remain politically influenced.

Public Administration and Bureaucratic Accountability

Professional public administration is essential for ensuring policy continuity, institutional stability, and impartial delivery of public services. Systems based on meritocratic recruitment, transparent promotion procedures, effective internal controls, performance

management frameworks and protection for whistleblowers provide the foundation for bureaucratic accountability and public trust.

In the Western Balkans, however, these standards are often weakened in practice. Administrative structures are frequently influenced by political parties, leading to forms of party – state fusion that blur the boundary between public institutions and partisan interests. Changes in government are commonly followed by significant staff turnover, indicating politicisation of civil service positions. In addition, performance evaluation systems often remain formalistic. They are established by law but weakly implemented. This limits their ability to ensure professionalism and accountability.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants how politicisation of public administration affects service delivery, policy continuity, and citizen trust.

Executive Dominance, Institutional Capture and Democratic Risks

Executive overreach is an increasing concern in hybrid and weakly consolidated democracies, where formal institutional checks exist but operate unevenly in practice. Concentration of power can emerge when executives dominate parliamentary majorities, exert influence over judicial and regulatory appointments and make strategic use of emergency powers to bypass ordinary oversight mechanisms. Accountability is further weakened when media environments are captured or pressured, limiting independent scrutiny of government actions as well as when regulatory bodies become subject to political or economic influence. Informal coordination between political and business elites can reinforce these dynamics, consolidating power networks that operate beyond formal institutional constraints. Together, these patterns undermine horizontal accountability and heighten the risk of institutional capture.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify warning signs of executive concentration in their national context.

Informal Institutions and Accountability Gaps

Formal accountability mechanisms may be undermined by informal practices such as patronage networks, clientelist exchanges, elite coordination outside institutional channels and political pressure on oversight bodies. These dynamics distort institutional mandates and reduce transparency.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants where informal norms most visibly override formal institutional rules.

International Standards and External Accountability Mechanisms

International frameworks influence domestic accountability systems through monitoring and conditionality mechanisms, including EU accession criteria, Venice Commission standards, GRECO monitoring, SIGMA public administration principles, OECD integrity frameworks, and OSCE governance commitments.

However, formal alignment with international standards does not guarantee behavioural change. External pressure may produce procedural reforms without transforming political incentives.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether international standards meaningfully strengthen domestic accountability or remain procedural benchmarks.

Comparative Institutional Context

Patterns of institutional accountability in the Western Balkans reflect distinct governance structures that shape how executive power is exercised and supervised:

• Albania operates within a unitary system characterised by strong executive leadership and highly disciplined party structures, which tend to centralise decision-making authority;
• Bosnia & Herzegovina presents a markedly different model, defined by fragmented multi-level governance, extensive power-sharing arrangements and ethnic veto mechanisms that complicate coordination and dilute accountability;
• Serbia also functions as a unitary state, but its system is marked by pronounced executive centralisation reinforced by influential informal political and economic networks.

This comparative perspective helps explain why accountability challenges manifest differently across the three countries.

Teaching Note

This topic should be taught as an applied institutional analysis, emphasising how accountability functions in practice rather than how institutions are designed on paper. Trainers should link theory to real political dynamics and use country examples as diagnostic tools to identify where executive power is effectively constrained, where oversight is weak, and how informal practices affect institutional performance. The focus should remain on recognising accountability gaps and assessing realistic reform options.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Albania’s parliamentary system formally establishes checks and balances. However, executive authority remains influential in practice due to disciplined party structures and centralised decision-making. Parliamentary oversight is often limited by majority dominance and political polarisation, which reduce opportunities for substantive scrutiny.

Comprehensive justice reforms have substantially reshaped executive – judicial relations through the vetting of judges and prosecutors and the creation of specialised institutions, including the Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) and new judicial governance bodies. While these reforms have strengthened formal accountability mechanisms, institutional capacity constraints and political pressures continue to affect their effectiveness.

Independent oversight institutions operate under resource limitations, and although public administration reforms have enhanced professionalism, they remain susceptible to politicisation. Informal political networks continue to influence appointments and administrative decision-making, affecting institutional autonomy.

Diagnostic takeaway: Institutional frameworks exist, but executive dominance and politicisation limit effective oversight.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s institutional framework distributes authority across state, entity, cantonal and district levels. While this fragmentation prevents the concentration of executive power at the centre, it complicates coordination and weakens coherent oversight mechanisms.

Parliamentary accountability is constrained by ethnic veto arrangements and prolonged coalition negotiations, which often delay decision-making and dilute responsibility. Independent institutions operate within overlapping jurisdictions, creating coordination challenges and inconsistencies in implementation.

Accountability chains are further fragmented by the significant powers of entity governments and cantonal administrations. In practice, informal ethnic coordination networks frequently bypass formal procedures, shaping political decisions outside institutional channels.

Diagnostic takeaway: Fragmentation constrains executive concentration but weakens coherent oversight and institutional effectiveness.

Serbia

Serbia’s parliamentary system formally establishes checks and balances, yet it functions within a political environment marked by executive centralisation. Strong party discipline and executive influence over parliamentary agendas constrain the legislature’s capacity for effective scrutiny.

Independent oversight institutions operate under persistent challenges, including politicised appointment processes, limited budgetary autonomy, and political pressure that restricts their operational independence. Media capture and sustained electoral dominance further consolidate executive influence by narrowing spaces for public accountability.

Although public administration reforms have introduced formal mechanisms for professionalisation, politicisation and party influence remain prevalent in recruitment, promotion and decision-making processes. Informal political – business networks further blur the boundaries between state authority and partisan interests, weakening institutional neutrality.

Diagnostic takeaway: Executive centralisation and informal networks weaken accountability despite formal democratic structures.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces institutional frameworks, executive-legislative relations, oversight mechanisms and international accountability standards through comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Institutional Accountability Diagnostic Lab (30 min) – Participants map institutional strengths and weaknesses in executive oversight;
   1. Parliamentary Oversight Simulation (25 min) – groups examine legislative tools and political constraints in holding the executive accountable;

• Independent Institutions Vulnerability Scan (30 min) – participants analyse risks of politicisation, capacity gaps, and regulatory capture.
  • Executive Accountability Reform Reflection (20 min) – Plenary discussion assessing feasible institutional reforms under political constraints.

The sequence moves participants from mapping institutional structures to diagnosing weaknesses, simulating oversight dynamics, and evaluating reform feasibility under real political conditions.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which mechanisms of executive accountability can realistically be strengthened through institutional reform, and which require deeper changes in political incentives, informal power structures and public demand for transparency?

Key Takeaways

• Executive accountability relies on a balanced system of institutional checks, including parliamentary oversight, judicial review, independent regulatory bodies and professional public administration;
  • In the Western Balkans, accountability mechanisms are formally established but often weakened by executive dominance, politicisation of institutions and informal power networks;
  • Parliamentary oversight frequently operates below its formal capacity due to agenda control by the executive, weak committee systems and political polarization;
  • Independent institutions require not only legal mandates but also real autonomy, transparent appointment procedures and adequate financial resources to function effectively;
  • Politicised public administration and party – state fusion undermine institutional neutrality, policy continuity and citizen trust;
  • Executive overreach becomes more likely where media capture, regulatory capture and patronage networks weaken horizontal accountability;
  • Strengthening executive accountability requires institutional reforms combined with changes in political incentives, administrative professionalism and public demand for transparency.

List of Literature

I. Foundational Accountability Concepts

O’Donnell, G. (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/horizontal-accountability-in-new-democracies/

II. Institutional Oversight and Executive Accountability

OECD (2021). Public Integrity Handbook.
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2020/05/oecd-public-integrity-handbook_598692a5.html

SIGMA (OECD/EU) (2023). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Transparency International. National Integrity System Assessments.
https://www.transparency.org/en/national-integrity-system-assessments

OECD (2022). Western Balkans Governance Reviews. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/04/multi-dimensional-review-of-the-western-balkans_aae194f5/8824c5db-en.pdf

II.     Western Balkans Governance and Institutional Dynamics

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

Freedom House. Nations in Transit Reports. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit

European Commission. Enlargement and Country Reports. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Topic 5: Contemporary Democratic Challenges: Populism, Disinformation and Hybrid Threats in the Western Balkans

Objectives

Contemporary democratic systems face growing pressures that challenge institutional stability, political pluralism and public trust. Populist governance styles, disinformation ecosystems and hybrid threats reshape how political power is exercised, how citizens perceive democracy, and how institutions function in practice.

In the Western Balkans, these pressures interact with political polarisation, fragile institutions, informal networks and external geopolitical influences. Although Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia maintain formal democratic frameworks, contemporary challenges increasingly affect media environments, political competition, institutional accountability and citizen engagement.

This topic equips participants with analytical tools to:

• understand how populism reshapes political discourse and governance practices
  • assess     how     disinformation     and     media     manipulation                  distort democratic accountability;
  • analyse how hybrid threats exploit institutional vulnerabilities;
  • evaluate institutional and societal resilience to contemporary democratic pressures;
  • assess reform feasibility within politically sensitive and information-contested environments.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to critically assess how contemporary democratic pressures affect governance and institutional accountability in the Western Balkans. They will analyse populist political strategies, diagnose vulnerabilities in

information ecosystems, evaluate institutional exposure to hybrid threats and assess the feasibility of resilience-oriented reforms within politically polarised environments.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This section should be delivered as a structured analytical progression. Trainers should emphasise that contemporary democratic challenges are not isolated phenomena but interlinked pressures affecting governance, institutions, and political behaviour.

Populism and Personalised Governance

Populism operates as a political logic that frames politics as a moral struggle between “the people” and “corrupt elites.” It manifests as discourse, political strategy and governance practice. Populist leaders frequently personalise authority, weaken institutional mediation and present themselves as direct representatives of popular will.

In governance, populism often leads to concentration of executive power, erosion of pluralistic dialogue, weakening of institutional oversight and increased polarisation. Populist narratives may also undermine independent institutions by portraying them as obstacles to popular sovereignty.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to distinguish between populism as rhetoric and populism as institutional practice affecting checks and balances.

Disinformation and Information Environment Distortion

Disinformation involves the deliberate dissemination of misleading or false information to influence political behaviour and public opinion. In contemporary democracies, information manipulation may occur through state-aligned campaigns, partisan media ecosystems, algorithmic amplification and coordinated online networks.

Distorted information environments weaken democratic accountability by undermining informed citizenship, eroding trust in institutions and enabling political actors to avoid scrutiny. Disinformation interacts closely with media capture, political polarisation and public distrust.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse how information manipulation affects electoral integrity, public trust and policy debates.

Hybrid Threats and Institutional Vulnerabilities

Hybrid threats combine political, informational, economic and cyber tools to influence domestic political processes. They may originate from external actors or domestic political networks and often exploit institutional weaknesses and societal divisions.

Hybrid tactics include foreign political financing, strategic disinformation, energy leverage, cyber operations and support for polarising political actors. These practices blur the boundary between security threats and governance challenges.

Trainer guidance: Emphasise that hybrid threats should be analysed not only as security issues but also as risks to institutional accountability and democratic resilience.

Democratic Resilience and Institutional Safeguards

Democratic resilience refers to the capacity of institutions and societies to withstand contemporary pressures while maintaining pluralism, accountability and rule of law standards. Resilience mechanisms include independent media, professional public administration, strong oversight institutions, digital regulation frameworks and active civil society.

Institutional safeguards operate most effectively when supported by political will, legal clarity, administrative capacity and public trust. Weak resilience environments allow populism, disinformation, and hybrid tactics to erode democratic standards.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify early warning indicators of institutional vulnerability and mechanisms that strengthen democratic resilience.

Political Culture, Trust and Societal Vulnerability

Contemporary democratic pressures interact with political culture patterns such as distrust in institutions, polarised identities and clientelist networks. Low social trust increases susceptibility to manipulation, populist narratives, and disinformation. Public perceptions of corruption, inequality and institutional inefficiency create fertile ground for political narratives that challenge liberal democratic norms.

Trainer guidance: Link this discussion to Topic 1 by examining how political culture conditions societal responses to contemporary threats.

Teaching Note

Trainers should guide participants through comparative analysis using four lenses:

(1) political narratives; (2) information environment; (3) institutional vulnerabilities;

(4) external influence vectors. Country Context Applications Albania

Political competition is characterised by strong polarisation and personalised leadership narratives. Political discourse frequently frames competition as a confrontation between entrenched elites and popular mandates, reinforcing adversarial dynamics.

The information environment is influenced by concentrated media ownership and strong alignment between political and media interests. While digital platforms expand access to information, they also facilitate rapid dissemination of polarised narratives and unverified content.

Institutional vulnerabilities arise from politicisation of oversight bodies, limited media independence, and persistent public distrust. Informal political networks influence public administration and regulatory practices.

External influence remains limited compared to regional peers, but economic dependencies and foreign investment flows may shape strategic political decisions.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania’s resilience depends on strengthening media independence, reinforcing oversight institutions, and reducing polarisation-driven governance dynamics.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Political narratives are strongly shaped by identity – based mobilisation and constitutional fragmentation. Populist rhetoric often reinforces ethnic divisions and portrays institutional compromise as a threat to collective interests.

The information environment is fragmented along linguistic and territorial lines, creating parallel media ecosystems with limited cross-community communication. Disinformation often amplifies nationalist narratives and institutional distrust.

Institutional vulnerabilities stem from fragmented governance, overlapping jurisdictions and weak coordination among oversight bodies. Political gridlock limits coherent policy responses to contemporary threats.

External actors maintain significant influence through political, economic, and diplomatic engagement, which may interact with domestic political divisions.

Diagnostic takeaway: Bosnia & Herzegovina’s resilience is constrained by constitutional fragmentation and identity-based politics that amplify institutional vulnerability.

Serbia

Political narratives emphasise strong leadership national stability, and economic development. Populist communication strategies reinforce personalised authority and reduce space for critical institutional oversight.

The information environment is characterised by media concentration, strong pro-government narratives, and limited pluralism in national broadcasting. Disinformation and partisan framing shape public discourse.

Institutional vulnerabilities arise from executive dominance, politicised regulatory institutions and constrained media independence. Informal political-business networks influence information flows and public messaging.

External influence operates through strategic economic partnerships, regional geopolitical positioning and foreign media presence.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s institutional resilience is challenged by executive centralisation, media capture, and close alignment between political authority and information control.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied diagnostic exercises.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces conceptual foundations of populism, disinformation, hybrid threats and democratic resilience. Trainers should link theory to institutional accountability (Topic 4) and political culture (Topic 1).

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Institutional Vulnerability Mapping (30 min.) – participants identify how contemporary pressures affect national institutions and accountability mechanisms;
2. Resilience Strategy Simulation (30 min.) – groups assess which institutional safeguards are technically desirable, politically feasible, and realistically sequenced with their national contexts;

Exercises should prioritise diagnostic reasoning and reform feasibility rather than technical detail.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which contemporary democratic pressures pose the greatest risks to institutional accountability, and which resilience mechanisms can realistically strengthen democratic stability within one political generation?

Key Takeaways

• Contemporary democratic challenges are not isolated phenomena but interconnected pressures that reshape political competition, institutional functioning and citizen trust;
  • Populism affects democracy not only through rhetoric but by altering institutional balances, weakening oversight and personalising executive authority;
  • Disinformation and distorted information environments undermine informed citizenship, reduce accountability and interact closely with media capture and political polarization;
  • Hybrid threats exploit institutional weaknesses and societal divisions, blurring the boundary between security risks and governance challenges;
  • Democratic resilience depends on strong institutions, independent media, professional administration, active civil society and sustained political commitment to rule of law standards;
  • Contemporary democratic pressures interact directly with political culture (Topic 1), institutional accountability (Topic 4) and integrity systems (Module 2), making resilience a cross-cutting governance challenge.

List of Literature

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
%20short%20introduction%20%282nd%20ed%2C%202017%20–%20Oxford%20University%20Press%29.pdf

Levitsky, S. & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown. https://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Levitsky%20%26%20Ziblatt%2C%20Ho w%20Democracies%20Die_%20What%20History%20Reveals%20about%20Our%20F uture%20%282019%20–%20Penguin%20Books%29.pdf

Bennett, W. & Livingston, S. (2020). The Disinformation Age. Cambridge University Press. https://www.ssrc.org/publications/the-disinformation-age-politics-technology-and-disruptive-communication-in-the-united-states/

International IDEA (2023). Global State of Democracy – Western Balkans. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/case-study-western-balkans-gsod-2023-report

NATO StratCom COE. Hybrid Threats and Information Operations Reports. https://stratcomcoe.org/publications?aid[]=20

European Commission (2023 – 2025). Enlargement Country Reports.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Freedom House. Nations in Transit. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit

Council of Europe. Platform for the Safety of Journalists.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/civil-society/platform-for-the-safety-of-journalists

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Module 2: Governance and institutional accountability

Topic 1: Constitutionalism and parliamentary governance

The Objectives

Constitutionalism and parliamentary governance define how political authority is organised, limited, and exercised. Constitutions allocate powers and set the rules for forming and constraining governments. They also provide the institutional foundations for accountability. Parliaments translate these principles into practice through legislation, representation and oversight.

Constitutionalism functions not only as a legal framework but also as a behavioural system. Its effectiveness depends on whether political actors respect institutional limits, comply with rules and uphold democratic norms. Parliamentary governance therefore reflects constitutional design as well as party systems, political incentives, institutional capacity, and informal practices.

In the Western Balkans, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia formally operate under parliamentary constitutional frameworks. However. practice often diverges from constitutional intent. Executive dominance, politicised administration, weak legislative capacity, fragmented constitutional arrangements and informal networks frequently shape how constitutional principles function in reality.

This topic equips participants to analyse how constitutionalism structures democratic authority, how parliamentary governance works in practice, and how political incentives, legislative capacity and informal institutions influence accountability, integrity and reform feasibility.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of the topic, participants will be able to explain how constitutional frameworks and parliamentary governance shape democratic accountability in practice. They will be able to analyse the balance of power between executives and legislatures, assess how oversight and constitutional review function and recognise where constitutional design diverges from day-to-day governance.

They will also understand how party discipline, legislative capacity and informal institutions influence parliamentary performance as well as identify realistic ways to strengthen constitutional governance and legislative accountability within their national contexts.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression from constitutional principles → parliamentary governance → executive-legislative relations → legislative capacity and oversight → constitutional review → informal practices → reform feasibility.

Constitutionalism and the Limitation of Political Power

Constitutionalism rests on the idea that political authority must operate within rules that limit arbitrary power. Constitutions define the basic structure of the state, allocate authority among institutions, protect rights, and set procedures for reviewing and

amending the political order. In democracies, these arrangements create the legal and institutional safeguards that make public authority accountable.

At the same time, constitutionalism is behavioural. Its effectiveness depends on political self-restraint, respect for institutional boundaries, compliance with constitutional court decisions and acceptance that power must remain subject to law even when majorities could act otherwise. A constitution may contain checks and balances yet still fail to constrain power if political actors undermine institutional autonomy or treat constitutional rules instrumentally.

This logic matters directly for accountability. Constitutionalism defines who may govern, under what limits, through which procedures, and under whose scrutiny. These principles become operational through parliamentary governance.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on whether constitutional limits in their country function as effective constraints or primarily as formal legal guarantees.

Parliamentary Governance: Institutional Logic

Parliamentary governance describes how a system actually functions when government authority depends on, and remains accountable to, the legislature. This goes beyond the formal label of a parliamentary republic. A country may have a parliamentary constitution, yet governance remains weak if the legislature exercises little scrutiny, representation, or agenda-setting power.

Parliaments carry three core democratic responsibilities: making laws, representing societal interests and overseeing the executive. Through debates, committee work, budget approval, hearings, and questioning ministers, they are expected to turn constitutional principles into democratic practice. In this sense, parliamentary governance is a primary channel through which constitutional accountability is exercised.

Its quality depends on more than procedures. Effective governance requires strong committees, transparent rules, access to information, independent research support and a professional parliamentary administration. Where these foundations are weak, parliamentary activity becomes procedural rather than substantive. Ultimately, whether these functions operate meaningfully depends heavily on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which parliamentary functions (e.g., legislation, representation or oversight) are strongest and weakest in their national context.

Executive-Legislative Relations and Accountability Dynamics

In parliamentary systems, the executive is accountable to the legislature because it derives its mandate from parliamentary confidence. In practice, however, this formal logic often coexists with executive dominance. Governments with stable majorities typically shape legislative agendas, control the timing of debates and influence committee work. Strong party discipline further limits the autonomy of members of parliament and reduces the legislature’s ability to act as an effective check on the executive.

The balance between executive efficiency and parliamentary accountability is shaped not only by constitutional design but also by party structures, coalition dynamics, agenda-setting rules and broader political incentives. Fragmented parliaments may strengthen bargaining power but can also produce instability and legislative deadlock. Conversely, strong majorities may enhance decisiveness while weakening scrutiny. This tension sits at the core of democratic governance in the region: whether parliament

operates as a genuine arena of accountability or functions largely as an extension of executive authority.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether parliaments in their national context act as effective counterweights to executive power or primarily endorse government initiatives.

Legislative Capacity and Expertise

Even where formal oversight mechanisms exist, their effectiveness depends on legislative capacity. Parliamentary accountability requires more than constitutional authority. It also requires the institutional means to use that authority well. Legislatures need strong committees, access to legal and policy expertise, professional staff support, research services, timely information from government and the ability to scrutinise draft laws and budgets in depth.

In the Western Balkans, weak committee systems, limited analytical capacity, restricted access to policy data and compressed legislative procedures often reduce the quality of scrutiny. Oversight therefore tends to be reactive, politicised or symbolic rather than evidence-based and continuous.

This matters because legislative weakness reinforces executive dominance. When parliaments lack capacity, accountability deficits stem not only from politics but also from institutional underdevelopment.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which capacity gaps most directly weaken parliamentary scrutiny in their country.

Parliamentary Oversight and Legislative Scrutiny

Parliamentary oversight is a core mechanism of democratic accountability. Through questions, hearings, committee inquiries, budget scrutiny, review of appointments and, where relevant, confidence votes, legislatures are expected to monitor government conduct and hold the executive to account.

But oversight is not effective simply because formal tools exist. It depends on whether these instruments are used consistently, supported by evidence and protected from excessive partisan control. Oversight weakens when committees lack autonomy, when governing majorities block scrutiny, when accelerated procedures limit deliberation or when access to information is restricted. Under such conditions, scrutiny may survive institutionally but lose much of its corrective value.

Strong oversight therefore requires legislative autonomy, procedural transparency and a political environment that treats parliament as a site of accountability rather than a forum for majority endorsement. Even robust formal mechanisms can still be distorted by informal practices.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to assess which parliamentary oversight tools function effectively in practice and which operate mainly as formal procedures.

Constitutional Review and Judicial-Parliamentary Interaction

Constitutional courts play a critical role in safeguarding constitutional governance. By reviewing the constitutionality of laws and executive actions, they preserve the hierarchy of norms and help maintain institutional balance. In parliamentary systems, this review also shapes legislative quality by requiring parliament to align its work with constitutional standards.

The effectiveness of judicial review depends on independent appointments, clear constitutional mandates, authoritative jurisprudence and, above all, consistent implementation of court decisions. Where courts operate credibly and their rulings are respected, they reinforce accountability and legal predictability. Where decisions are delayed, ignored or selectively applied, constitutional review loses much of its practical force. For this reason, judicial review should be understood as part of a wider accountability ecosystem linking parliament, the executive and the judiciary.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether constitutional courts in their country meaningfully shape parliamentary behaviour and legislative quality.

Informal Institutions and Parliamentary Governance

Formal constitutional rules rarely tell the full story of how parliamentary governance works. Informal institutions often shape legislative behaviour, oversight dynamics and government formation in ways that are not visible in constitutional texts. These include party-state fusion, informal veto players, clientelist legislative behaviour, informal agenda-setting, patronage-based appointments and coalition management outside formal parliamentary channels.

Such practices can significantly weaken parliamentary autonomy. Informal coordination between party leaders may replace open deliberation. Patronage networks may shape committee appointments and voting behaviour. Executive actors may manage parliamentary majorities through clientelist incentives rather than programmatic cohesion. In fragmented systems, informal coalition management may become more important than formal legislative procedure. Together, these dynamics can contribute to legislative capture and reinforce executive dominance even where formal accountability mechanisms remain in place. For governance analysis, informal institutions are particularly important because they explain why constitutional rules that appear adequate on paper often produce weak accountability in practice.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify where informal practices most visibly shape parliamentary behaviour, agenda-setting or oversight in their national context.

International Standards and Parliamentary Accountability

Constitutional and parliamentary governance in the Western Balkans is shaped not only by domestic institutional design but also by external standards and monitoring frameworks. EU accession criteria, Venice Commission opinions, Council of Europe recommendations, OSCE commitments and SIGMA principles all promote stronger legislative accountability, institutional balance, transparency and rule-of-law compliance.

These frameworks can open reform windows, provide technical benchmarks and increase pressure for legislative and constitutional adjustment. However, external influence has limits. Formal alignment with European standards does not automatically produce behavioural change. Parliamentary strengthening may remain superficial where domestic political incentives favour façade reforms, procedural compliance or selective implementation.

This makes reform feasibility central to analysis. Strengthening constitutional governance is politically viable only where institutional reform aligns, at least partly, with elite incentives, public demand, external pressure and broader political opportunity structures.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether international standards in their country strengthen substantive parliamentary accountability or mainly shape formal institutional design.

Constitutional Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Constitutional and parliamentary reforms are rarely purely technical exercises. Their feasibility depends on political incentives, balance of power, party system configuration, public trust, external pressure and the perceived risks of reform for governing elites. Some reforms may be normatively desirable yet politically unrealistic. Others may be adopted formally but remain behaviourally shallow.

Participants should therefore be encouraged to distinguish between three levels of reform:

1. technically desirable reforms;
2. politically feasible reforms;
3. reforms likely to have real behavioural impact.

This analytical distinction is especially important in the Western Balkans, where façade reforms, selective compliance and externally driven institutional adjustment are recurrent governance patterns.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess under what conditions parliamentary strengthening becomes politically viable and when reforms are likely to remain symbolic.

Teaching Note

This topic should be taught as an applied institutional analysis linking constitutional principles to real governance dynamics. Trainers should guide participants from constitutional design to a structured diagnosis of how parliamentary governance actually functions in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. The focus should be on identifying gaps between formal rules and political practice, understanding how executive dominance and legislative weakness emerge as well as analysing the role of informal institutions in shaping accountability. Participants should also be encouraged to think in terms of politically feasible reforms, not only ideal institutional models.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should guide participants through a structured comparative analysis across four lenses: (a) constitutional design; (b) executive-legislative relations; (c) oversight capacity and (d) informal governance dynamics.

Albania

Albania’s constitution establishes a parliamentary republic with formal checks and balances and a relatively coherent constitutional structure. In practice, however, parliamentary governance is often shaped by centralised party leadership, strong party discipline and recurring political polarisation. Governments typically exercise significant influence over legislative agendas, and the use of accelerated or urgent legislative procedures, especially for significant legislation, has at times reduced the time available for meaningful parliamentary scrutiny and consultation.

Parliamentary oversight is further affected by limited analytical and research capacity within parliamentary committees and by periodic parliamentary boycotts in specific political cycles, which have occasionally weakened the legislature’s ability to perform its representative and accountability functions. At the same time, the justice reform launched in 2016 has altered parts of the constitutional balance through the creation of new judicial

governance bodies and specialised accountability institutions, including SPAK, the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council. These reforms have strengthened elements of the accountability architecture, but they have not fully resolved the broader imbalance between executive influence and parliamentary scrutiny.

Informal political and patronage networks are often reported to influence public appointments, administrative decisions and legislative priorities.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania’s constitutional framework is comparatively coherent, but parliamentary governance continues to face challenges related to executive agenda control, political polarisation, the use of accelerated legislative procedures for significant reforms and persistent informal political influence.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s constitutional architecture, shaped by the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), combines parliamentary governance with extensive territorial and ethnic power-sharing arrangements. Authority is distributed across state, entity, cantonal and district levels. Therefore, parliamentary governance unfolds within a highly fragmented and multi-layered institutional system

This fragmentation limits centralised executive dominance but also weakens coherent accountability. Entity-level executives and cantonal fragmentation complicate legislative coordination, while coalition instability, ethnic veto mechanisms and overlapping mandates frequently produce legislative deadlock. Parliamentary oversight is weakened not only by institutional complexity but also by limited analytical and policy-support capacity within legislatures and by the diffusion of responsibility across multiple levels of governance.

A particularly important constitutional challenge is the uneven or delayed implementation of decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina and relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. This reflects deeper structural challenges in constitutional accountability, where formal adjudication does not always translate into political or institutional compliance.

Diagnostic takeaway: Bosnia & Herzegovina’s constitutional design helps preserve post-conflict balance, but fragmentation, veto structures and the limited implementation of key judicial decisions continue to undermine coherent parliamentary governance and constitutional accountability.

Serbia

Serbia formally operates under a parliamentary constitutional framework, but governance practice is often characterized by strong executive centralization within a dominant-party political system. Parliamentary majorities aligned with the government exercise extensive control over legislative agendas and procedures, reducing opportunities for substantive scrutiny and reinforcing executive influence over legislative outcomes.

Committee systems and parliamentary procedures formally exist. Nevertheless, parliamentary oversight often remains limited in practice. This institutional pattern is reinforced by concerns regarding media pluralism and the concentration of influence over major media outlets, which can narrow public accountability and strengthen executive control over the broader political environment. The 2022 constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary addressed certain formal aspects of judicial independence, but

their behavioural impact has so far remained limited in a context where political influence and informal governance patterns continue to affect institutional autonomy.

Informal political and business networks are often reported to influence legislative priorities, regulatory decisions and the relationship between party structures and state institutions.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s formal parliamentary framework coexists with strong executive centralisation, dominant-party control, constrained media pluralism and informal governance patterns that continue to weaken legislative accountability.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces constitutionalism, parliamentary governance, executive-legislative relations, legislative capacity, constitutional review and reform feasibility through comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Constitutional Governance Diagnostic Lab (30 min.)

Participants analyse the distribution of power within constitutional systems and identify strengths and weaknesses in parliamentary governance;

• Parliamentary Oversight Simulation (30 min.)

Participants examine legislative tools, political incentives and institutional constraints affecting executive oversight;

• Legislative Capacity and Oversight Mapping (20 min.)

Participants assess committee strength, research capacity, information access and procedural conditions necessary for meaningful scrutiny.

These exercises help participants move from constitutional theory to practical diagnosis of parliamentary performance, accountability gaps and reform feasibility.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which aspects of constitutional and parliamentary governance can realistically be strengthened through institutional reform, and which depend on deeper changes in political incentives, party systems, informal practices and public expectations of accountability?

Key Takeaways

• Constitutionalism limits public power through legal rules, institutional constraints and democratic norms, but its effectiveness also depends on behavioural compliance and political restraint.
  • Parliamentary governance is the practical arena through which constitutional accountability is exercised, linking legislation, representation and executive oversight.
  • In the Western Balkans, parliamentary accountability is often weakened not only by executive dominance and party discipline, but also by limited legislative capacity and constrained scrutiny procedures.
  • Informal institutions such as party-state fusion, clientelism, informal agenda-setting and coalition bargaining frequently shape parliamentary performance more strongly than formal rules suggest.

• Western Balkan countries share common accountability challenges, but these manifest differently depending on constitutional structure, fragmentation and political incentives.
  • Strengthening constitutional governance requires both institutional reform and changes in political behaviour, legislative professionalism and public demand for accountability.

List of Literature

I. Foundational Constitutionalism and Democracy

Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. (2018). How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA Law Review. https://scispace.com/pdf/how-to-save-a-constitutional-democracy-5g7brheqqc.pdf

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. http://digamo.free.fr/lijphart99.pdf

Landau, D. (2013). Abusive Constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Review, Volume 47. https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/archives/47/1/abusive-constitutionalism

Stone Sweet, A. (2000). Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford University Press. https://images.irpa.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/1_Che-cosa-sono-le-corti-costituzionali-corti-marshalliane-e-corti-kelseniane_2006-II-1-491.pdf

II. Parliamentary Governance and Accountability

Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 37: 261-289. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00513

Norton, P. (2013). Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe. Routledge. https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9781135254667_A23789249/preview-9781135254667_A23789249.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU) (2023). The Principles of Public Administration.
https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Venice Commission. Selected opinions on constitutional and parliamentary governance. https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/all-opinions-and-studies

III.  Western Balkans Governance Context

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

European Commission (2023 – 2025). Enlargement Country Reports.https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Freedom House. Nations in Transit. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit

Topic 2: Judicial independence and access to justice

The Objectives

This topic explores how judicial independence and access to justice underpin democratic accountability and the rule of law. It examines how courts, prosecutors and judicial governance institutions function in practice, and how institutional capacity, political incentives and informal governance dynamics influence the delivery of justice in the Western Balkans.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how judicial independence enables courts to limit arbitrary power and protect constitutional rights. They will gain insight into how judicial councils, appointment procedures, prosecutorial autonomy and court administration shape the functioning of justice systems. Participants will also be able to analyse barriers to access to justice, including cost, delay, procedural complexity and enforcement gaps as well as assess how political incentives and informal institutional dynamics influence judicial behaviour. Through this perspective, they will be better equipped to evaluate realistic pathways for strengthening judicial independence and improving justice delivery in their national contexts.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: constitutional guarantees → judicial independence → prosecutorial autonomy → court administration and capacity → access to justice → informal practices → international standards → reform feasibility

Constitutional Guarantees and the Role of the Judiciary

Constitutions across the Western Balkans formally guarantee judicial independence, separation of powers and the right to an effective legal remedy. These provisions establish courts as a co-equal branch of government responsible for interpreting the law, resolving disputes and reviewing the actions of executive and legislative authorities.

In principle, constitutional guarantees protect judges from political interference and ensure that individuals can challenge violations of their rights through independent courts. These safeguards form the legal foundation of democratic accountability and the rule of law. However, constitutional guarantees alone do not automatically ensure judicial independence. Their effectiveness depends on political respect for judicial authority, institutional autonomy of judicial governance bodies and the consistent enforcement of judicial decisions.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether constitutional guarantees in their country translate into meaningful judicial autonomy or remain primarily formal commitments.

Judicial Independence: Structural and Behavioural Dimensions

Judicial independence operates through both institutional safeguards and professional behaviour. Structural independence refers to the institutional arrangements that protect courts from external influence. These include transparent appointment procedures, security of judicial tenure, adequate remuneration, financial autonomy and independent judicial governance bodies such as judicial councils.

Behavioural independence refers to the willingness and ability of judges to decide cases impartially, resist political pressure and apply the law consistently even when decisions may affect powerful actors.

A justice system may formally guarantee structural independence but still experience weak behavioural independence if political pressure, career incentives or institutional culture discourage judges from acting autonomously. Understanding the relationship between institutional safeguards and judicial behaviour is therefore essential when analysing the functioning of judicial systems.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which structural safeguards in their country are strongest and which appear most vulnerable to political influence.

Prosecutorial Autonomy and the Enforcement of Law

Prosecutors play a central role in enforcing the law and ensuring accountability for corruption, organised crime and abuse of public authority. Their independence is therefore a critical component of the rule of law.

Prosecutorial autonomy depends on transparent appointment and dismissal procedures, independence from political actors and professional capacity to investigate complex cases. Internal rules governing case allocation and prosecutorial hierarchy also influence the degree to which prosecutors can operate independently.

In several Western Balkan systems, concerns persist regarding political influence over prosecutorial priorities, selective enforcement of laws and limited investigative resources. These factors can weaken public confidence in the impartial enforcement of justice.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on whether prosecutorial decisions in their country appear impartial or influenced by political considerations.

Court Administration, Capacity and Ef𝑓iciency

The effectiveness of justice systems depends not only on judicial independence but also on the administrative capacity of courts. Even where judges operate within formally independent institutions, inefficient court administration can significantly undermine access to justice and public confidence in legal institutions.

Efficient justice systems require adequate staffing, professional court administration and reliable case-management systems. Digitalisation of judicial procedures, transparent publication of court decisions and effective enforcement mechanisms are also important elements of modern judicial governance.

Across the Western Balkans, courts frequently face challenges such as case backlogs, uneven distribution of judges, limited administrative capacity and incomplete digitalisation of judicial processes. These constraints contribute to delays in case resolution and reduce the predictability of judicial outcomes.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which administrative bottlenecks most directly affect justice delivery in their national context.

Access to Justice: Rights, Barriers and Remedies

Access to justice refers to the ability of individuals and communities to understand, access and effectively use legal mechanisms to protect their rights. It ensures that legal rights are not merely formal guarantees but can be enforced through accessible and effective institutions.

In practice, multiple structural and social factors shape access to justice. High legal costs, complex procedural rules and lengthy judicial proceedings can discourage individuals from pursuing legal claims. Limited availability of legal aid further restricts access for economically disadvantaged groups.

Inconsistent enforcement of judicial decisions also weakens the effectiveness of legal remedies. When court judgments are not implemented in practice, public trust in judicial institutions declines and citizens may become reluctant to pursue legal avenues for dispute resolution.

These barriers tend to affect vulnerable groups disproportionately and may reinforce existing social inequalities.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse which groups in their country face the greatest obstacles in accessing justice and why.

Informal Institutions and Judicial Governance

Formal legal frameworks define how judicial systems are organised, but informal institutional dynamics often influence how justice is delivered in practice. Informal networks, professional hierarchies and political relationships may shape judicial behaviour in ways that remain outside official legal frameworks. In some contexts, political actors attempt to influence judicial appointments, disciplinary procedures or prosecutorial priorities through informal channels. Patronage networks within judicial institutions may affect career advancement, case allocation or administrative decisions. Selective enforcement of laws and informal coordination between political and judicial actors can further weaken perceptions of judicial neutrality.

These informal governance patterns often coexist with formally independent institutions. As a result, the credibility of judicial independence depends not only on institutional design but also on transparency, professional ethics and the broader political environment in which courts operate.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify where informal practices most visibly affect judicial decision-making in their national context.

International Standards and External Accountability

Judicial independence and access to justice in the Western Balkans are influenced by international rule-of-law standards and monitoring frameworks. These include European Union accession requirements under Chapters 23 and 24, Venice Commission opinions on judicial reform, GRECO anti-corruption evaluations, CEPEJ reports on judicial efficiency and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. These frameworks establish benchmarks for judicial governance, court efficiency and fair trial guarantees while also creating external incentives for institutional reform.

However, formal alignment with international standards does not automatically produce behavioural change. Selective implementation, reform fatigue and domestic political resistance often limit the transformative impact of these frameworks.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether external standards in their country produce substantive improvements or primarily formal compliance.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Judicial reform is politically sensitive because it affects the distribution of power within the state and strengthens institutions capable of holding governing actors accountable. As a result, reforms designed to strengthen judicial independence may face resistance from political elites who perceive independent courts as a constraint on executive authority.

The feasibility of judicial reform therefore depends not only on technical institutional design but also on broader political incentives. Public demand for justice reform,

international pressure, domestic political competition and institutional capacity all shape the likelihood that reforms will be implemented effectively. In many cases, reforms are adopted formally but implemented only partially. Distinguishing between technically desirable reforms and politically feasible reforms is therefore essential when analysing prospects for strengthening judicial independence.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to examine which reforms in their country have produced meaningful change and which have remained largely symbolic.

Teaching Note

This topic should guide participants from constitutional guarantees of judicial independence toward a practical diagnosis of how courts, prosecutors and judicial councils function in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Trainers should focus on the gap between formal institutional safeguards and real-world practice, encouraging participants to analyse how political incentives, institutional capacity and informal governance dynamics influence access to justice.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should guide participants through comparative analysis across four dimensions:

(1) judicial independence; (2) prosecutorial autonomy; (3) access to justice; (4) informal governance dynamics.

Albania

Albania launched one of the most comprehensive justice reform processes in the Western Balkans through constitutional amendments adopted in 2016. The reform introduced new judicial governance bodies such as the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council. It also established the Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) to investigate and prosecute high-level corruption and organised crime.

A nationwide vetting process assessed the integrity and professionalism of judges and prosecutors, removing a significant number of magistrates who failed to meet professional or integrity standards. While this process strengthened judicial integrity and accountability, it also created temporary capacity shortages within the judiciary, contributing to case backlogs and delays in judicial proceedings.

Although the institutional framework for judicial independence has improved significantly, challenges remain in strengthening court efficiency, ensuring consistent behavioural independence and expanding access to legal aid.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania has made substantial structural progress in strengthening judicial independence, but capacity constraints, case backlogs and uneven behavioural independence continue to affect access to justice.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina operates a highly decentralised judicial system shaped by the constitutional arrangements established by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Courts and prosecutorial institutions exist at state, entity, cantonal and district levels, resulting in a fragmented and complex institutional landscape.

The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) plays a central role in managing appointments, promotions and disciplinary procedures across the country. While intended to safeguard judicial independence, the council has faced criticism regarding transparency, governance practices and potential political influence.

Access to justice remains uneven across jurisdictions due to differences in administrative capacity and legal aid availability. Challenges related to the implementation of Constitutional Court decisions and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights further illustrate structural obstacles affecting judicial authority.

Diagnostic takeaway: Institutional fragmentation and governance challenges within judicial oversight bodies continue to affect judicial independence and consistent access to justice.

Serbia

Serbia formally guarantees judicial independence through constitutional provisions and judicial governance institutions. Constitutional amendments adopted in 2022 sought to strengthen these safeguards by modifying appointment procedures and reducing direct parliamentary influence in the selection of judges and prosecutors.

Despite these reforms, international assessments frequently highlight concerns regarding political influence over judicial governance, selective prosecution and limited autonomy of judicial institutions. Public trust in courts remains relatively low, reflecting perceptions of political influence and inconsistent enforcement of judicial decisions. Access to justice is also affected by procedural delays, limited legal aid availability and administrative inefficiencies.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia has strengthened formal institutional safeguards, but behavioural independence of judicial actors and effective prosecutorial autonomy remain influenced by broader political dynamics.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces judicial independence, prosecutorial autonomy, court administration, access to justice, informal governance dynamics and reform feasibility through comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Judicial Independence Diagnostic Lab (30 min)

Participants analyse structural and behavioural dimensions of judicial independence.

• Access to Justice Vulnerability Scan (30 min)

Participants identify barriers to justice including cost, delay, complexity and enforcement gaps.

• Reform Feasibility Simulation (20 min)

Groups evaluate which reforms are technically desirable, politically feasible and capable of producing meaningful institutional change.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which aspects of judicial independence and access to justice can realistically be strengthened through institutional reform, and which depend on deeper changes in political incentives, professional culture and public expectations of fairness?

Key Takeaway

• Judicial independence is a cornerstone of democratic governance and limits arbitrary exercise of power
  • Structural safeguards must be complemented by behavioural independence of judges and prosecutors;
  • Efficient court administration and enforcement of judgments are essential for meaningful access to justice;
  • Informal political influence and institutional culture often shape judicial outcomes alongside formal legal frameworks;
  • Sustainable judicial reform requires institutional capacity, political commitment and public trust in the fairness of the justice system.

List of Literature

Bingham, T. (2010). The Rule of Law. London; New York: Allen Lane. https://archive.org/details/ruleoflaw0000bing

Garoupa, N., & Ginsburg, T. (2009). Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence. American Journal of Comparative Law.

Tamanaha, B. (2004). On the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. https://ppotoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/On-The-Rule-of-Law.pdf

European Commission. EU Enlargement Reports – Rule of Law Chapters (23 and 24).
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership/chapters-acquis_en

GRECO. Evaluation Reports on Corruption Prevention.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations

World Justice Project. Rule of Law Index. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Topic 3: Decentralisation and local governance

The Objectives

This topic examines how decentralisation distributes public authority across levels of government and how local governance influences democratic accountability, service delivery and citizen participation. It explores how political, administrative and fiscal autonomy are structured within decentralised systems and how central-local relations, institutional capacity and informal governance dynamics shape local governance outcomes. Particular attention is given to how decentralisation operates in practice in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, where formal frameworks broadly reflect European principles but implementation remains uneven.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how decentralisation structures the distribution of authority within the state and how local governance contributes to democratic accountability. Participants will be able to analyse political, administrative and fiscal dimensions of decentralization. They will also be able to assess the relationship between central and local governments, identify institutional and capacity constraints affecting service delivery and evaluate how informal practices, political incentives and limited fiscal autonomy shape local governance outcomes. They will also be able to identify realistic pathways for strengthening local accountability and improving multi-level governance in their national contexts.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: constitutional and legal frameworks → political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation → central-local relations → local capacity and service delivery → accountability mechanisms → informal governance practices → international standards → reform feasibility.

Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Decentralisation

Decentralisation is grounded in constitutional and legal frameworks that define how authority is distributed between central and local levels of government. These frameworks typically establish the autonomy of local governments, the principle of subsidiarity, the scope of municipal competencies and the mechanisms through which central authorities exercise supervision or oversight.

Across the Western Balkans, decentralisation frameworks formally align with European governance principles, especially through the influence of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and related public administration standards. At the same time, central governments often retain significant regulatory and fiscal influence, which can reduce the practical autonomy of municipalities.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether decentralisation in their country represents a meaningful transfer of authority or primarily a formal legal commitment with limited practical autonomy.

Dimensions of Decentralisation: Political, Administrative and Fiscal

Decentralisation consists of three interrelated dimensions:

1. Political decentralisation refers to elected municipal councils and mayors, local political competition and opportunities for citizen participation;
2. Administrative decentralisation concerns the transfer of responsibilities for service delivery, local administration and implementation of public policies;
3. Fiscal decentralisation concerns local revenue sources, intergovernmental transfers, borrowing rules and municipal financial management.

In much of the Western Balkans, political decentralisation is more advanced than the administrative and fiscal dimensions. Municipalities often have elected institutions, but their ability to manage services effectively remains constrained by limited staffing, uneven capacity and insufficiently predictable financing. Regional SIGMA analysis also points to limited consultation practices and weakly developed inter-municipal co-operation across the region.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which dimension of decentralisation is most developed and which remains most constrained in their national context.

Central-Local Relations and Multi-Level Governance

Effective decentralisation requires a clear division of competences and constructive co-operation between central and local governments. In practice, however, central-local relations in the region are often shaped by detailed central regulation of local functions, discretionary supervision, weak consultation and fragmented responsibilities across tiers of government.

These dynamics often create a paradox of decentralization – municipalities are formally responsible for delivering services but may lack the resources, staffing or decision-making autonomy needed to do so effectively. Recent SIGMA work on multi-level governance in the Western Balkans highlights continued weaknesses in consultation, fiscal autonomy and intergovernmental co-ordination.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse whether central oversight in their country supports effective governance or primarily constrains local autonomy.

Local Capacity and Service Delivery

The effectiveness of decentralised governance depends heavily on the administrative and technical capacity of local governments. Municipalities require professional staff, planning capacity, financial management systems, procurement systems, data access and administrative infrastructure in order to provide public services effectively.

Across the Western Balkans, capacity differences between municipalities are pronounced. Larger urban municipalities generally have stronger institutional resources, while smaller municipalities often face staff shortages, weak financial management and lower digitalisation. These disparities translate into uneven service quality and uneven local development outcomes. SIGMA reporting also identifies insufficient personnel capacity, uneven public financial management systems and underdeveloped inter-municipal co-operation as recurring regional problems.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which capacity gaps most directly affect municipal governance and service delivery in their country.

Accountability Mechanisms in Local Governance

Local accountability operates through several channels, including competitive local elections, transparency and public participation, internal audit and financial oversight, central supervision and performance monitoring of municipal institutions.

Where these mechanisms function effectively, they strengthen public trust and responsiveness. Accountability weakens, however, when local councils lack independence from executive authorities, transparency rules are poorly enforced or oversight bodies lack the capacity to monitor municipal performance effectively. In such cases, decentralisation may exist formally while accountability remains shallow in practice.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse which accountability mechanisms operate meaningfully in their national context and which remain largely formal.

Informal Institutions and Local Governance

Formal decentralisation frameworks frequently coexist with informal governance practices that shape how local institutions operate in practice. These may include patronage networks influencing municipal hiring, politically motivated allocation of grants or investments, party-state fusion at the local level and informal bargaining between central and local elites. Such practices can distort the intended goals of decentralisation by weakening local autonomy and creating unequal access to services or

resources. Where local political competition is heavily shaped by party hierarchies or clientelistic relationships, decentralisation may strengthen local elite capture rather than citizen accountability. This pattern is consistent with broader regional governance concerns identified in EU and SIGMA assessments.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify where informal political practices most visibly influence local governance in their national context.

International Standards and External Drivers of Reform

Decentralisation reforms in the Western Balkans are influenced by several international frameworks and policy benchmarks. The European Charter of Local Self-Government sets out principles of local autonomy, subsidiarity and financial independence. The SIGMA Principles of Public Administration include a multi-level governance dimension and emphasise adequate fiscal autonomy and clear accountability relationships. EU accession processes also encourage reforms related to local self-government, fiscal transparency and co-ordination across levels of government. While these frameworks provide important benchmarks, their practical effect depends on domestic political commitment, administrative capacity and whether reforms align with national political incentives.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether international standards drive substantive improvements in local governance or primarily formal legal alignment.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Decentralisation reforms are politically sensitive because they redistribute authority, resources and influence within the state. Central governments may be reluctant to transfer meaningful powers or revenues if doing so reduces political control or strengthens rival actors at the local level.

The feasibility of decentralisation therefore depends on political incentives at both central and local levels, fiscal constraints, administrative capacity and public demand for local accountability. External pressure from the EU and international partners can support reform, but domestic political dynamics ultimately determine whether reform produces meaningful institutional change or remains selective and symbolic. Recent regional analysis continues to identify fiscal decentralisation and institutionalised consultation as major unresolved issues.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to evaluate which decentralisation reforms in their country have produced real governance improvements and which remain largely symbolic.

Teaching Note

This topic should guide participants from the constitutional and legal foundations of decentralisation toward a practical diagnosis of how local governance operates in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Trainers should emphasise the gap between formal decentralisation frameworks and actual governance practices, focusing on fiscal constraints, administrative capacity, political incentives and informal governance dynamics.

Participants should be encouraged to analyse decentralisation not only as an institutional design issue but also as a political process shaped by incentives and power relations.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should guide participants through comparative analysis across four dimensions:

(1) decentralisation frameworks; (2) central-local relations; (3) local capacity and service delivery; (4) informal governance dynamics.

Albania

Albania has undertaken significant territorial and administrative reforms, most notably the 2015 territorial consolidation, which reduced the number of municipalities from 373 to 61 in order to improve administrative capacity and service delivery. Political decentralisation is established through elected municipal institutions, but municipalities continue to face limited and unstable financial resources, uneven digitalisation and varying administrative capacity. The European Commission’s 2024 and 2025 reports note limited progress in implementing the Cross-cutting Strategy on Decentralisation and Local Governance 2023 – 2030, continuing concerns over the division of responsibilities between central and local government, and the need to strengthen inter-municipal co-operation. SIGMA also notes that local own revenues account for about 41% of total municipal budgets, showing some revenue capacity but continued dependence on central transfers and uneven municipal performance.

Central oversight remains strong, and consultation between central and local authorities is not always systematic. Informal political influence and party-aligned appointments are also reported to shape local governance outcomes.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania has a relatively coherent decentralisation framework, but limited fiscal autonomy, uneven municipal capacity, low digitalisation and informal political dynamics continue to constrain effective local governance.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina has one of Europe’s most complex multi-level governance systems, with authority distributed across the state, two entities, ten cantons in the Federation, Brcˇko District and municipalities. This fragmentation creates overlapping competences, uneven fiscal arrangements and significant co-ordination challenges across government tiers. EU reporting continues to describe reform dynamics as uneven and politically stalled, while SIGMA highlights broad public administration and co-ordination weaknesses that affect the quality of governance across levels.

Local governments operate within highly differentiated governance frameworks and service delivery conditions vary significantly across entities and cantons. Political fragmentation, identity-based power sharing and intergovernmental bargaining can weaken accountability and coherent policy implementation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Institutional fragmentation, uneven fiscal and administrative arrangements, and political complexity undermine coherent decentralisation and weaken local accountability and service delivery in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Serbia

Serbia formally operates a system of local self-government, but decentralisation remains limited in practice. Municipalities and cities are responsible for a range of local services and development functions, yet they remain heavily dependent on central transfers and constrained by significant central regulatory influence. The European Commission’s 2025 report explicitly calls for implementing the local-self-government component of public administration reform through the necessary financial and fiscal decentralisation. SIGMA

likewise indicates that decentralisation and multi-level governance remain areas requiring stronger implementation.

Administrative capacity varies widely between municipalities, with smaller local governments facing greater staffing and resource constraints. Political alignment between central and local authorities, dominant-party structures and informal political networks continue to shape local appointments, procurement and resource allocation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s formal local self-government framework coexists with strong central influence, limited fiscal autonomy and uneven municipal capacity, which continue to constrain effective local accountability.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces decentralisation frameworks, multi-level governance, fiscal autonomy, central-local relations, municipal capacity and reform feasibility using comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Decentralisation Diagnostic Lab (30 minutes)

Participants map political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation in their country.

• Local Capacity and Service Delivery Mapping (30 minutes)

Participants identify administrative and financial constraints affecting municipal governance.

• Reform Feasibility Simulation (20 min)

Participants evaluate which decentralisation reforms are desirable, feasible and likely to produce meaningful governance improvements.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which aspects of decentralisation and local governance can realistically be strengthened through institutional reform, and which depend on deeper changes in political incentives, fiscal arrangements and informal governance practices?

Key Takeaways

• Decentralisation brings decision-making closer to citizens but requires political, administrative and fiscal autonomy to function effectively;
  • Local governance quality depends on institutional capacity, financial resources and accountability mechanisms;
  • In the Western Balkans, decentralisation frameworks often align with European standards, but implementation remains uneven and fiscal decentralisation limited;
  • Informal political dynamics frequently shape local governance more strongly than formal institutional rules;
  • Sustainable decentralisation requires both institutional reforms and shifts in political incentives and administrative professionalism.

List of Literature

Council of Europe. European Charter of Local Self-Government. https://www.coe.int/en/web/impact-convention-human-rights/european-charter-of-local-self-government#/

European Commission. Albania Report 2024 and Albania Report 2025 – sections on local self-government/decentralisation.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-8748-9058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf;
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/albania-report-2025_en

European Commission. Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2024 – public administration reform and multi-level governance context.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/451db011-6779-40ea-b34b-a0eeda451746_en?filename=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202024.pdf

European Commission. Serbia Report 2025 – local self-government and fiscal decentralisation. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921a-c60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). The Principles of Public Administration (2023), especially Principle 14 on multi-level governance and Principle 32 on fiscal autonomy/resources. https://www.sigmaweb.org/content/dam/sigma/en/publications/reports/2023/11/th e-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805/7f5ec453-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in Albania 2024. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/01/public-administration-in-albania-2024_9ec56245/5577d117-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/03/public-administration-in-the-western-balkans-2024_07555c85/1ec4c18f-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in Serbia 2024. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/public-administration-in-serbia-2024_02001fe4-en.html

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in the Western Balkans 2024. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/public-administration-in-the-western-balkans-2024_1ec4c18f-en.html

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Inter-municipal Co-operation in the Western Balkans (2024). https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/inter-municipal-co-operation-in-the-western-balkans_a78a01e6-en.html

SIGMA. Implementation and Challenges of Multi-level Governance in the Western Balkans (2025). https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/implementation-and-challenges-of-multi-level-governance-in-the-western-balkans_32891a8f-en.html

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Hirkic´, M. (2025). Crisis partnership with China? Evidence from a survey experiment in Sarajevo and Tuzla. In: Recalibrating the global compass: China and shared future in a fragmented world (Dialogues on China, Vol. 5, Article 28, pp. 502–

524). https://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_ser/iipe_dijalozi_kina/2025-5/iipe_dijalozi_kina-2025-5-ch28.pdf

Topic 4: Public administration professionalism and executive accountability

The Objectives

This topic examines how a professional public administration supports democratic governance, policy continuity and executive accountability. It explores how merit-based civil service systems, executive co-ordination, internal accountability arrangements, ethics safeguards and administrative capacity shape the functioning of the executive branch, and how political incentives and informal governance practices affect professionalism in the Western Balkans. Across Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, formal reform frameworks are in place, but implementation remains uneven and politicisation continues to affect administrative practice

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how public administration professionalism contributes to democratic accountability by ensuring neutrality, competence and continuity in executive governance. They will be able to analyse how recruitment systems, senior civil service management, executive co-ordination, internal controls and ethics arrangements influence the performance of government institutions. They will also be able to assess how politicisation, weak managerial accountability, fragmented administrative structures, limited use of evidence-based policymaking and informal networks shape executive behaviour in practice. Through this perspective, participants will be better equipped to identify realistic pathways for strengthening professional and accountable administration within their national contexts.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: constitutional and legal foundations of public administration → professionalism and merit-based civil service → executive accountability and internal controls → executive co-ordination and policy implementation → digitalisation and service modernisation → ethics and politicisation risks → informal practices → international standards → reform feasibility.

Public Administration Professionalism and Executive Accountability: Conceptual Relationship

Public administration professionalism and executive accountability are closely related but analytically distinct. Professionalism refers to the degree to which the administration operates on the basis of merit, neutrality, competence and continuity. It concerns whether civil servants are recruited, promoted and managed according to professional standards rather than partisan loyalty.

Executive accountability, by contrast, refers to the mechanisms that constrain political leadership and ensure that executive power is exercised lawfully and responsibly. These mechanisms include internal controls, managerial accountability, audit, complaint systems, administrative review and external oversight by parliaments, courts and independent institutions.

The relationship between the two is central to democratic governance. Without a professional administration, executive accountability weakens because political decisions are implemented through politicised or ineffective structures. Without accountability, professionalism becomes fragile because merit systems can be overridden by political pressure. As discussed in Topic 1, Module 2, executive dominance can weaken

parliamentary oversight. Therefore, Topic 4, Module 2 examines how politicised administration can deepen that imbalance.

Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Public Administration

Professional public administration is grounded in constitutional and legal frameworks that define the role of the civil service, regulate executive institutions and establish principles of legality, neutrality and accountability. In democratic systems, the administration is expected to serve the public interest rather than partisan or private interests.

These frameworks typically govern civil service recruitment, rights and obligations of officials, disciplinary procedures, internal hierarchy and administrative review. Across the Western Balkans, legal frameworks broadly recognise merit-based civil service and administrative accountability, but implementation remains uneven, especially where secondary legislation, enforcement mechanisms or institutional co-ordination are weak.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether legal frameworks in their country genuinely protect professional administration or mainly establish formal standards with uneven application.

Merit-Based Civil Service and Administrative Professionalism

A professional public administration depends on recruitment, promotion and dismissal systems based on merit, competence and transparent procedures. These systems are designed to preserve continuity, institutional memory and equality of access to public employment while limiting patronage and discretionary appointments.

Professionalism also depends on performance management, training systems, job classification, remuneration, protection from arbitrary dismissal and the professionalism of senior civil servants. In practice, recent SIGMA monitoring shows that formal recruitment rules in the region often coexist with weak implementation, broad use of temporary or acting appointments, limited strategic HR management and continuing political influence over senior posts.

This has wider democratic consequences. A politicised administration weakens trust in state institutions and increases vulnerability to corruption and misuse of office. By contrast, professional administration supports rule-of-law reforms because it provides the institutional continuity needed to implement legal and judicial decisions consistently.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which aspects of professionalism in their administration are most effectively protected and which remain most vulnerable to political influence.

Executive Co-ordination and Policy Implementation

Professional administration is also essential for executive co-ordination and policy implementation. Ministries and central agencies need clear mandates, functioning centre-of-government structures, strategic planning capacity and reliable administrative procedures in order to translate political priorities into coherent public policy.

Where executive co-ordination works well, governments are more likely to use regulatory impact assessment, evidence-based policymaking, inter-ministerial consultation and implementation monitoring effectively. Where co-ordination is weak, overlapping mandates, fragmented responsibilities and poor follow-up can lead to inconsistent policy execution and reactive decision-making.

Recent SIGMA assessments continue to highlight weaknesses across the region in policy development, centre-of-government functions, evidence use and co-ordination, although Albania performs somewhat better than some regional peers in several of these areas.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify where executive co-ordination fails in their national context and whether these failures are institutional, political or both.

Accountability and Oversight within Public Administration

Executive accountability depends not only on parliaments and courts, but also on internal administrative accountability. Public administration systems require clear managerial responsibility, internal audit, financial inspection, complaint handling, administrative review and disciplinary mechanisms in order to ensure lawful and efficient conduct. These instruments play different roles:

• Internal audit focuses on risk management, internal control and system improvement;
• Financial inspection is more concerned with compliance, misuse of funds and financial irregularities;
• Administrative review allows executive decisions to be challenged within the administration before matters proceed to judicial review;
• Senior    civil    service    accountability     is     particularly                  important           because                 top administrative managers link political direction to implementation capacity.

Across the Western Balkans, managerial accountability remains a weak point. Recent SIGMA and EU Commission reporting points to limited delegation, blurred responsibility lines, weak performance management and insufficient use of accountability tools in practice.

Weak internal accountability has broader governance effects. It increases corruption risks, weakens administrative learning and reduces the capacity of the executive to correct poor performance before problems escalate into political or legal crises.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether internal accountability in their administration functions as a meaningful control mechanism or remains largely procedural.

Digitalisation and Administrative Modernisation

Digitalisation has become a major driver of public administration reform across the region. E-services, digital registries, interoperable databases and more transparent workflow systems can improve efficiency, reduce discretion in routine procedures and increase traceability of administrative decisions.

At the same time, digitalisation does not automatically depoliticise administration. Digital tools can improve service delivery and transparency, but they must be accompanied by stronger institutions, reliable data governance, user access and accountability mechanisms. Recent SIGMA monitoring treats service delivery and digitalisation as one of the core areas of public administration performance, highlighting both progress and persistent gaps across the Western Balkans.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on whether digitalisation in their country has improved professionalism and accountability or mainly modernised service interfaces.

Ethics, Integrity and Risks of Politicisation

Administrative professionalism depends not only on competence but also on ethical standards  and  integrity  safeguards.  Codes  of  ethics,  conflict-of-interest  rules, whistleblower protection, asset declaration systems and disciplinary procedures all contribute to a culture of lawful and impartial administration. Nevertheless, public administrations in the Western Balkans continue to face significant politicisation risks. Political influence over recruitment, promotion, dismissal or resource allocation can undermine neutrality and reinforce party-state fusion. Such patterns weaken public trust and can distort administrative decisions in favour of partisan or private interests rather than public purposes. Recent official assessments continue to stress the need for more professional and depoliticised civil services, especially in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, while Albania also faces continuing challenges in consistent merit implementation and managerial accountability.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to distinguish between isolated integrity failures and deeper patterns of politicisation affecting institutional performance.

Informal Institutions and Administrative Governance

Formal rules rarely explain the whole functioning of executive institutions. Informal practices often shape recruitment, career progression, co-ordination and accountability more strongly than legal frameworks suggest. These may include patronage networks, politically motivated appointments, informal instructions overriding procedures and unequal access to administrative resources. Such practices distort merit systems by rewarding loyalty over competence. They weaken managerial accountability because superiors may avoid enforcing performance rules where political networks protect underperformance. Party-state fusion can also blur the distinction between administrative service and partisan service, undermining the neutrality expected from professional civil servants.

This helps explain why Public Administration Reforms (PAR) often advance more quickly in law than in behaviour. Informal networks can absorb, redirect or selectively implement reforms while preserving existing political control. This mirrors the logic of Topic 1, Module 2, where formal constitutional rules may coexist with weak accountability because informal institutions shape how the state actually operates.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify where informal governance dynamics most visibly affect professionalism, promotion, performance management or executive accountability in their national context.

International Standards and External Drivers of Reform

Public administration reform in the Western Balkans is shaped by several external frameworks. The SIGMA Principles of Public Administration are the main benchmark for merit-based civil service, managerial accountability, service delivery, organisation and policy co-ordination. EU accession processes also place strong emphasis on professional, depoliticised and accountable public administration, while OECD and Council of Europe frameworks support integrity, ethics and good governance reforms.

These standards have helped place PAR at the centre of governance reform agendas. But formal alignment with international standards does not automatically produce deep institutional change. Progress remains uneven, and many recommendations are repeated across reporting cycles, indicating limited behavioural transformation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether international standards in their country have produced substantive changes in professionalism and accountability or mainly formal compliance.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Public administration reform is politically sensitive because it changes how executive power is exercised and constrained. Professionalising the civil service may reduce opportunities for patronage, limit political control over appointments and increase administrative resistance to arbitrary decisions. For this reason, reforms that are technically desirable may face political resistance. Therefore, the feasibility of reform depends on political incentives, leadership commitment, fiscal constraints, administrative capacity and public demand for professional and fair public services. Some reforms, such as training, digitalisation or clearer procedures, may be easier to advance politically than reforms that directly affect appointments, dismissals, delegation or managerial accountability.

In many cases, reforms are adopted formally but implemented selectively. Distinguishing between reforms that are technically sound, politically feasible and likely to produce real behavioural change is therefore essential. Across the region, recent official reporting continues to show that stalled implementation and insufficient depoliticisation remain core constraints.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to evaluate which PAR reforms in their country have produced meaningful administrative change and which have remained largely symbolic.

Teaching Note

This topic should guide participants from the legal and institutional foundations of public administration toward a practical diagnosis of how professionalism and executive accountability function in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Trainers should use concrete administrative cases where possible, invite participants to map the accountability chain within their own institution or ministry, and encourage them to identify where politicisation risks arise in recruitment, promotion, co-ordination or performance management. The focus should remain on the gap between formal merit-based rules and actual administrative practice, especially in relation to politicisation, managerial accountability and informal governance dynamics.

Country Context Applications

Trainers should guide participants through comparative analysis across four dimensions: (1) civil service professionalism and merit; (2) executive co-ordination and administrative capacity; (3) accountability and oversight within the administration;(4) informal governance dynamics.

Albania

Albania remains moderately prepared in public administration reform, and recent Commission reporting (2025) notes limited progress in the latest cycle, while SIGMA finds comparatively stronger results than some regional peers in policy development, co-ordination and elements of service delivery and digitalisation. The legal framework for civil service management is largely in place, but both SIGMA and the Commission continue to identify weaknesses in managerial accountability, consistency of merit implementation and systematic follow-up on reform strategies. The reform trajectory is therefore improving but uneven.

Administrative professionalism in Albania is supported by a relatively developed formal framework, but executive accountability remains affected by uneven implementation, politicisation risks and variable institutional capacity across government bodies. Digitalisation and service-delivery reforms have advanced, yet managerial accountability

and consistent enforcement remain weaker areas. The conclusions of the 13th EU-Albania PAR Special Group (October 2025) also point to the need to strengthen public administration capacity and professionalism, including merit-based civil service management, improved policy coordination and evidence-based law-making, stronger fiscal governance, and clearer institutional accountability, in order to effectively prepare for and implement the EU acquis during the accession process.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania has a comparatively developed PAR framework and stronger formal merit structures than some regional peers, but uneven implementation, politicisation risks and weak managerial accountability continue to limit full administrative professionalism and executive accountability.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina continues to face serious structural obstacles to professional and accountable public administration. European Commission reporting (2024) stresses the need to ensure a professional and depoliticised civil service and a more co-ordinated, countrywide approach to policymaking. Although some steps have been taken, including adoption of a state-level civil service law in 2024 and creation of a forum of civil service agencies, the administration remains fragmented across state, entity, cantonal and Brcˇko levels. The reform trajectory is therefore slow and fragmented because of structural constraints.

This fragmentation weakens consistency in civil service rules, executive co-ordination, managerial accountability and performance management. SIGMA’s 2024 assessment confirms uneven performance and continuing weaknesses in accountability, organisation and co-ordination. Under these conditions, professionalism is constrained not only by politicisation but also by the differentiated governance regimes operating across the country.

Diagnostic takeaway: Bosnia & Herzegovina has formal reform commitments but fragmentation, uneven civil service regimes and persistent politicisation risks continue to weaken professionalism, policy co-ordination and executive accountability.

Serbia

Serbia remains moderately prepared in public administration reform, but the European Commission reported (2025) no progress in the latest cycle and noted that previous recommendations largely remain valid. The legal and institutional framework exists, yet implementation problems persist, especially in merit-based HR management, depoliticisation and managerial accountability. SIGMA’s 2024 assessment similarly identifies continuing weaknesses across core PAR dimensions despite the existence of formal structures. The reform trajectory is best described as formal reforms without sufficient behavioural change.

Administrative professionalism in Serbia therefore coexists with persistent concerns regarding political influence, weak implementation of reform commitments and limited accountability within executive institutions. The problem is not only the existence of formal rules, but the gap between legal design and administrative behaviour. This affects trust, predictability and the credibility of executive governance.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia has a formal PAR framework, but stalled implementation, politicisation concerns and weak managerial accountability continue to constrain professional and accountable executive governance.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces merit-based civil service systems, executive co-ordination, internal administrative accountability, ethics and integrity safeguards, digitalisation, politicisation risks and reform feasibility through comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Administrative Professionalism Diagnostic Lab (30 minutes)

Participants analyse merit, neutrality and professionalism in their country’s civil service system.

• Executive Accountability Mapping (30 minutes)

Participants map how managerial accountability, internal audit, financial inspection, complaint systems and administrative review function in practice.

• Politicisation Risk Exercise / PAR Reform Feasibility Simulation (20 minutes)

Participants identify where politicisation risks arise in recruitment, promotion, co-ordination or performance management and assess which reforms are desirable, feasible and likely to produce meaningful behavioural change.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Which aspects of public administration professionalism and executive accountability can realistically be strengthened through institutional reform, and which depend on deeper changes in political incentives, organisational culture and informal governance practices?

Key Takeaways

• Professionalism and executive accountability are distinct but mutually reinforcing dimensions of democratic governance;
  • A professional administration provides neutrality, competence and continuity. In the same time, executive accountability ensures that political leadership remains constrained by internal and external checks;
  • Weak professionalism affects trust, increases corruption risks and undermines implementation of rule-of-law reforms;
  • Across the Western Balkans, formal PAR frameworks often exist, but implementation remains uneven and politicisation continues to affect administrative practice;
  • Sustainable reform requires institutional capacity, political commitment and a shift from formal compliance to behavioural professionalism.

List of Literature

SIGMA (OECD/EU). The Principles of Public Administration (2023). Core benchmark for merit-based civil service, managerial accountability, service delivery, organisation and executive governance.

https://www.sigmaweb.org/content/dam/sigma/en/publications/reports/2023/11/th e-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805/7f5ec453-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in Albania 2024. Country assessment across all PAR areas.
https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/01/public-administration-in-albania-2024_9ec56245/5577d117-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024. Country assessment focused on fragmentation, accountability and civil service governance. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/01/public-administration-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-2024_df5d9924/969426b5-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in Serbia 2024. Country assessment of implementation gaps and PAR performance. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/01/public-administration-in-serbia-2024_8f89d39a/02001fe4-en.pdf

SIGMA (OECD/EU). Public Administration in the Western Balkans 2024. Regional comparative overview across PAR dimensions. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/03/public-administration-in-the-western-balkans-2024_07555c85/1ec4c18f-en.pdf

European Commission. Albania Report 2025. Public Administration Reform chapter. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fe9138b7-90fe-4277-a12c-3a03f6d1957f_en?filename=albania-report-2025.pdf

European Commission. Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2024. Public Administration Reform chapter and wider governance recommendations.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/451db011-6779-40ea-b34b-a0eeda451746_en?filename=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202024.pdf

European Commission. Serbia Report 2025. Public Administration Reform and financial control chapters. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921a-c60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf

SIGMA.    Public     service    and    human    resource    management                   thematic                 materials. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/thematic-areas/Public-service-and-human-resource-management.html

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Topic 5: Gender equality and inclusive participation

The Objectives

This topic examines how gender equality and inclusive participation influence democratic legitimacy, institutional accountability and the quality of public decision-making. It explores how legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and public policies seek to promote equal representation and participation of women and other underrepresented groups in political, administrative and civic life.

Particular attention is given to how equality commitments translate into institutional practice in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, where formal equality frameworks coexist with structural barriers, uneven implementation and persistent informal norms that continue to shape participation in public life.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how gender equality and inclusive participation strengthen democratic governance by improving institutional accountability, policy responsiveness and the legitimacy of public decision-making.

Participants will be able to analyse equality frameworks, assess representation patterns in political and administrative institutions, identify structural and institutional barriers affecting participation of women and marginalised groups, and evaluate how political incentives, social norms and institutional practices influence inclusive governance outcomes.

They will also develop the capacity to distinguish between formal representation and substantive influence in policymaking and to identify realistic pathways for strengthening inclusive governance in their national contexts.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

The topic should follow the following analytical progression: constitutional and legal guarantees → representation and participation → institutional mechanisms → gender mainstreaming in policymaking → barriers and intersectionality → informal norms and political incentives → international standards → reform feasibility → monitoring and data.

Gender Equality, Inclusion and Democratic Accountability

Gender equality is not only a social policy objective but also a core component of democratic governance. Inclusive participation strengthens democratic legitimacy, broadens representation of social interests and improves the responsiveness and quality of public policymaking. Where decision-making institutions reflect the diversity of society, policy outcomes are more likely to address a wider range of social needs. Conversely, exclusion from political and administrative decision-making can weaken accountability and undermine public trust in institutions. This governance perspective links gender equality directly to institutional performance: professional, representative and inclusive institutions are more capable of delivering fair and effective public policy.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse how inclusive representation improves policy responsiveness and democratic accountability.

Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Gender Equality

Gender equality in the Western Balkans is grounded in constitutional guarantees of equality before the law and reinforced by anti-discrimination and gender equality legislation.

Most countries in the region have adopted gender equality laws, anti-discrimination frameworks and electoral rules requiring gender quotas on candidate lists. These frameworks aim to promote equal participation in political life and reduce structural barriers affecting women and other underrepresented groups.

While legal frameworks are relatively well developed across the region, implementation often remains uneven. Enforcement mechanisms may be weak, equality institutions may lack resources and policy commitments do not always translate into behavioural change within political and administrative institutions.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether equality frameworks in their country generate measurable institutional change or primarily formal compliance.

Representation and Participation in Political Institutions

Gender quotas have significantly increased women’s representation in national and local parliaments across the Western Balkans. However, representation must be analysed beyond numerical presence. Therefore, a key analytical distinction is between:

1. Descriptive representation – the numerical presence of women in political institutions;
2. Substantive representation – the ability of those representatives to influence policymaking and institutional decisions.

Even where quotas increase parliamentary representation, several factors can limit substantive influence. Party discipline can restrict independent legislative action, committee assignments often shape policy influence and executive leadership positions frequently remain male-dominated. In many cases, improvements in legislative representation are not matched by similar progress in executive institutions, senior administrative leadership or party leadership structures.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to analyse whether increased representation has translated into greater influence over policy outcomes.

Institutional Mechanisms for Promoting Equality

Most governments in the Western Balkans have established institutional mechanisms designed to promote gender equality and inclusive participation. These typically include national gender equality agencies, parliamentary committees on equality and human rights, gender focal points within ministries and independent equality institutions such as ombudsperson offices.

These institutions are intended to support gender mainstreaming across public policy, monitor equality commitments and ensure that gender considerations are integrated into legislative and administrative decision-making. In practice, however, their influence often depends on the authority they hold within government structures, the resources available to them and the political support they receive from executive institutions.

In some cases, gender focal points operate primarily as coordination or advisory mechanisms with limited decision-making power. In others, equality institutions lack enforcement authority or sufficient capacity to monitor compliance with equality legislation effectively. As a result, the presence of institutional mechanisms does not automatically translate into meaningful policy influence.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether equality institutions in their country exercise real policy influence or operate primarily as symbolic structures.

Gender Mainstreaming in Public Policymaking

Gender mainstreaming represents a key governance tool for integrating equality considerations into policymaking. Rather than treating gender equality as a separate policy area, gender mainstreaming seeks to ensure that all public policies are assessed in terms of their impact on women and men.

Key instruments include gender impact assessments of legislation, gender-responsive budgeting and the systematic use of sex-disaggregated data in policy design. These tools allow governments to evaluate how policy choices affect different social groups and to adjust policy design accordingly.

The EU strongly promotes gender mainstreaming through accession requirements and public administration reform processes. However, implementation in the Western Balkans remains uneven. Gender impact assessments are rarely systematic, gender-responsive budgeting is only partially developed and data collection often remains limited.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether gender equality considerations are integrated into policymaking processes in their country or treated primarily as a separate policy domain.

Barriers to Inclusive Participation and Intersectionality

Despite formal equality frameworks, structural barriers continue to affect participation in political and public life. These barriers often intersect across multiple dimensions of inequality.

Gender inequality in the Western Balkans frequently intersects with ethnicity, particularly affecting Roma women, as well as with rural-urban divides, disability, socio-economic status and age. Women in rural areas, minority communities and economically disadvantaged groups often face additional obstacles to participation in political and administrative institutions.

Unequal distribution of care responsibilities, limited access to political networks and persistent gender stereotypes also influence opportunities for participation and career advancement. These structural factors help explain why improvements in formal representation do not always produce substantive equality in leadership and decision-making positions.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse which intersectional barriers most strongly affect participation in their national context.

Informal Norms and Political Incentives

Formal equality frameworks often coexist with informal political norms that shape participation in practice. Political recruitment and candidate selection frequently occur through informal party networks, which may favour established leadership structures and limit opportunities for newcomers.

Party hierarchies, patronage relationships and informal expectations regarding leadership roles can influence access to political careers and senior administrative positions. In some contexts, gender quotas may increase representation while informal political practices continue to limit influence over party leadership or executive decision-making. These informal dynamics demonstrate that institutional change depends not only on formal legal frameworks but also on broader political culture and incentives within political organisations.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on how informal networks influence political recruitment and leadership opportunities in their country.

Data, Monitoring and Evaluation

Effective gender equality policies depend on reliable data and monitoring mechanisms. Governments require sex-disaggregated data to identify participation gaps, evaluate policy outcomes and design evidence-based interventions. Monitoring systems may include national equality strategies, reporting mechanisms, parliamentary oversight and independent monitoring by equality institutions or civil society organisations.

Across the Western Balkans, data availability has improved in recent years, but monitoring frameworks often remain fragmented and evaluation of equality policies is limited. Strengthening data collection and monitoring systems is therefore a key component of effective equality governance.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants how equality outcomes are measured and monitored in their national context.

International Standards and External Drivers of Reform

Gender equality reforms in the Western Balkans are strongly influenced by international legal and policy frameworks. These include the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention and EU accession requirements related to fundamental rights and equality.

International organisations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and UN Women also support reforms aimed at improving women’s participation in political and public life. These frameworks provide important benchmarks for equality policy and encourage governments to strengthen institutional accountability for equality outcomes. However, as with other governance reforms, the practical impact of international commitments depends on domestic political incentives, institutional capacity and sustained political support.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse whether international standards drive substantive policy change or primarily legal alignment.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Reforms promoting gender equality vary in their political feasibility and potential impact. Some measures such as, for example, electoral gender quotas can produce relatively rapid improvements in representation. Other reforms, such as increasing women’s participation in executive leadership or redistributing care responsibilities, require deeper cultural and institutional change.

The feasibility of equality reforms therefore depends on political incentives within party systems, civil society advocacy, public demand for equality and the degree of international engagement in governance reforms.

A useful analytical distinction is between reforms that are technically desirable, politically feasible and behaviourally transformative. Sustainable progress often requires alignment between these three dimensions.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to evaluate which equality reforms in their country have produced real behavioural change and which remain largely symbolic.

Teaching Note

This topic should guide participants from legal equality guarantees toward a practical assessment of how inclusive participation operates in political and administrative institutions in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Trainers should emphasise the relationship between gender equality and democratic accountability and encourage participants to analyse the gap between formal commitments and institutional practice. Participants should also be encouraged to identify politically feasible reforms that can strengthen inclusive governance.

Country Context Applications

Participants  should  analyse  equality  frameworks  across  four  dimensions:

(1) representation in political institutions; (2) institutional mechanisms for equality;

(3) structural and intersectional barriers; (4) informal governance dynamics.

Albania

Albania has adopted a comprehensive legal framework promoting gender equality and anti-discrimination, including legislation supporting equal opportunities and gender representation in political life. Electoral legislation requires gender quotas on candidate lists, which has contributed to a relatively high proportion of women in the national parliament compared with earlier periods and with some countries in the region.

Nevertheless, gender disparities remain visible in executive leadership, senior administrative positions and local governance. European Commission reporting (2025) continues to emphasise the need to strengthen implementation of gender equality policies, improve gender mainstreaming across public administration and enhance protection against discrimination. Structural barriers, including labour market inequalities, unequal care responsibilities and social norms, continue to influence women’s participation in political and public life.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania has strengthened legal frameworks and parliamentary representation, but structural barriers and uneven policy implementation continue to constrain substantive gender equality in leadership and decision-making.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina has established gender equality legislation and electoral quota provisions that support women’s representation in political institutions. Formal representation has improved gradually, although participation in executive and senior leadership positions remains limited.

The country’s complex multi-level governance structure creates significant variation in the implementation of gender equality policies across state, entity and cantonal levels. Institutional fragmentation and political priorities related to identity-based power sharing can also reduce policy attention to gender equality issues.

Diagnostic takeaway: Bosnia & Herzegovina’s formal equality framework operates within a highly fragmented governance system where institutional complexity and political priorities limit the consistent implementation of gender equality policies.

Serbia

Serbia has progressively strengthened gender quotas in electoral legislation, resulting in relatively high representation of women in the National Assembly. Legal frameworks on gender equality and anti-discrimination are also broadly aligned with European standards.

However, challenges remain regarding substantive influence in political decision-making and representation in executive leadership positions. European Commission reporting (2025) continues to highlight the need for stronger institutional implementation of gender equality policies and improved protection against discrimination.

Informal political networks and strong party hierarchies may also shape candidate selection and leadership opportunities.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia has achieved relatively high formal political representation through quota mechanisms, but substantive influence and leadership opportunities remain uneven.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces equality frameworks, representation patterns, institutional mechanisms and governance implications of inclusive participation.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Representation Mapping Exercise (30 minutes)

Participants analyse representation patterns in national and local institutions.

• Intersectionality Diagnostic Exercise (20 minutes)

Participants identify barriers affecting participation of women and marginalised groups.

• Policy Reform Simulation (20 minutes)

Participants evaluate which equality reforms are politically feasible and likely to produce behavioural change.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can democratic institutions ensure that formal equality commitments translate into meaningful participation, influence and accountability in public decision-making?

Key Takeaways

• Gender equality and inclusive participation strengthen democratic legitimacy and institutional accountability;
  • Formal equality frameworks do not automatically produce substantive representation or policy influence;
  • Structural barriers and intersectional inequalities continue to shape participation outcomes;
  • Informal political norms can undermine the impact of formal equality mechanisms;
  • Sustainable progress requires both institutional reforms and broader changes in political incentives and social norms.

List of Literature

European Commission. Albania Report 2025. Sections on fundamental rights and gender equality. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fe9138b7-90fe-4277-a12c-3a03f6d1957f_en?filename=albania-report-2025.pdf

European Commission. Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2024. Section on equality and non-discrimination.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/451db011-6779-40ea-b34b-a0eeda451746_en?filename=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202024.pdf

European Commission. Serbia Report 2025. Section gender equality and political participation. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921a-c60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf

Council of Europe. Gender Equality Strategy 2024 – 2029. https://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/gender-equality-strategy

UN Women (2023). Gender Equality and Social Cohesion in the Western Balkans – Regional Analysis.
gender_equality_and_social_cohesion_in_the_wb_0.pdf

CEDAW Committee (1997). General Recommendation No. 23: Women in Political and Public Life. https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/cedaw/1997/39377

OSCE (2009). Ministerial Council Decision No. 7/09 on Women’s Participation in Political and Public Life. https://www.osce.org/mc/40710

Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024 – Western Balkans. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/NIT_2024_Digital_Booklet.pdf

World Bank (2026). Women, Business and the Law (latest edition). https://wbl.worldbank.org/en/publications/flagship-report

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Module 3: Integrity and anti-corruption systems

Topic 1: Principal-agent and collective action perspectives

The Objectives

This topic introduces the two dominant analytical frameworks used to understand corruption and integrity systems:

1. principal – agent model;
2. collective action perspective.

It examines how these frameworks explain the incentives, constraints and behavioural patterns that shape corruption risks within public institutions, and how they apply to the governance realities of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, where formal anti-corruption frameworks coexist with political incentives, institutional weaknesses and informal practices. Therefore, the topic equips participants to diagnose corruption not only as individual rule-breaking, but as a systemic governance challenge shaped by incentives, expectations and institutional design.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to interpret corruption through two complementary governance lenses. They will understand how the principal – agent model links corruption to delegation problems, information asymmetries, weak monitoring and misaligned incentives as well as how the collective action perspective explains corruption as a systemic equilibrium shaped by expectations of widespread corrupt behaviour.

Participants will be able to analyse how political incentives, institutional capacity, oversight mechanisms and informal networks shape corruption risks in their national contexts. They will be able to distinguish settings where principal – agent tools (monitoring, sanctions, transparency) are likely to be effective from those where collective action dynamics require broader shifts in expectations, trust and political competition. This will enable them to identify realistic strategies for strengthening integrity systems based on the dominant corruption dynamics in their country.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: corruption as a governance problem → principal–agent logic → information asymmetry, discretion and incentives → monitoring and accountability → collective action dynamics → trust, expectations and corruption equilibria → state capture and informal institutions → implications for anti-corruption strategies → reform feasibility.

Corruption as a Governance Problem

Corruption is commonly understood as the abuse of entrusted public power for private gain. It affects procurement, licensing, inspections, taxation, public employment, regulatory enforcement and political decision-making. Beyond individual wrongdoing, corruption weakens institutional accountability, distorts economic competition and undermines public trust in democratic institutions.

For this reason, corruption should be understood not only as an ethical or legal problem but as a governance problem. It emerges from the way authority is delegated, how institutions monitor behaviour, what incentives shape decision-making and which

informal practices determine how rules are applied in reality. This analytical shift is important because it directs attention away from isolated misconduct toward the broader institutional and political environment in which integrity either holds or breaks down.

As discussed in Module 2, formal rules often coexist with weak implementation when political incentives and informal institutions shape how the state actually functions. Topic 1 of Module 3 applies that broader governance logic directly to corruption.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse corruption not only as an individual failure, but as an institutional problem shaped by incentives, expectations and accountability structures.

Principal – Agent Logic in Integrity Systems

The principal – agent model views corruption as a problem of delegation. Citizens, voters or political leaders act as principals who delegate authority to public officials or institutions, who act as agents. Corruption occurs when agents use their delegated authority for private benefit rather than for the public interest. This becomes more likely when principals cannot effectively observe agents’ behaviour, when monitoring is weak, when sanctions are inconsistent or unlikely, and when incentives reward political loyalty or discretionary control more than integrity. From this perspective, corruption is not random. It is a rational response to misaligned incentives within institutional relationships.

This model is particularly useful for diagnosing corruption risks in institutions where responsibility is formally delegated and where targeted reforms can reduce discretion and improve accountability. Typical examples include procurement bodies, inspectorates, licensing agencies, tax authorities, police units and municipal administrations.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify institutions in their country where corruption appears driven primarily by weak monitoring, misaligned incentives or poor enforcement.

Information Asymmetry, Discretion and Incentives

Principal – agent problems become more acute when officials enjoy broad discretion, when rules are complex or opaque, when citizens lack information about procedures, when oversight bodies lack independence or capacity and when political leaders benefit from maintaining discretionary control. These conditions create fertile ground for bribery, favouritism, abuse of office and clientelist decision-making.

In many Western Balkan contexts, information asymmetry is reinforced by limited transparency in procurement and budgeting, politicised appointments, inconsistent enforcement of rules and weak internal controls.

Therefore, the principal – agent model points to a fairly clear reform logic: reduce discretion, improve transparency, strengthen monitoring and ensure credible sanctions. However, while these tools are often necessary, they are not always sufficient where corruption is systemic rather than opportunistic.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse how discretion and information asymmetry shape corruption risks in their own institutions.

Monitoring, Accountability and Principal – Agent Remedies

From the principal – agent perspective, anti-corruption strategies focus on correcting incentive failures through institutional design. These remedies include clearer rules and standards, stronger internal and external oversight, access to information, audit systems,

asset declarations, conflict-of-interest regulation, professionalisation of the civil service and credible sanctions for misconduct.

It is important, however, to distinguish between de jure accountability and de facto accountability. Oversight institutions may exist in law while remaining politically constrained, under-resourced or selectively activated in practice. Similarly, sanctions may appear strong on paper but lose credibility where enforcement is inconsistent or politically selective.

As discussed in Module 2, Topic 4, politicised administration weakens internal accountability and increases principal – agent risks. Political control over oversight institutions can change incentives across the system: officials may conclude that loyalty offers stronger protection than integrity. This helps explain why principal – agent reforms such as ethics codes, asset declarations or internal audit mechanisms may have limited impact in environments where accountability is selective rather than impartial.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to assess which anti-corruption mechanisms in their country operate effectively as accountability tools and which remain largely formal.

Collective Action Perspective: Corruption as a Social Equilibrium

The collective action perspective begins from a different premise. It argues that corruption often persists not because rules are absent, but because people expect others to behave corruptly. In such environments, honest behaviour is perceived as risky, naive or ineffective, while corrupt behaviour appears rational because it is seen as the normal way the system works.

Under these conditions, corruption becomes a coordination problem. Most actors may prefer a cleaner system in theory, but they do not trust others to behave honestly, and therefore they continue to participate in corrupt practices themselves.

This perspective is especially relevant where political competition is weak, party-state fusion is strong, informal networks dominate appointments and resource allocation, and citizens expect corruption as an ordinary feature of public life. In these settings, more rules, more monitoring or more sanctions may have only limited impact if the broader expectations and social equilibrium remain unchanged.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether corruption in their country feels primarily like an individual abuse of office or a systemic expectation embedded in everyday governance.

Trust, Fairness and the Credibility of Enforcement

Collective action theory depends heavily on trust. Where citizens do not trust institutions, where officials do not believe sanctions are applied fairly, and where honest conduct is not seen as rewarded, corruption can become self-reinforcing even when most actors dislike it.

Three elements are especially important:

1. Institutional trust – whether people believe state institutions act impartially;
2. Fairness of enforcement – whether sanctions are applied equally rather than selectively;
3. Credibility of sanctions – whether corrupt conduct is actually punished in practice.

Where these conditions are missing, anti-corruption messages lose credibility. People may continue to act corruptly not because they approve of corruption, but because they assume honest behaviour will leave them isolated or disadvantaged.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on what makes honest behaviour appear credible or non-credible in their institutional environment.

Corruption Equilibria and Equilibrium Traps

Collective action theory is especially useful in explaining why corruption may persist even when nearly everyone recognises it as harmful. Corruption can become an equilibrium trap. For example, individuals adapt to a system they distrust, and those adaptations collectively reproduce the very system they dislike.

In such equilibria, honest officials may remain silent because they fear retaliation. Citizens may pay bribes because they assume formal procedures will not work. Political actors may preserve patronage systems because they believe rivals would do the same if they had the chance.

This helps explain why reforms sometimes fail even when widely supported in principle. If reforms do not change expectations about how others will behave, the corruption equilibrium may remain intact.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify where corruption in their context appears self-reinforcing even among actors who do not openly support it.

State Capture and Corruption Beyond Individual Abuse

In the Western Balkans, corruption often goes beyond individual abuse of office and takes the form of state capture. This is a situation in which powerful political or economic actors shape institutions, rules and enforcement systems to protect their own interests.

State capture interacts with both analytical models. From a principal – agent perspective, it weakens monitoring because principals lose control over oversight institutions. From a collective action perspective, it reinforces the expectation that integrity will not be rewarded because powerful actors can bend institutions to their advantage.

This makes anti-corruption reform especially difficult. Where institutions themselves are politically controlled, the issue is not only corruption within the system, but corruption of the system.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on whether anti-corruption challenges in their country concern isolated corruption risks, systemic informal governance or deeper patterns of institutional capture.

Implications for Anti-Corruption Strategies

The principal – agent and collective action perspectives imply different but complementary reform strategies.

Principal – agent solutions are more effective where corruption is relatively isolated, opportunistic or concentrated in specific institutions. These solutions focus on monitoring, sanctions, transparency, reducing discretion, internal controls and professionalisation.

Collective action solutions are more relevant where corruption is systemic and socially expected. These reforms focus on shifting expectations through political competition, institutional independence, visible enforcement, media freedom, civic mobilisation and sustained leadership commitment to integrity.

In practice, most countries require a combination of both approaches. Some institutions may suffer mainly from weak monitoring, while broader political systems may be shaped by entrenched collective expectations. Understanding which dynamic dominates is therefore essential for designing realistic reforms.

This also helps explain why some reforms fail. Principal – agent reforms such as audits, ethics codes or asset declarations often disappoint when corruption is systemic and trust is low. Conversely, broad public awareness campaigns or civic mobilisation efforts may achieve little where basic incentives remain badly misaligned and enforcement is not credible.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to map which institutions in their country require principal -agent remedies and which require collective action approaches.

Informal Institutions and Corruption Dynamics

Formal anti-corruption frameworks often coexist with informal practices that shape behaviour more strongly than legal rules. These include patronage networks, clientelist exchanges, loyalty-based career advancement, selective enforcement, informal political influence over appointments and informal veto players who shape access to resources or decisions.

Such practices can undermine both principal – agent and collective action reforms. They reduce the credibility of sanctions, weaken oversight institutions, reward loyalty over integrity and create parallel systems of accountability that operate outside formal legal structures.

This mirrors the wider logic developed throughout Module 2, especially Topic 1 and Topic

4. For example, formal rules may be present, but informal institutions often determine how power is actually exercised. In corruption analysis, this means that the existence of anti-corruption agencies, laws or strategies tells only part of the story. What matters equally is whether these rules can overcome the informal incentives that sustain corrupt behaviour.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which informal practices most visibly undermine integrity in their national context and whether informal veto players affect oversight, appointments or enforcement.

Institutional Capacity and Integrity Systems

As in Module 2, institutional capacity remains central. Anti-corruption institutions need professional staff, clear mandates, investigative tools, internal controls, HR management systems and credible co-ordination with prosecutors, audit bodies and sectoral oversight agencies.

Where institutional capacity is weak, even well-designed integrity frameworks may remain ineffective. Weak internal controls, poor case management, fragmented mandates and under-resourced oversight bodies can all reinforce corruption risks regardless of the legal framework on paper. This is why integrity systems should be analysed not only through law and policy, but also through organisational capacity and the quality of implementation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify whether corruption risks in their institutions stem more from weak incentives, weak expectations, or weak institutional capacity.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Anti-corruption reforms are politically sensitive because they affect access to appointments, resources, rents and influence. Their feasibility depends on political will, elite incentives, independence of oversight institutions, public demand for integrity, media freedom, civil society mobilisation and external pressure from EU and international partners.

Participants should distinguish explicitly between three levels of reform:

1. Technically desirable reforms – e.g., asset declarations, procurement transparency or improved legal frameworks;
2. Politically feasible reforms – e.g., digitalisation, procedural simplification or narrow sector-specific controls that elites are willing to adopt;
3. Behaviourally transformative reforms – e.g., depoliticised appointments, genuinely independent oversight institutions and consistent enforcement capable of shifting expectations;

This distinction is especially important in contexts where formal anti-corruption strategies exist but implementation remains selective, shallow or symbolic.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess which anti-corruption reforms in their country have produced real behavioural change, which remain largely formal and which are blocked by political incentives.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

To help participants classify corruption dynamics in their own institutions, trainers may use the following diagnostic questions:

1. Are rules clear and consistently enforced?
2. Are sanctions for misconduct credible in practice?
3. Do staff believe integrity is rewarded?
4. Are informal networks more influential than formal procedures?
5. Do people expect others to behave honestly or corruptly?

Where the main problem lies in weak rules, weak monitoring or weak sanctions, principal–agent remedies may be more relevant. Where the main problem lies in low trust, informal protection and expectations of corruption, collective action dynamics are likely to be stronger.

Teaching Note

This topic should guide participants from theoretical models of corruption toward a practical diagnosis of how incentives, expectations, institutional capacity and informal practices shape integrity outcomes in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia. Trainers should emphasise the difference between corruption as an individual deviation from rules and corruption as a systemic equilibrium sustained by collective expectations. Moreover, participants should be encouraged to analyse which model best explains corruption dynamics in their own countries, to map corruption risks in a specific organisation or sector, and to identify realistic reform strategies based on political incentives and implementation capacity.

Country Context Applications

Participants should analyse corruption dynamics across four dimensions: (1) Incentive structures; (2) monitoring and accountability; (3) collective expectations; (4) informal networks.

Albania

Albania has developed a comprehensive anti-corruption framework, including SPAK (Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime), the Intersectoral Strategy Against Corruption (ISAC) 2024 -2030, and extensive digitalisation reforms. Recent European Commission reporting (2025) confirms that SPAK remains the central institution for high-level corruption enforcement, with an expanding caseload and growing public visibility. At the same time, preventive integrity systems remain uneven: integrity plans are inconsistently implemented, ethical awareness varies across institutions, and whistleblowing mechanisms remain underused, despite a solid legal framework.

Administrative digitalization (e.g., e-Albania and automated registries) has reduced opportunities for petty corruption in standardised procedures by limiting face-to-face interactions and increasing traceability. However, broader integrity outcomes remain uneven, especially in sectors where discretion, political influence, or weak internal controls persist.

Corruption dynamics in Albania reflect a combination of principal – agent problems and collective action patterns. Principal – agent risks are visible in areas with weak internal controls, discretionary administrative procedures, limited oversight capacity and inconsistent enforcement. Collective action dynamics emerge where informal networks, political influence, and expectations of selective implementation shape behaviour more strongly than formal rules. SPAK’s visibility may gradually shift expectations in some areas, but recent reporting (2025) still highlights selective enforcement risks, politicised appointments, and weaknesses in preventive integrity systems, which limit broader behavioural change.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania exhibits mixed corruption dynamics. Principal–agent problems are evident in administrative sectors with high discretion and weak controls, while collective action patterns persist where political influence and informal networks shape expectations about how public authority is exercised.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s fragmented governance structure creates multiple principal – agent chains characterised by weak monitoring, overlapping mandates and inconsistent enforcement. Anti-corruption responsibilities and prevention bodies are spread across different levels of government, and recent EU’s Commission reporting (2024) continues to stress that independence and resources of corruption prevention bodies at entity and cantonal levels need strengthening.

Collective action dynamics are reinforced by political fragmentation, identity-based competition, weak trust in institutions and differentiated accountability structures. In such a setting, there is often no single effective principal capable of enforcing coherent anti-corruption rules across the whole system. This makes reforms difficult to implement consistently and allows fragmented political incentives to sustain collective action traps. Risks of state capture in Bosnia & Herzegovina are also explicitly noted in the 2025 enlargement policy communication.

Diagnostic takeaway: In Bosnia & Herzegovina, fragmentation and political incentives reinforce collective action dynamics, while multiple weak principal – agent chains and uneven enforcement make anti-corruption reforms difficult to apply consistently across institutions and levels of government.

Serbia

Serbia has adopted formal anti-corruption strategies and institutions, and principal – agent problems remain visible in sectors such as public procurement, inspections, and local administration. The European Commission reports (2025) that the legal and strategic framework is broadly in place, but preventive measures, enforcement consistency, and institutional coordination require significant improvement. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024 – 2028 has been adopted. However, the EU Commission notes (2025) that effective monitoring, resourcing and inter-institutional coordination mechanisms are still lacking, limiting its practical impact.

In practice, systemic corruption in Serbia is more accurately explained through collective action dynamics. Strong party hierarchies, politicised appointments, extensive use of acting positions in public institutions, and political influence over media ecosystems weaken the credibility of formal integrity rules. These patterns reinforce expectations that loyalty is rewarded more than integrity, reducing the deterrent effect of sanctions and undermining trust in oversight institutions. Recent EU Commission reporting (2025) continues to highlight limited progress, selective enforcement, and political influence over independent bodies, while the 2025 Enlargement Package explicitly identifies risks of state capture.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s corruption environment is shaped predominantly by collective action dynamics. Although formal rules and institutions exist, politicised appointments, media influence, and informal political incentives continue to shape behaviour more decisively than formal integrity frameworks, making anti-corruption reforms difficult to implement consistently.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces principal – agent theory, collective action perspectives, information asymmetry, trust, corruption equilibria, state capture, informal institutions and reform feasibility using regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Corruption Dynamics Diagnostic Lab (30 min.)

Participants map corruption risks in a specific institution or sector using principal – agent and collective action lenses.

• Incentive and Expectation Mapping (20 min.)

Participants identify how incentives, trust and social expectations shape behaviour.

• Reform Feasibility Simulation (20 min.)

Groups evaluate which anti-corruption reforms are technically desirable, politically feasible and behaviourally transformative.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can integrity systems shift both incentives and expectations so that honest behaviour becomes rational, rewarded and sustainable within public institutions?

Key Takeaways

• Corruption can be understood through principal – agent problems or collective action dynamics, and each perspective implies different reform strategies;
  • Principal – agent solutions focus on monitoring, sanctions, transparency and reducing discretion;
  • Collective action solutions focus on shifting expectations, strengthening institutional credibility and changing political incentives;
  • State capture and informal practices can undermine both models by shaping behaviour more strongly than formal rules;
  • Sustainable anti-corruption reform requires aligning incentives, strengthening institutions and changing expectations about how public authority is exercised.

List of Literature

I. Foundational Theories of Corruption

Klitgaard,     R.     (1988).     Controlling     Corruption.     University     of     California Press. https://dokumen.pub/controlling-corruption-9780520911185.html

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.Cambridge University Press.
https://institutes.abu.edu.ng/idr/public/assets/docs/Corruption%20and%20Governm ent_%20Causes,%20Consequences,%20and%20Reform%20(%20PDFDrive%20).pdf

Lambsdorff, J. (2007). The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform. Cambridge University Press.
https://nzdr.ru/data/media/biblio/kolxoz/G/GU/Lambsdorff%20J.G.%20The%20insti tutional%20economics%20of%20corruption%20and%20reform%20(CUP,%202007)(I SBN%200521872758)(O)(302s)_GU_.pdf

II.  Collective Action and Systemic Corruption

Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail – Systemic Corruption   as   a   Collective   Action   Problem.   Governance,   26:   449-471. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x

Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government. University of Chicago Press. https://www.scirp.org/reference/referencespapers?referenceid=3929223

III.  Informal Institutions and Political Incentives

Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics. Perspectives on Politics. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/307_0.pdf

Grzymała-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and Political Competition. Comparative Political Studies.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414007313118

IV. Anti-Corruption Systems and Integrity Frameworks

OECD    (2017).    OECD    Integrity    Framework.                https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/public-integrity.html

UNODC (2005). United Nations Convention against Corruption UNCAC).
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf

World     Bank     (2020).     Enhancing     Government     Effectiveness                  and Transparency.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/publication/enhancing-government-effectiveness-and-transparency-the-fight-against-corruption

V. Western Balkans Governance Context

European Commission (2023 – 2025). Enlargement Reports. Governance, Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption        Chapters.                                     https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

SIGMA/OECD(2024). Public Administration the Western Balkans.
https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/03/public-administration-in-the-western-balkans-2024_07555c85/1ec4c18f-en.pdf

Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit. Corruption and Governance Indicators. https://freedomhouse.org/reports/nations-transit/nations-transit-methodology

BIRN (2023 – 2025). Country corruption and integrity investigations. https://birn.eu.com/

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Topic 2: Political settlement dynamics and state capture The Objectives

This topic examines how political settlement dynamics shape the distribution of power, influence institutional behaviour and create conditions in which corruption becomes systemic. It explores how political competition, elite bargaining, party-state relations and control over economic resources affect the functioning of public institutions, with particular attention to state capture, where powerful actors shape rules, institutions and enforcement to protect their interests.

The topic equips participants to analyse how political incentives, informal networks and structural power imbalances influence integrity outcomes in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia, and how these dynamics interact with formal anti-corruption frameworks.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how political settlements shape institutional behaviour and corruption risks. They will be able to explain how elite bargaining, party dominance and control over state resources influence governance outcomes, and how state capture emerges when political or economic actors shape rules, appointments and enforcement to their advantage.

Participants will also be able to analyse how political incentives, informal networks, media ecosystems and economic structures influence integrity systems in their national contexts. They will gain the capacity to identify where political settlement dynamics constrain reform feasibility and where openings for institutional strengthening may exist.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: political settlements → elite bargaining and incentives → party-state relations → control over institutions and resources → state capture → media and economic influence → implications for integrity systems → reform feasibility.

Political Settlements and Formal Institutions

A political settlement refers to the underlying distribution of power among political elites, institutions and influential economic or social actors. It is not the same as a formal constitutional or legal arrangement. Rather, it is the informal balance of power that determines how formal institutions actually function. This distinction is important because countries may adopt similar laws, oversight bodies or institutional structures while producing very different governance outcomes. Formal institutions define what should happen. Political settlements help explain what is likely to happen in practice, who can influence decisions, which rules are enforced and where institutional autonomy is limited.

In this sense, political settlements provide the deeper governance context within which corruption, integrity systems and state capture must be analysed. This mirrors the logic developed in Module 2, where formal constitutional and administrative rules often coexisted with informal political dynamics that shaped real outcomes.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which actors shape the political settlement in their country and how this affects institutional behaviour.

Elite Incentives and Political Behaviour

Political settlements are sustained not only by balances of power, but also by incentives. Elites support, resist or reshape institutions according to whether those institutions protect their access to office, resources, appointments, rents or legal protection.

Where elite incentives favour stability through institutionalised competition and credible rules, integrity systems are more likely to function. Where elite incentives favour discretionary control, patronage or selective enforcement, institutions may be maintained formally but used instrumentally.

Understanding elite incentives helps explain why reforms that are technically sound may still fail. If reforms threaten the distribution of power or resources within the settlement, they are likely to face resistance, delay or selective implementation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse not only who holds power, but what incentives powerful actors have to preserve or alter institutional rules.

Elite Bargaining, Party Dominance and Informal Power Structures

Political settlements are maintained through bargaining among elites. These bargains often determine access to public appointments, distribution of economic opportunities, control over regulatory and enforcement institutions and influence over public enterprises, procurement and major public projects.

Where a dominant party or coalition controls key levers of the state, political loyalty may become more important than merit or institutional autonomy. Where elites are

fragmented, institutions may be pulled in competing directions, weakening coherence and accountability while increasing the scope for selective enforcement and mutually tolerated abuses.

Informal networks (political, economic or personal) often play a decisive role in shaping these bargains. They influence recruitment and promotion, procurement decisions, regulatory enforcement and, in some cases, judicial or prosecutorial outcomes.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse how informal networks influence institutional decisions in their national context.

Party – State Fusion and Public Patronage

One of the clearest expressions of distorted political settlements is party-state fusion. This occurs when party structures penetrate public institutions so deeply that the boundary between public office and partisan control becomes blurred.

Party-state fusion often operates through public sector hiring, politicised promotions, acting positions, politically aligned boards of public enterprises and control over administrative careers. In such contexts, public employment may become a tool of patronage, and public enterprises may become channels for distributing resources, influence and protection.

This directly affects integrity systems. Where appointments depend on political alignment, internal accountability weakens, professionalism declines and anti-corruption institutions may find it harder to act against politically protected actors. This connects closely to Module 2, Topic 4, where politicised administration was shown to weaken executive accountability and administrative professionalism.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants where party-state fusion is most visible in their country – e.g., civil service, public enterprises, local government or oversight bodies.

State Capture: Concept and Mechanisms

State capture occurs when powerful political or economic actors shape the rules of the game (e.g., laws, regulations, appointments and enforcement priorities) to protect their interests. This differs from ordinary corruption in an important way – corruption usually involves rule-breaking while state capture involves rule-shaping.

This distinction is central. In ordinary corruption, actors violate existing rules. In state capture, actors influence how rules are written, interpreted or enforced so that private or partisan advantage is built into the system itself.

State capture can take different forms. Systemic capture affects the wider political and institutional order and shapes multiple sectors simultaneously. Sectoral capture may be concentrated in specific domains such as energy, procurement, construction, extractives, media regulation or public enterprises.

Mechanisms of capture may include influencing appointments to oversight bodies, shaping legislation to benefit specific actors, controlling procurement or concession flows, influencing judicial or prosecutorial decisions, shaping media narratives to reduce scrutiny and using public resources to reinforce political loyalty.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to distinguish between corruption as rule-breaking and state capture as rule-shaping, and between systemic capture and sector-specific capture.

Media, Economic Power and Informational Capture

Media ecosystems and economic structures play a central role in political settlements. When media outlets are politically aligned, economically dependent on state advertising or concentrated in ownership structures close to political power, scrutiny weakens and public narratives become easier to shape.

This can create informational capture or control over the information environment that limits exposure of wrongdoing, narrows public debate and protects dominant actors from scrutiny. Informational capture does not necessarily eliminate all criticism, but it can significantly influence what becomes visible, credible or politically costly.

Economic structures matter in a similar way. Where firms depend on political connections for market access, procurement, licensing or concessions, incentives for integrity decline. This can also lead to regulatory capture, where regulators, licensing authorities or procurement agencies become more responsive to powerful interests than to public rules.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on how media and economic structures influence integrity outcomes in their country.

Implications for Integrity Systems

Political settlement dynamics shape the effectiveness of integrity systems in several ways. Preventive mechanisms may exist formally but be selectively applied. Oversight institutions may have legal mandates but limited autonomy. Enforcement bodies may face political pressure or uneven follow-up. Appointments may prioritise loyalty over competence. Public enterprises may be used to distribute resources or influence. Procurement may become a channel for political financing.

This also helps explain the limits of the models introduced in Module 3, Topic 1. In captured systems, principal-agent tools often fail because monitoring bodies are not fully autonomous and sanctions are not impartial. Collective action traps persist because actors do not trust institutions to act fairly or consistently.

Institutions therefore matter not only for enforcement but also for institutional signalling. Consistent enforcement, public communication and visible impartiality can signal that rules matter. Selective enforcement or silence signals the opposite.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants where political settlement dynamics most visibly constrain integrity reforms and which institutions send the strongest or weakest integrity signals.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Reform feasibility depends on how proposed changes affect the political settlement. Reforms that threaten established power structures may face strong resistance, while reforms that align with elite incentives or external pressures may advance more easily.

Three categories of reform are useful here:

1. Technically desirable reforms – for example, stronger asset declaration verification, clearer procurement disclosure or better conflict-of-interest rules;
   1. Politically feasible reforms – for example, digitalisation, procedural simplification or selected transparency tools that do not fundamentally disrupt power arrangements;
   1. Behaviourally transformative reforms – for example, depoliticised appointments, credible enforcement, independent regulators and stronger institutional autonomy.

Sequencing also matters. Some reforms need to precede others. For example, transparency tools may have limited impact if oversight institutions cannot act on disclosed information; independent appointments may matter little if acting positions remain widespread; enforcement reforms may not change behaviour if public expectations remain shaped by selective protection.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify which reforms in their country fall into each category and which need to come first for wider reform to become credible.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

To help participants apply the topic in practice, trainers may use the following questions:

1. Who controls key public appointments?
2. Who controls public enterprises and major procurement flows?
3. Who shapes dominant media narratives?
4. Where are informal veto players located?
5. Which sectors are most exposed to rule-shaping rather than rule-breaking?
6. Which institutions have formal powers but weak real autonomy?

Teaching Note

This topic should guide participants from broad theories of corruption toward a political understanding of how power structures shape institutional performance. Trainers should emphasise that state capture is not simply “more corruption”. In fact, it is a different mode of governance in which formal institutions may be subordinated to entrenched interests.

Participants should be encouraged to diagnose capture risks in specific institutions or sectors, identify informal veto players, analyse the role of media and economic influence, and reflect on which reforms address symptoms and which address underlying power arrangements.

Country Context Applications

Participants should analyse political settlement dynamics across four dimensions:

(1) elite bargaining and party-state relations; (2) control over institutions and appointments; (3) influence over economic and media structures; (4) risks of state capture.

Albania

Albania’s political settlement is characterised by strong party competition but also by centralised party leadership and significant influence over public appointments. The European Commission’s report (2025) points to a relatively developed institutional anti-corruption framework and continued activity by SPAK (Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime), but also identifies weaknesses in preventive integrity, ethics implementation, integrity plans and broader administrative follow-up. This suggests that stronger formal enforcement institutions coexist with continued vulnerabilities to political influence and uneven institutional depth.

SPAK has helped strengthen high-level enforcement and may affect expectations in parts of the system, but it does not by itself change the broader political settlement. Risks remain in areas such as politically influenced appointments, procurement-related incentives, public enterprises and the wider relationship between political power and

access to economic opportunity. Media polarisation and politically mediated economic access also remain relevant to understanding Albania’s mixed risk environment.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania’s political settlement combines stronger formal reforms with persistent informal influence over appointments and resources, creating mixed risks of institutional capture in specific sectors.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s political settlement is shaped by a highly fragmented constitutional structure, identity-based political competition and differentiated accountability systems across state, entity and cantonal levels. The European Commission’s 2024 report continues to stress weak anti-corruption implementation, limited institutional coherence and the need to strengthen the independence and resources of prevention bodies at entity and cantonal level. It also points to a stronger coordinating role for APIK (Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption).

This fragmentation creates multiple centres of power rather than a single dominant captor. Entity-level and cantonal differences in prevention bodies, co-ordination and follow-up create overlapping capture risks across different parts of the system. The Sarajevo Canton anti-corruption office has often been cited as a relatively stronger example, which itself illustrates the unevenness of institutional performance. The 2025 Enlargement Communication explicitly flags state-capture risks in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Diagnostic takeaway: Fragmentation and identity-based political competition create multiple structural vulnerabilities to state capture across different levels of government, weakening coherence, accountability and institutional autonomy.

Serbia

Serbia’s political settlement is characterised by concentrated political power, strong party hierarchies and extensive use of acting positions and politicised appointments in public institutions. The European Commission’s report (2025) raises concerns about political capture of state institutions, weak accountability and limited transparency in major projects, while the 2024 report already highlighted weak progress in corruption control and the need for stronger monitoring and co-ordination of the anti-corruption strategy. Risks of state capture in Serbia are explicitly highlighted in the 2025 Enlargement Communication.

Media influence, ownership concentration and wider informational control reinforce political dominance, while oversight institutions face challenges in autonomy, follow-up and enforcement credibility. Political control over appointments, including acting positions, and vulnerabilities in procurement and public enterprises further strengthen systemic capture risks. In Serbia, the issue is therefore not only sectoral distortion, but wider settlement dynamics that shape how institutions behave.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s political settlement exhibits strong systemic capture risks, where concentrated political power, politicised appointments, media influence and control over institutions shape integrity outcomes more strongly than formal rules

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces political settlement theory, elite bargaining, state-capture mechanisms, party-state relations, media and economic influence, and reform feasibility using comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Political Settlement Mapping (30 min.)

Participants identify key actors, power relations and informal networks shaping governance;

• State Capture Diagnostic (20 min.)

Participants analyse where rule-shaping dynamics appear in their national context.

• Reform Feasibility Simulation (20 min.)

Groups evaluate which reforms are technically desirable, politically feasible and behaviourally transformative.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can integrity reforms be designed to navigate political settlement dynamics and reduce the risks of state capture while strengthening institutional autonomy and public accountability?

Key Takeaways

• Political settlements are not formal institutional blueprints. They are underlying distributions of power that shape how formal institutions actually function;
  • State capture involves rule-shaping, not only rule-breaking;
  • Party-state fusion, politicised appointments, media influence and control over economic resources can undermine integrity systems;
  • Fragmented settlements create multiple overlapping capture risks while concentrated settlements can generate systemic capture risks;
  • Sustainable reform     requires    aligning    technical improvements                with political incentives, institutional autonomy and broader accountability pressures.

List of Literature

II. Foundational Concepts

Mushtaq Khan (2010). Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. Growth-Enhancing Government.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265567069_Political_Settlements_and_the_ Governance_of_Growth-Enhancing_Institutions

Grzymała-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and Political Competition.  Comparative  Political  Studies, 41(4-5): 638-673.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414007313118?utm_source=research gate.net&utm_medium=article

Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000). Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition. World Bank  Institute. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/537461468766474836/pdf/multi-page.pdf

II.  Governance, Capture and Integrity

Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in              International                   Perspective. University                                                        of                   Chicago                         Press. https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v150y2012i3p793-795.html

World     Bank     (2020).     Enhancing     Government     Effectiveness                  and        Transparency.

III. Regional Monitoring

European Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports for Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.

European     Commission     (2025).      Communication     on      EU                         Enlargement     Policy. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/eb69a890-40d6-4696-801e-612d51709fdd_en?filename=2025+Communication+on+EU+Enlargement+Policy.pdf

SIGMA/OECD (2024). Public Administration in the Western Balkans. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/public-administration-in-the-western-balkans-2024_1ec4c18f-en.html

Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/NIT_2024_Digital_Booklet.pdf

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-

political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Topic 3: Transparency systems and political finance regulation

The Objectives

This topic examines how transparency systems and political finance regulation shape integrity, democratic accountability and corruption risks. It explores how access-to-information frameworks, open data, procurement transparency, beneficial ownership registers and public reporting mechanisms interact with political finance rules on donations, campaign spending, party financing and third-party influence.

The topic equips participants to analyse how transparency and political finance rules function in practice, how they can be manipulated or selectively enforced, and how political incentives, media ecosystems and informal networks shape their credibility in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how transparency reduces information asymmetry and supports accountability, and how political finance regulation influences party competition, campaign behaviour and corruption risks.

They will be able to assess access-to-information systems, procurement transparency, asset and interest disclosure, beneficial ownership registers and political finance oversight bodies. They will also be able to analyse how political incentives, media influence, economic concentration and informal networks shape the enforcement of transparency and political finance rules in their national contexts, and identify realistic pathways for strengthening integrity.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: transparency as an accountability tool → access to information → open data and procurement transparency

→ asset and interest disclosure → beneficial ownership → political finance rules → campaign finance and party funding → enforcement and oversight → informal influence and loopholes → reform feasibility.

Transparency as an Accountability Tool

Transparency and accountability are closely related, but they are not the same:

1. Transparency concerns the availability of information – whether decisions, spending, ownership structures or political financing are visible and understandable;
   1. Accountability concerns consequences – whether misuse of power leads to scrutiny, correction or sanction.

This distinction matters because transparency without verification or enforcement often produces only the appearance of openness. Information may be published, but if it is incomplete, inaccessible or ignored, it does not change behaviour.

A useful way to understand this is through a transparency chain: disclosure → accessibility

→ verification → enforcement → public accountability.

If the chain breaks at any point, transparency loses much of its practical value. Information may exist but not be searchable. Data may be accessible but not verified.

Violations may be visible but not sanctioned. In that case, transparency becomes procedural rather than transformative.

Transparency systems therefore work best when they are embedded in wider integrity systems that include oversight, institutional independence and credible sanctions. This also links directly to Topics 1 and 2 of Module 3 – transparency can reduce information asymmetry, but it cannot overcome state-capture risks or political settlement constraints on its own.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which transparency tools in their country actually change behaviour and which remain largely symbolic.

Access to Information and Open Data

Access-to-information (ATI) laws are the foundation of most transparency systems because they allow citizens, journalists and civil society organisations to request information about public decisions, spending and institutional performance.

In stronger systems, transparency does not rely only on individual requests. It also depends on proactive disclosure: governments publishing key budgets, contracts, datasets, reports and decisions without waiting to be asked. This reduces the burden on individual requesters and makes transparency more systematic.

Open data initiatives complement ATI frameworks by publishing information proactively in structured formats, especially in procurement, budgeting, public appointments and political finance. However, practical usability matters as much as formal disclosure. Many institutions publish information in non-searchable PDFs, fragmented documents or poorly structured formats without metadata. This may satisfy formal legal requirements while still limiting real transparency.

ATI implementation remains uneven across the region, including delays, restricted access and limited proactive disclosure. In Serbia, concerns remain about ATI implementation and broader transparency deficits. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, fragmentation affects consistency. Albania has made broader digitalisation progress, but practical access and follow-up still matter.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse whether ATI in their country leads to meaningful disclosure, whether information is proactively published and whether published data is actually usable.

Procurement Transparency and Public Spending

Public procurement is one of the highest-risk areas for corruption and political influence because it links public money, private firms and administrative discretion. Transparency in procurement is therefore central to integrity systems.

Transparency tools typically include e-procurement portals, publication of tender documents and contracts, open contracting data and red-flag tools that help identify suspicious patterns. However, corruption risks often persist after the contract is awarded. This is why contract implementation transparency matters – e.g., publication of contract amendments, information on delivery and payments, and transparency about subcontractors are all essential for meaningful scrutiny.

This area also links directly to political economy. Procurement can become a channel for political finance, patronage or economic influence where politically connected firms win disproportionate contracts or where public enterprises act as intermediaries in politically sensitive spending. In Serbia, EU Commission reporting continues to raise concerns about transparency in major projects. In Albania, procurement-related political influence

remains a relevant concern. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, fragmented procurement and oversight structures create uneven transparency and enforcement conditions.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants where procurement transparency is strongest in their country and where loopholes remain, especially after contract award.

Asset and Interest Disclosure

Asset and interest declaration systems are intended to reveal conflicts of interest, detect illicit enrichment and make hidden influence more visible. Their credibility depends less on the existence of declaration forms than on what happens after declarations are submitted.

Verification models vary. Some systems use random verification, some focus on risk-based verification, some rely mainly on complaints, and some apply more intensive checks to senior officials or politically exposed persons. Stronger systems also depend on systematic cross-checking with tax records, land registries, company data, procurement records and, where legally possible, other financial information.

In the Western Balkans, one recurring weakness is that declarations are submitted but verification remains limited or uneven. In Albania, EU Commission reporting specifically points to the need for more effective and transparent HIDAACI (High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest) verification and stronger procedures and resources. In Serbia, verification weaknesses remain part of broader preventive integrity concerns. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, fragmented institutional frameworks complicate consistency across jurisdictions.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to assess whether declaration systems in their country are credible oversight tools, and what type of verification model is actually used.

Bene𝑓icial Ownership Transparency

Beneficial ownership transparency is essential for understanding who really controls companies, foundations and other legal entities. It matters because formal company names often conceal the individuals who ultimately benefit from procurement, concessions, political financing or regulatory decisions.

These registers are most valuable when they are accurate, verified and linked to other systems such as procurement databases, political finance disclosures and conflict-of-interest controls. They become less useful when companies self-report without verification, when sanctions for false reporting are weak, or when politically exposed persons can hide behind proxies or layered ownership structures.

Beneficial ownership data is especially important in the Western Balkans because it can reveal links between business interests, public contracts and political influence. Its value increases significantly when oversight institutions can cross-check it against procurement awards, donations, concession holders or public appointments.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants how beneficial ownership data is used in their country, whether it is verified and whether it is linked to procurement or political finance oversight.

Political Finance Regulation: Rules and Risks

Political finance regulation concerns how parties, candidates and related actors raise and spend money. This includes party donations, campaign spending limits, public funding, third-party campaigning, media advertising and disclosure obligations.

Political finance rules shape party competition and can either reduce or reinforce corruption risks. Weak rules may allow wealthy donors, hidden funders or politically connected economic actors to gain disproportionate influence over policy, procurement, regulation or public appointments. They may also distort electoral competition by favouring incumbents.

Political finance is not only about donations. It also includes incumbency advantages created through misuse of public resources such as, for example, public employees being mobilised for campaigns, public vehicles or facilities being used politically, state advertising favouring aligned media or public enterprises being drawn into partisan activity.

The idea of shadow financing helps structure these risks. Shadow financing may include unreported donations, business-party exchanges, third-party campaigning without disclosure and, in some contexts, channels of foreign or opaque influence. These practices often matter as much as official campaign reports because they reveal how formal rules are bypassed in practice.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify which political finance risks are most visible in their country and whether they involve direct donations, misuse of public resources or shadow financing channels.

Oversight and Enforcement of Political Finance

Political finance rules matter only when monitored and enforced by institutions with real authority, expertise and credible sanctions. This requires independent supervisory bodies, timely reporting, audit capacity and legal powers to investigate and penalise violations.

A key distinction is between formal and de facto autonomy. An oversight body may be legally independent, but weakened by political appointments, budget dependence, limited investigative powers or weak follow-up. These situations could reflect the institutional autonomy challenges discussed in Topic 2.

Real-time transparency is an emerging issue. In many systems, campaign finance becomes visible only after elections, when political effects are already locked in. Stronger systems increasingly require real-time or near-real-time reporting of donations, spending, and media advertising. And this is still a major gap across the region.

EU Commission reporting (2025) on Serbia highlights ongoing concerns about campaign finance transparency and enforcement. In Albania, political advertising and campaign finance oversight remain vulnerable areas. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, fragmentation and weak co-ordination complicate oversight across levels of government.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants where the political finance oversight chain breaks down in their country (reporting, verification, auditing, sanctioning or follow-up)

Informal In𝑓luence, Loopholes and Shadow Financing

Formal transparency and political finance rules often coexist with informal influence channels that undermine their practical effect. These may include unreported donations, pressure on public employees to contribute or campaign, business actors financing political campaigns in exchange for contracts, public enterprises being used for political purposes or state advertising being directed toward politically aligned media.

These loopholes matter because they allow actors to benefit from opacity while still operating within a formally regulated system. They also connect directly to political settlement dynamics discussed in Topic 2. For example, informal financing often reinforces incumbent power, protects networks of influence and weakens fair competition.

Where shadow financing becomes normalised, transparency loses much of its preventive force. The issue is not only whether reports are filed, but whether important flows of influence remain outside the reporting framework altogether.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on which informal financing channels are most relevant in their country and whether they are linked to procurement, media or public enterprises.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Transparency and political finance reforms affect the incentives of political actors directly, which makes them politically sensitive. Therefore, reform feasibility depends on whether elites perceive such reforms as manageable procedural adjustments or as serious constraints on their access to resources, visibility and influence.

Three categories are useful:

1. Technically desirable reforms include improved reporting formats, digital disclosure systems, machine-readable open data, stronger beneficial ownership transparency and more robust declaration verification;
2. Politically feasible reforms may include procedural improvements, selected digital tools or transparency measures that increase information availability without fundamentally disrupting dominant political incentives;
3. Behaviourally transformative reforms include real-time campaign finance transparency, independent oversight with credible sanctioning powers, full beneficial ownership verification, depoliticised appointments and stricter control of public resource misuse;

Sequencing matters here as well. Some reforms depend on others. Open data matters more when oversight institutions can use it. Real-time reporting matters more when media and civil society can analyse it. Beneficial ownership transparency matters more when linked to procurement and political finance oversight.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which transparency and political finance reforms in their country are easiest to adopt, most resisted politically and most likely to change behaviour if implemented consistently.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

To help participants apply the topic in practice, trainers may use the following questions:

1. Is information published proactively or only on request?
2. Is published data searchable, machine-readable and usable?
3. Are asset and interest declarations actually verified?
4. Are procurement amendments, payments and subcontractors public?
5. Are political finance reports audited in practice?
6. Are sanctions applied consistently?
7. Which transparency tools in your country change behaviour, and which are mostly symbolic?
8. Where do political finance rules fail most often: reporting, verification or sanctions?

Teaching Note

This topic should help participants understand transparency not only as a normative principle but as a practical governance tool that shapes incentives within political and administrative systems. Trainers should emphasise that disclosure becomes meaningful only when it is accessible, verifiable and linked to consequences.

Participants should be encouraged to analyse transparency and political finance systems in their national context, identify where the transparency chain breaks down and reflect on where information availability leads to accountability and where it does not.

Country Context Applications

Participants should analyse transparency and political finance systems across four dimensions: (1) access to information and open data; (2) procurement and spending transparency; (3) asset, interest and ownership disclosure; (4) political finance rules and enforcement.

Albania

Albania has made visible progress in digitalisation and procurement transparency, especially through e-government services and procurement portals, which have reduced some opportunities for petty corruption and improved public access to services. At the same time, recent Commission reporting (2025) points to weaknesses in ATI implementation, limitations in HIDAACI’s verification capacity and the need for more effective and transparent checks of declarations. It also highlights continued concerns regarding financing transparency, media ownership concentration and the absence of stronger rules on indirect state advertising and transparency requirements for online media.

Political finance transparency remains affected by limited visibility of campaign spending and political advertising, while public enterprises and procurement continue to represent areas where political influence intersects with economic opportunity. Albania therefore combines comparatively strong digitalisation reforms with persistent weaknesses in verification, enforcement and broader political finance transparency.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania combines strong digitalisation and formal transparency tools with persistent gaps in ATI practice, HIDAACI verification, political advertising transparency and political finance oversight.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s transparency and political finance landscape is shaped by institutional fragmentation across state, entity and cantonal levels. ATI implementation varies significantly, legal frameworks differ across jurisdictions and procurement transparency is uneven. Fragmented procurement and disclosure environments create multiple gaps in consistency, comparability and enforcement. Commission reporting (2024) also continues to stress the need for stronger anti-corruption and oversight co-ordination.

Political finance oversight is complicated by multiple legal and institutional frameworks and weak co-ordination between supervisory bodies. This fragmentation creates opportunities for opaque spending, inconsistent reporting and weak sanctions, while allowing influence channels to vary across jurisdictions rather than following a single national pattern.

Fragmented transparency and political finance systems create uneven accountability, weak co-ordination and multiple vulnerabilities to opaque influence across Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Serbia

Serbia has formal transparency and political finance rules, but recent Commission reporting (2025) continues to highlight weak implementation, limited transparency in major projects and broader concerns about political influence. Transparency challenges are linked not only to ATI and asset declaration verification, but also to the wider political environment in which media influence, ownership concentration and state advertising affect public scrutiny. Procurement transparency concerns remain particularly relevant in major projects and exceptional procedures.

Political finance risks in Serbia include opaque donations, limited transparency of campaign financing, media influence and the use of public resources and public enterprises for political purposes. Oversight institutions face challenges in autonomy and enforcement, and sanctions are rarely applied with sufficient credibility to alter behaviour.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s transparency and political finance systems are formally developed but undermined by weak enforcement, media influence, opacity in major projects and political control over institutions.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces the key analytical concepts of transparency and political finance regulation, including the distinction between transparency and accountability, the transparency chain (disclosure → accessibility → verification → enforcement → accountability), access to information and proactive disclosure, procurement transparency and contract implementation, asset and interest declaration systems, beneficial ownership transparency, political finance rules and shadow financing, as well as oversight mechanisms and reform feasibility, illustrated through comparative examples from Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Transparency Chain Mapping (30 min.)

Participants analyse transparency systems in their country and identify where the chain breaks (disclosure, accessibility, verification or enforcement);

• Political Finance Diagnostic (20 min.)

Groups identify key political finance risks, including campaign financing, misuse of public resources, procurement links and shadow financing channels;

• Reform Feasibility Simulation (20 min.)

Participants classify potential reforms as technically desirable, politically feasible or behaviourally transformative.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can transparency and political finance reforms be designed so that disclosure leads not only to visibility, but to verification, enforcement and meaningful public accountability?

Key Takeaways

• Transparency makes information available whereas accountability ensures consequences for misuse of power;
  • The effectiveness of transparency depends on the whole transparency chain: disclosure, accessibility, verification, enforcement and accountability;
  • ATI, open data, procurement transparency, asset disclosure and beneficial ownership are core integrity tools, but they matter only when they are usable and acted upon;
  • Political finance regulation shapes party competition and corruption risks not only through donations, but also through misuse of public resources, shadow financing and media influence;
  • Sustainable reform requires linking transparency improvements to oversight capacity, institutional autonomy and political incentives.

List of Literature

OECD. OECD Public Integrity Indicators. https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/ Council of Europe GRECO. Evaluation and Compliance Reports.

OSCE/ODIHR (2015). Handbook for the Observation of Campaign Finance.
https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/f/8/135516.pdf

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

European Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports. Sections on Transparency and Political Finance. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Open Government Partnership. Open Data and Transparency Standards.
https://www.opengovpartnership.org/open-data/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Topic 4: Conflict of interest and whistleblower protection

The Objectives

This topic examines how conflict-of-interest (COI) systems and whistleblower protection frameworks function as core components of public integrity. It explores how COI rules prevent undue influence in public decision-making, how disclosure and recusal mechanisms operate, and how whistleblower systems enable early detection of misconduct.

The topic also analyses how political incentives, institutional capacity, organisational culture and informal practices shape the credibility of these mechanisms in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants should understand how conflict-of-interest regulation and whistleblower protection function as preventive integrity mechanisms rather than purely punitive tools. Participants will be able to explain how COI rules aim to manage risks before corruption occurs, how disclosure and recusal procedures are intended to protect impartial decision-making, and how whistleblower systems help detect misconduct that might otherwise remain hidden.

Participants will also be able to analyse how these systems operate in practice, including how institutional culture, political incentives, fear of retaliation and weak enforcement can undermine their effectiveness. Finally, they will be able to evaluate the credibility of COI and whistleblower frameworks in their national contexts and identify realistic pathways for strengthening prevention, detection and protection mechanisms.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: conflict of interest → disclosure and recusal → verification and sanctions → organisational culture and informal influence → whistleblowing as early detection → reporting channels and protection → retaliation risks → institutional follow-up → credibility and trust → reform feasibility.

Con𝑓lict of Interest as a Core Integrity Risk

Conflict of interest arises when a public official’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their official duties. Importantly, conflict of interest is not the same as corruption. Conflict of interest represents a risk of undue influence, while corruption is the outcome that may occur if such risks are not managed.

This distinction highlights the preventive nature of COI regulation. Integrity systems seek to identify and manage situations where private interests could distort public decisions before wrongdoing occurs.

International standards also emphasise the concept of perceived conflict of interest. Even when no actual influence exists, situations that appear to compromise impartiality can undermine public trust in institutions. Preventive integrity systems therefore aim to address both real and perceived conflicts.

Typical conflict-of-interest situations include:

• financial interests in regulated sectors;
• outside employment or business activities;
• gifts, hospitality or other benefits;

• political or organisational loyalties;
• revolving-door transitions between public and private sectors.

COI systems therefore aim to maintain impartial decision-making, protect institutional credibility and reinforce public confidence in governance.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify where COI risks most frequently arise in their countries (procurement, licensing, inspections, recruitment or appointments).

Disclosure, Recusal and Veri𝑓ication

Most conflict-of-interest systems rely on a combination of disclosure obligations, recusal mechanisms and institutional oversight. Public officials are typically required to disclose relevant interests, enabling oversight bodies to identify potential conflicts.

It is important to distinguish between asset declarations and conflict-of-interest declarations. Asset declarations focus on wealth, income and property ownership. Conflict-of-interest declarations focus on interests that could influence official decisions, such as business activities, professional roles or relationships with affected parties.

When a conflict arises, recusal mechanisms require officials to withdraw from decision-making processes. However, recusal is often the weakest component of COI systems. Effective systems therefore require (a) written recusal statements; (b) formal documentation of recusal decisions; (c) registers logging recusals; (d) independent review of recusal compliance.

Oversight institutions may also verify declarations and investigate violations. However, many COI systems struggle because declarations are collected but rarely verified, recusal decisions remain informal and sanctions are seldom applied. This dynamic reflects the principal-agent problem discussed in Topic 1 – rules alone do not change behaviour unless monitoring and enforcement mechanisms function effectively.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to examine whether COI declarations in their country are systematically verified or mainly administrative requirements.

Organisational Culture and Informal In𝑓luence

Formal conflict-of-interest rules operate within broader organisational cultures that shape how institutions behave in practice. Even strong legal frameworks can be undermined by informal norms and expectations. In some contexts, public officials may experience implicit pressure to avoid obstructing politically sensitive decisions or to favour connected actors. Career incentives may also influence behaviour, particularly when promotions depend more on loyalty than professional integrity.

Informal veto players may also shape decision-making processes. Political intermediaries, influential business actors or senior officials may exert pressure that discourages strict application of COI rules.

These dynamics illustrate how organisational culture interacts with formal integrity systems. Where loyalty and political alignment are prioritised over professional standards, conflict-of-interest safeguards risk becoming symbolic rather than effective.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants how informal expectations or career incentives influence COI behaviour within their countries.

Revolving Doors and Post-Public Employment Risks

Conflict-of-interest risks often extend beyond the period of public office. When officials move between government positions and private-sector roles connected to their previous responsibilities, concerns arise that decisions taken while in office may have been influenced by anticipated future employment. These “revolving-door” dynamics are particularly sensitive in sectors with high economic stakes, including infrastructure, energy, telecommunications and financial regulation.

To address these risks, many systems introduce cooling-off periods that restrict former officials from working in sectors they previously regulated or supervised. However, such restrictions are frequently circumvented through advisory roles, consultancies or informal influence networks.

Lobbying transparency also becomes important in this context. Where lobbying activities remain opaque, it becomes more difficult to monitor interactions between former officials and current decision-makers.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which sectors in their country are most exposed to revolving-door risks and whether cooling-off periods are effectively enforced.

Whistleblowing as an Early-Warning Mechanism

Whistleblowing systems allow individuals to report wrongdoing that would otherwise remain hidden inside institutions. These mechanisms play a critical role in detecting corruption, fraud, procurement irregularities and abuse of office.

Whistleblowing may occur through internal reporting channels, such as ethics officers or internal compliance units, or through external channels, including anti-corruption bodies, ombudsperson institutions or law enforcement authorities. In some cases, individuals turn to journalists or civil society organisations when institutional channels fail.

Anonymous reporting mechanisms are also increasingly recognised as important safeguards. While some systems allow anonymous reports, others require identifiable complainants, which may discourage reporting in environments where retaliation risks remain high.

Whistleblowing systems function most effectively when individuals believe that reports will be treated seriously, investigated impartially and followed by appropriate action.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether whistleblowing in their country is perceived as safe, risky or ineffective.

Retaliation Risks and Protection Mechanisms

Whistleblowers frequently face retaliation after reporting misconduct. Retaliation may take overt or subtle forms, including dismissal, demotion, disciplinary proceedings or reputational attacks. In many cases, retaliation occurs through less visible mechanisms such as negative performance evaluations, changes in job duties, forced relocation or social isolation within the workplace. Constructive dismissal where working conditions become intolerable is another common risk.

Effective protection systems therefore include safeguards such as confidentiality guarantees, protection against dismissal or demotion, burden-shifting provisions requiring employers to prove no retaliation occurred, interim relief measures during investigations, access to legal assistance, independent oversight of retaliation complaints.

In many Western Balkan contexts, retaliation remains difficult to prove, which discourages potential whistleblowers from coming forward.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to discuss what forms of retaliation are most common in their institutions.

Follow-Up, Enforcement and Credibility

The credibility of both conflict-of-interest and whistleblower systems ultimately depends on what happens after reports or disclosures are made. A lack of follow-up is one of the main reasons these systems fail to generate trust. When reports are ignored, investigations delayed or sanctions applied selectively, institutional credibility erodes rapidly. Conversely, visible enforcement actions send strong signals that integrity rules are taken seriously.

Therefore, credibility depends on consistent enforcement, transparent reporting by oversight bodies and impartial investigation procedures. This logic mirrors the transparency chain discussed in Topic 3 – disclosure alone does not produce accountability without verification and enforcement.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether oversight institutions in their country publicly report outcomes of COI and whistleblower investigations.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Conflict-of-interest enforcement and whistleblower protection are politically sensitive reforms because they affect appointments, procurement decisions and access to information. Therefore, reform feasibility depends not only on technical design but also on political incentives, institutional autonomy and organisational trust.

Technically desirable reforms may include improved declaration formats, digital reporting systems and clearer recusal procedures. Politically feasible reforms may involve incremental improvements such as internal reporting channels or better guidance for officials. Behaviourally transformative reforms involve stronger institutional autonomy, credible sanctions for COI violations, robust whistleblower protection and depoliticised appointments.

Whistleblowing reforms are particularly dependent on trust-building. Without confidence that reports will lead to fair investigations and protection from retaliation, even well-designed legal frameworks will remain underused.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

Conflict-of-interest checklist

• Are COI declarations updated regularly?
• Are recusal decisions documented and monitored?
• Are gifts and hospitality logged and published?
• Are declaration systems cross-checked with other databases?

Whistleblowing checklist

• Are reports acknowledged within a clear timeframe?
• Are whistleblowers informed about investigation outcomes?
• Are retaliation cases investigated and publicly reported?
• Do employees trust reporting channels?

Teaching Note

This topic introduces conflict-of-interest and whistleblower protection systems as preventive integrity mechanisms rather than purely legal compliance tools. Trainers should emphasise that conflict of interest represents a risk of undue influence, while corruption is a possible outcome if such risks are not managed.

Participants should reflect on how disclosure, recusal and verification mechanisms function in practice, and how organisational culture, political incentives and informal influence may weaken their effectiveness.

The whistleblowing component highlights reporting systems as early-warning mechanisms for detecting misconduct. Trainers should encourage participants to assess the credibility of reporting channels, retaliation risks and the importance of consistent follow-up in building institutional trust.

Participants should analyse how these systems operate in their own contexts and identify realistic reforms to strengthen prevention, protection and accountability.

Country Context Applications

Participants should analyse COI and whistleblower systems across four dimensions: (1) COI disclosure and verification; (2) recusal and enforcement; (3) whistleblower reporting channels and protection; (4) institutional follow-up and credibility.

Albania

Albania has a relatively comprehensive legal framework governing conflicts of interest and whistleblower protection. Oversight responsibilities are primarily exercised by HIDAACI (High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest). European Commission reporting (2025) notes that while the legal framework is largely aligned with international standards, verification capacity remains limited and systematic cross-checking of declarations is still developing. Integrity plans have been introduced across public institutions, but their implementation remains uneven.

Whistleblower protection legislation exists and provides formal reporting channels. Albania has enacted a new, strengthened framework for whistleblower protection, Law No. 96/2025 “On whistleblowing and the protection of whistleblowers”, effective February 5, 2026. This law aligns with EU standards (Directive 2019/1937), mandating that public and private entities with over 50 employees establish internal reporting mechanisms for misconduct and provides strong protection against retaliation However, the use of these channels remains relatively limited due to fear of retaliation and low trust in internal reporting systems.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania combines relatively strong legal frameworks with weak verification capacity and limited use of whistleblower mechanisms.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s conflict-of-interest and whistleblower systems are shaped by the country’s fragmented governance structure. Legal frameworks exist at state, entity and cantonal levels, resulting in significant differences in implementation and enforcement. European Commission reporting (2024) highlights the absence of a unified conflict-of-interest framework, inconsistent enforcement across jurisdictions and fragmented whistleblower protection legislation. For example, different whistleblower protection regimes exist in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and Brcˇko District. This fragmentation complicates oversight coordination and creates uneven protection for individuals reporting misconduct.

Diagnostic takeaway: Institutional fragmentation produces multiple gaps in conflict-of-interest enforcement and whistleblower protection across Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Serbia

Serbia has established legal frameworks governing conflict-of-interest regulation and whistleblower protection. Oversight institutions monitor declarations and investigate potential violations. However, European Commission reporting (2025) continues to highlight challenges related to enforcement capacity, political influence and the extensive use of acting positions in public administration, which can weaken institutional autonomy.

Although whistleblower protection laws exist, retaliation cases rarely result in sanctions, and institutional follow-up remains inconsistent. Media influence and political control over public enterprises also create additional conflict-of-interest risks.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s legal frameworks are formally developed but weakened by selective enforcement, political influence and low trust in reporting mechanisms.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces conflict-of-interest regulation, disclosure and recusal mechanisms, whistleblower protection frameworks, retaliation risks and institutional oversight using comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Conflict-of-interest risk mapping (30 min.)

Participants identify institutional areas most exposed to COI risks.

• Whistleblower system diagnostic (20 min.)

Participants analyse the credibility of reporting channels and protection mechanisms.

• Reform feasibility simulation (20 min.)

Groups classify reforms as technically desirable, politically feasible or behaviourally transformative.

Integrative

Conflict-of-interest systems prevent undue influence through disclosure, recusal and verification;

• Whistleblower protection enables early detection of hidden misconduct;
  • Both systems depend heavily on trust, organisational culture and credible enforcement;
  • Fragmentation, political influence and weak verification frequently undermine effectiveness;
  • Sustainable reform requires linking technical improvements with institutional autonomy, enforcement capacity and behavioural change;

List of Literature

OECD. OECD Public Integrity Indicators. https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/

Council of Europe GRECO. Evaluation and Compliance Reports.

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

European Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

UNODC (2015). Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons. https://track.unodc.org/track/en/track/resourcehub/2015/resource_guide_on_good_p ractices_in_the_protection_of_reporting_persons.html

Transparency International. Conflict of Interest and Whistleblower Protection Standards.
https://www.transparency.org/en/the-organisation/conflict-of-interest-policy

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Topic 5: Reform obstacles and institutional traps

The Objectives

This topic examines why anti-corruption reforms often fail to produce meaningful changes in governance even when legal frameworks and institutions appear well developed. Building on the previous topics of this module, the session analyses the structural and behavioural obstacles that frequently undermine integrity reforms, including political incentives, institutional fragmentation, administrative capacity constraints and informal influence networks.

Participants learn how to diagnose institutional traps that prevent reforms from translating into practice and how to assess reform feasibility in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants should understand why anti-corruption reforms frequently encounter implementation gaps despite strong legal frameworks. Participants will be able to analyse how political incentives, institutional fragmentation, selective enforcement and administrative capacity constraints shape the effectiveness of integrity systems.

They will also develop the ability to identify institutional traps that prevent reforms from producing behavioural change and assess which reforms are technically desirable, politically feasible or behaviourally transformative.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: implementation gap → reform incentives → institutional traps → selective enforcement → fragmentation and coordination → administrative capacity → symbolic compliance → reform fatigue → credibility and trust → reform feasibility.

Why Reforms Fail Despite Good Laws

Topic 5 brings together the core insights developed throughout Module 3 and explains why integrity reforms so often fall short of producing real behavioural change. The earlier topics have already shown that corruption is not simply a matter of weak rules, but of deeper incentive structures and institutional dynamics. Topic 1 demonstrated that behaviour inside institutions is shaped by incentives, expectations and information asymmetries. Topic 2 revealed how political settlements and patterns of state capture influence how institutions actually function, regardless of what the law prescribes. Topic 3 showed that transparency mechanisms lose much of their value when they are not accompanied  by verification  and  enforcement.  Topic 4  highlighted  that conflict-of-interest and whistleblowing frameworks depend heavily on organisational culture, trust and the credibility of protection mechanisms. Topic 5 synthesises these insights by asking a central question: why do reforms that look strong on paper so often fail in practice? The answer lies in the persistent gap between adopting reforms and implementing them in a way that changes behaviour.

Most integrity reforms follow a predictable trajectory. They begin with policy adoption, when governments introduce new laws, strategies or institutions often in response to external pressure or political signalling needs. The next stage is policy implementation, where institutions attempt to apply these rules in real administrative settings. Only after this stage can reforms generate policy impact, meaning they begin to influence incentives, behaviour and governance outcomes.

In many governance systems, reforms progress smoothly through the first stage but encounter serious obstacles during implementation. Institutions may lack the autonomy, resources or political backing needed to enforce new rules. Informal networks may override formal procedures. Oversight bodies may exist in law but remain weak in practice. As a result, reforms that appear ambitious on paper fail to translate into meaningful change on the ground. This implementation gap is one of the most common reasons why anti-corruption reforms produce extensive legislation and new institutions. However, they leave underlying governance practices largely untouched.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on where reforms most often break down in their national systems – for example, during adoption, implementation or the stage where reforms are expected to produce real impact.

Reform Incentives and Political Economy

Anti-corruption reforms are shaped not only by technical policy considerations but also by the incentives of political actors. Governments often support anti-corruption reforms because they signal commitment to international standards, strengthen relations with external partners or support EU accession processes. At the same time, effective enforcement may threaten networks of influence connected to public procurement, political appointments or state-owned enterprises. This creates a structural tension between reform commitments and political incentives. Governments may adopt strategies, laws and institutions while avoiding reforms that would significantly constrain political control over key resources. As a result, reforms may prioritise institutional form over institutional behaviour, producing visible institutional changes without necessarily altering underlying governance practices.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which anti-corruption reforms in their countries were primarily domestically driven and which were mainly adopted under external pressure.

Institutional Traps in Integrity Systems

Anti-corruption reforms often encounter institutional traps that prevent formal rules from producing meaningful impact:

1. One common trap is the legalistic reform trap, where governance systems accumulate increasingly complex legislation without building the administrative capacity needed for implementation. Institutions may be formally required to comply with numerous procedures but lack the resources to enforce them effectively;
2. A second trap involves institutional proliferation. New agencies are frequently created to demonstrate reform commitment, but their mandates overlap with existing institutions. Instead of strengthening accountability, this may produce confusion over responsibilities and dilute enforcement capacity;
3. Another recurring trap is monitoring without enforcement. Institutions collect declarations, reports or risk assessments but rarely follow these processes with sanctions or corrective action.

Two additional traps frequently appear in reform environments:

1. Mandate inflation occurs when institutions receive new responsibilities without corresponding resources, expertise or authority. As mandates expand, implementation capacity becomes increasingly strained;
2. Coordination traps emerge when several institutions depend on each other for enforcement but operate with misaligned incentives or weak information sharing mechanisms;

Finally, reforms may fall into symbolic compliance, where institutions adopt formal procedures primarily to demonstrate alignment with international standards while governance practices remain largely unchanged.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify which institutional traps appear most frequently in their countries.

Political Capture and Selective Enforcement

Selective enforcement represents one of the most damaging obstacles to effective integrity systems. When enforcement decisions depend on political considerations rather than objective legal standards, anti-corruption systems lose credibility. Some investigations may be pursued vigorously while others remain ignored.

Selective enforcement generates perverse incentives within institutions. Honest officials may feel unprotected, while corrupt actors may perceive that political connections provide protection. Over time, the signalling power of enforcement weakens and informal networks become more influential.

In some contexts, enforcement becomes strategic enforcement, where investigative tools are used selectively to discipline political rivals or reward loyalty. This dynamic reflects insights from political settlement theory discussed earlier in the module.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether enforcement patterns in their countries appear consistent or politically selective.

Fragmentation and Coordination Failures

Anti-corruption systems often involve multiple institutions responsible for prevention, investigation, prosecution and oversight. Fragmentation can appear in two forms:

1. Vertical fragmentation occurs when responsibilities are distributed across different levels of government. Bosnia & Herzegovina provides a clear example, where authority is divided among state, entity, cantonal and municipal institutions;
2. Horizontal fragmentation occurs when several agencies operate at the same administrative level with overlapping mandates, as is often the case in Albania and Serbia.

Fragmentation becomes particularly problematic when information sharing mechanisms are weak. Oversight institutions may lack access to procurement databases, tax information, asset declarations or beneficial ownership data. Without effective coordination and data integration, anti-corruption systems risk becoming administratively complex but operationally ineffective.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which institutions in their countries are responsible for corruption prevention, investigation and oversight.

Administrative Capacity Constraints

Even when political support for reform exists, administrative capacity limitations can significantly constrain implementation. For example, integrity systems require specialised expertise in areas such as financial investigation, forensic accounting, data analytics, regulatory auditing and corruption risk assessment. Many institutions responsible for integrity oversight face shortages of these skills.

Capacity gaps may also arise from outdated IT systems, limited case management tools, insufficient staffing levels or weak analytical units capable of identifying corruption risks.

Another important challenge is capacity asymmetry. Political actors and private networks often possess greater financial and organisational resources than the oversight institutions responsible for monitoring them. This imbalance can undermine the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, strengthening administrative capacity requires not only training and staffing improvements but also modern information systems, data integration and specialised investigative tools.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which institutions in their countries face the most significant technical capacity constraints.

Symbolic Compliance and Reform Fatigue

Repeated cycles of anti-corruption reform can eventually generate reform fatigue within public institutions. Officials may become accustomed to adopting new strategies, action plans or reporting requirements without expecting meaningful changes in institutional

behaviour. This phenomenon is often described as isomorphic mimicry, where institutions imitate international best practices to gain legitimacy while maintaining existing governance practices.

Donor-driven reform cycles may unintentionally reinforce this pattern. External partners encourage the adoption of strategies, plans or institutional reforms, but implementation capacity and incentives remain unchanged. Over time, this dynamic can produce reform fatigue among both public officials and citizens, weakening trust in reform initiatives.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether anti-corruption reforms in their countries are perceived as genuine improvements or recurring policy announcements.

Trust, Legitimacy and Institutional Credibility

The effectiveness of integrity systems depends heavily on institutional credibility. Institutions send signals to society through their behaviour. Consistent enforcement, transparent communication and visible impartiality signal that rules apply equally to all actors. These signals influence whether individuals are willing to report corruption, comply with integrity rules or trust public institutions.

Trust also demonstrates strong asymmetry. It takes time to build but can be lost quickly when institutions appear politically influenced or ineffective. Therefore, strengthening institutional credibility requires consistent enforcement, transparent reporting of outcomes and visible independence of oversight bodies.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to discuss whether citizens trust anti-corruption institutions in their countries.

Reform Feasibility and Political Incentives

Integrity reforms differ in their political and institutional feasibility:

1. Some reforms are technically desirable, such as improving risk analysis systems or introducing digital transparency tools;
2. Others are politically feasible, including incremental improvements to reporting procedures or administrative guidance;
3. More ambitious reforms are behaviourally transformative, requiring stronger institutional autonomy, credible sanctions and depoliticised appointment processes.

Understanding these distinctions allows policymakers to identify reforms that can realistically improve integrity systems under existing political conditions.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which reforms in their countries appear technically desirable but politically difficult to implement.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

Participants can assess reform feasibility using the following matrix.

Reform Feasibility Matrix

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to classify recent anti-corruption reforms in their countries using this matrix.

Teaching Note

This topic helps participants understand why anti-corruption reforms frequently encounter structural and political obstacles. Trainers should emphasise that reform success depends not only on legal frameworks but also on political incentives, institutional capacity and organisational behaviour.

Participants should analyse institutional traps such as symbolic compliance, selective enforcement and fragmented oversight structures. The discussion should encourage participants to assess reform feasibility realistically and identify conditions under which integrity reforms can produce lasting institutional change.

Country Context Applications

Participants should analyse reform obstacles across three dimensions: (1) institutional architecture; (2) political incentives; (3) administrative capacity.

Albania

Albania has undertaken extensive anti-corruption reforms, particularly within the justice sector, including the establishment of the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) and strengthened oversight mechanisms for asset declarations and public procurement. SPAK has delivered a growing track record in high-level corruption cases, but progress in criminal enforcement has not automatically translated into broader administrative integrity. European Commission assessments (2024, 2025) highlight persistent weaknesses in High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI)’s verification capacity, the use of procurement exemptions, especially in major projects, and governance vulnerabilities in state-owned enterprises. Preventive integrity systems remain uneven across institutions, and coordination between oversight bodies continues to evolve.

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania demonstrates strong reform momentum, but broader administrative integrity reforms remain uneven.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina faces deep structural challenges stemming from its highly fragmented governance system, where authority over integrity frameworks is divided across state, entity, cantonal and municipal levels. This fragmentation results in different legal frameworks for conflict of interest, procurement oversight and whistleblower protection across jurisdictions, producing uneven enforcement and persistent coordination difficulties.

European Commission assessments (2024, 2025) highlight the absence of a unified corruption risk assessment framework, limited coordination among integrity institutions and significant variation in the effectiveness of prevention and oversight mechanisms. While some jurisdictions such as, for example, Sarajevo Canton have introduced comparatively stronger integrity tools, these remain exceptions within a system marked by institutional inconsistency.

Diagnostic takeaway: Bosnia & Herzegovina illustrates how institutional fragmentation weakens the coherence, coordination and overall effectiveness of anti-corruption systems.

Serbia

Serbia has established a range of anti-corruption institutions and legal frameworks aligned with European standards, including conflict-of-interest regulation, whistleblower protection legislation and a national anti-corruption strategy. However, structural governance challenges continue to limit their practical impact.

European Commission assessments (2024, 2025) highlight persistent concerns regarding political influence over public administration, the extensive use of acting positions in public institutions and limited follow-up on corruption investigations, particularly at higher levels. These factors weaken the credibility of enforcement and reduce the deterrent effect of integrity mechanisms. In addition, non-transparent state advertising practices and broader media influence have been identified as governance factors that affect public scrutiny, transparency and accountability.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia illustrates how political influence, weak enforcement credibility and media-related governance pressures can undermine otherwise well-developed legal and institutional frameworks.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces reform incentives, institutional traps, selective enforcement and reform feasibility using comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Institutional trap mapping (30 min.)

Participants identify institutional traps within their national systems;

• Reform feasibility matrix exercise (20 min.)

Participants classify reforms by feasibility and capacity;

• Institutional trust discussion (10 min.)

Participants analyse how credibility influences anti-corruption reforms.

Integrative Closing Reflection

Why do anti-corruption reforms often produce new institutions and strategies but limited behavioural change?

Key Takeaways

• Integrity reforms often fail because implementation gaps emerge between legal adoption and behavioural impact;
  • Institutional traps such as mandate inflation, coordination failures and symbolic compliance weaken reform effectiveness;
  • Selective enforcement undermines credibility and strengthens informal networks;
  • Fragmentation and administrative capacity constraints limit coordination and oversight;
  • Sustainable reform requires aligning political incentives, institutional capacity and enforcement credibility.

List of Literature

Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000). Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition. World Bank Institute.
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/537461468766474836/pdf/multi-page.pdf

Mushtaq Khan (2010). Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. Growth-Enhancing Government.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265567069_Political_Settlements_and_the_ Governance_of_Growth-Enhancing_Institutions

Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcock (2017). Building State Capability. Evidence, Analysis, Action. Oxford University Press. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/bb540dab-9bbb-45ea-8ef1-4843b24dd432/624551.pdf

Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. University of Chicago Press. https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v150y2012i3p793-795.htmlOECD. OECD Public Integrity Indicators. https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

European Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Council of Europe GRECO. Evaluation and Compliance Reports.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations

World Bank (2020). Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/publication/enhancing-government-effectiveness-and-transparency-the-fight-against-corruption

Transparency International (2025). Corruption Perceptions Index and Governance Analysis. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Topic 6: Designing anti-corruption strategies aligned with EU standards

The Objectives

This topic examines how national anti-corruption strategies translate political commitments into coordinated governance reforms aligned with EU standards. It explores how strategic frameworks combine prevention, enforcement, transparency and institutional accountability, and how political incentives and administrative capacity influence their implementation.

Participants learn how to assess whether anti-corruption strategies function as operational governance tools or remain largely symbolic policy frameworks.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will understand how anti-corruption strategies are designed and implemented within EU governance frameworks.

Participants will be able to assess the credibility of strategic frameworks, analyse how prevention and enforcement mechanisms are coordinated, and evaluate whether national strategies address structural obstacles such as institutional fragmentation, selective enforcement and administrative capacity constraints.

They will also develop the ability to identify realistic pathways for strengthening strategic coherence, implementation credibility and long-term reform sustainability.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic should follow a structured analytical progression: anti-corruption strategies → strategic credibility → EU governance standards → strategic coherence → risk-based approaches → prevention and enforcement balance → institutional coordination → monitoring and evaluation → implementation credibility → reform sustainability.

Anti-Corruption Strategies as Governance Frameworks

National anti-corruption strategies are intended to function as overarching governance frameworks that coordinate integrity reforms across government institutions. Instead of focusing on individual laws or agencies, strategies seek to align prevention, transparency, enforcement and oversight mechanisms within a single policy framework.

In principle, strategic frameworks help governments translate political commitments into coordinated institutional action. They establish priorities, define responsibilities and create monitoring mechanisms that allow reform progress to be assessed over time. Ideally, strategies also provide a common reference point for public institutions, oversight bodies, civil society organisations and international partners working on governance reforms.

In practice, however, the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies varies widely. Some operate as practical governance tools that guide institutional behaviour and resource allocation. Others remain largely declarative policy documents adopted to demonstrate political commitment to international standards. The difference between these two models often lies not in the formal design of the strategy but in the political and institutional conditions that shape its implementation.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether anti-corruption strategies in their countries influence everyday institutional behaviour or mainly function as policy statements.

Strategic Credibility

A central question in assessing anti-corruption strategies is whether they are credible. Strategic credibility refers to the extent to which a strategy is capable of producing real institutional change rather than merely signalling reform intentions.

Several factors determine credibility:

1. Political commitment is essential. Reforms are more likely to succeed when political leadership consistently supports enforcement and accountability;
2. Institutional autonomy also matters, as oversight bodies require sufficient independence to investigate corruption without political interference;
3. Resource allocation represents another critical element. Strategies that lack dedicated budgets, trained staff or analytical capacity are unlikely to influence governance practices.
4. Equally important is enforcement follow-up. Preventive measures and investigative mechanisms must lead to visible corrective action or sanctions when violations occur;
5. Monitoring transparency plays an important role in building credibility. Public reporting on implementation progress allows parliaments, civil society organisations and the media to assess whether reforms are producing tangible results.

Where these elements are absent, strategies risk functioning primarily as instruments of political signalling rather than effective governance reforms.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether anti-corruption strategies are credible governance instruments or primarily symbolic commitments in their countries.

Strategic Coherence

Another important dimension of effective strategy design is coherence. Many anti-corruption strategies suffer from excessive scope and fragmented priorities. Action plans may include dozens of measures without clearly identifying which reforms are most important or most feasible. Strategic coherence requires a clear connection between corruption risk diagnostics and policy actions. High-risk sectors should receive priority attention, while institutional responsibilities and implementation timelines must remain realistic.

When strategies attempt to address too many policy areas simultaneously, implementation capacity becomes diluted and coordination becomes more difficult. As a result, reforms may advance unevenly across institutions, reducing the overall impact of the strategy.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to examine whether strategic priorities in their countries correspond to the most significant corruption risks.

EU Governance Standards and Integrity Frameworks

Anti-corruption strategies in the Western Balkans are strongly influenced by EU enlargement policy and the governance standards associated with the accession process. The EU’s current enlargement methodology emphasises a “fundamentals first” approach that prioritises reforms in three areas: rule of law, democratic institutions and public administration reform.

Within this framework, anti-corruption policies form part of broader governance reforms under Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis. Enlargement assessments regularly evaluate the effectiveness of corruption prevention mechanisms, investigative institutions and transparency frameworks.

EU alignment also interacts with a wider ecosystem of international integrity standards. Council of Europe monitoring through GRECO evaluates national frameworks for corruption prevention and political integrity. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) provides global standards on prevention, criminalisation and international cooperation. At the policy level, the OECD Public Integrity Framework and SIGMA Principles of Public Administration provide guidance on building integrated integrity systems across public administration. Together, these frameworks encourage governments to develop coordinated anti-corruption strategies that combine prevention, enforcement and institutional accountability.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants how EU accession incentives influence anti-corruption policy design in their countries.

Risk-Based Strategic Design

Modern anti-corruption strategies increasingly rely on risk-based approaches that identify sectors where corruption vulnerabilities are highest. Rather than applying generic reforms across the entire public administration, risk-based governance focuses on specific institutional environments where corruption risks are particularly significant. Public procurement, infrastructure investment, state-owned enterprises, licensing systems and local government administration often represent high-risk areas. Therefore, risk-based strategies rely on analytical tools such as corruption risk registers, institutional integrity plans, procurement red-flag indicators and sector-specific risk assessments.

However, the effectiveness of these approaches depends on whether identified risks lead to practical mitigation measures. In many governance systems, corruption risk assessments identify vulnerabilities but fail to translate them into operational reforms. Thus, risk identification represents only the first stage of effective prevention. Strategies must also specify institutional controls, oversight mechanisms and enforcement procedures capable of addressing identified risks.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse whether corruption risk assessments in their countries lead to concrete institutional changes.

Prevention – Enforcement Balance

Anti-corruption strategies generally combine two complementary policy approaches: prevention and enforcement:

1. Preventive integrity systems aim to reduce corruption risks before violations occur. These mechanisms include transparency policies, conflict-of-interest regulation, procurement oversight, administrative controls and internal audit procedures;

• Enforcement mechanisms address corruption once misconduct has occurred. These include investigative authorities, specialised prosecutors, disciplinary procedures and asset recovery mechanisms.

Maintaining a balanced relationship between prevention and enforcement is essential. Strategies that focus primarily on criminal prosecution may neglect structural governance weaknesses that enable corruption risks to emerge. Conversely, strategies that emphasise preventive policies without credible enforcement may fail to deter misconduct.

Another challenge concerns enforcement bottlenecks. Case backlogs, limited financial investigation capacity and weak cooperation between investigative bodies can reduce the effectiveness of enforcement systems. When such bottlenecks persist, the deterrent effect of anti-corruption policies may remain limited.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether corruption control policies in their countries rely primarily on criminal enforcement or preventive integrity systems.

Institutional Coordination

Anti-corruption strategies typically involve multiple institutions responsible for prevention, investigation, prosecution and oversight. Effective implementation therefore depends heavily on institutional coordination.

Coordination operates in two dimensions. Horizontal coordination refers to cooperation between ministries, agencies and oversight bodies operating at the same administrative level. Vertical coordination concerns the relationship between central government institutions and regional or local authorities responsible for implementing integrity policies.

Coordination challenges frequently arise when information systems remain fragmented. Oversight institutions may lack access to procurement data, tax information, asset declarations or beneficial ownership registers maintained by other institutions. When administrative databases are not interoperable, anti-corruption systems may operate in isolation rather than as integrated governance frameworks.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether institutions responsible for corruption prevention and enforcement share information effectively in their countries.

Monitoring, Indicators and Evaluation

Monitoring mechanisms play a central role in determining whether anti-corruption strategies produce meaningful governance improvements. Many strategies include monitoring frameworks that track the implementation of action plans and institutional activities. However, monitoring systems often focus primarily on procedural outputs. These may include the number of training sessions organised, reports produced or coordination meetings held. While such indicators provide information about administrative activity, they do not necessarily reveal whether corruption risks are declining or whether governance practices are improving. Outcome-oriented monitoring focuses instead on measurable governance changes. These may include improved verification of asset declarations, reduced procurement risks, stronger enforcement credibility or increased public trust in oversight institutions.

Independent monitoring mechanisms also strengthen strategic accountability. Parliamentary oversight, civil-society monitoring initiatives and investigative journalism can complement official reporting and contribute to greater transparency in strategy implementation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to examine whether monitoring indicators in their national strategies measure activities or real governance outcomes.

Implementation Credibility and Political Incentives

The implementation of anti-corruption strategies is strongly influenced by political incentives. Governments may adopt ambitious strategies to demonstrate alignment with EU standards or to respond to international expectations. However, implementation may remain limited when reforms threaten political control over key economic or administrative resources.

This dynamic creates a distinction between political signalling and political commitment. Strategies adopted primarily for signalling purposes may include extensive action plans and institutional reforms but produce limited behavioural change. Therefore, implementation credibility depends on consistent enforcement, institutional autonomy and adequate resource allocation. Without these conditions, even well-designed strategies may struggle to produce lasting governance improvements.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse whether anti-corruption strategies in their countries reflect genuine political commitment or primarily serve as political signalling.

Reform Sustainability

Sustaining anti-corruption reforms over time requires institutional stability and administrative capacity. Two governance factors frequently influence reform sustainability:

1. Institutional memory plays an important role. Frequent leadership turnover, acting appointments and politically driven administrative changes can weaken continuity in reform implementation. When institutional leadership changes frequently, strategic priorities may shift before reforms produce measurable results;
2. Another important factor is absorptive capacity. Public institutions may struggle to absorb multiple governance reforms simultaneously. When strategies introduce numerous reforms within a short timeframe, administrative capacity may become overstretched, reducing implementation effectiveness.

Therefore, sustainable anti-corruption reforms require gradual institutionalisation of integrity mechanisms, stable leadership and realistic implementation timelines.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether institutional turnover affects the continuity of anti-corruption reforms in their countries.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

Participants may assess anti-corruption strategies using the following questions:

• Does the strategy include a clear corruption risk assessment?
  • Are priorities linked to identified risks
  • Are responsibilities clearly assigned to institutions?
  • Are prevention and enforcement measures balanced?
  • Are monitoring indicators focused on outcomes rather than activities?
  • Does the strategy include realistic budgets and implementation capacity?

Teaching Note

This topic examines anti-corruption strategies as governance instruments rather than purely declarative policy documents. Trainers should emphasise that credible strategies

require strategic coherence, institutional coordination, political commitment and adequate resources.

Participants should analyse whether national strategies address the structural obstacles discussed in previous topics of the module and assess which reforms are most likely to strengthen implementation credibility and long-term governance improvements and identify conditions under which integrity reforms can produce lasting institutional change.

Country Context Applications

Participants  should  analyse  anti-corruption  strategies  across  three  dimensions:

(1) strategic design; (2) institutional coordination and (3) implementation credibility.

Albania

Albania has adopted comprehensive anti-corruption strategies aligned with EU accession requirements and has strengthened investigative institutions such as the Special Structure against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). Digitalisation reforms have improved transparency in several administrative areas.

At the same time, implementation challenges remain. Integrity plans across public institutions are applied unevenly, whistleblowing mechanisms remain relatively underused and procurement exemptions in large infrastructure projects continue to raise governance concerns. European Commission assessments (2024, 2025) also highlight limitations in verification capacity within the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI).

Diagnostic takeaway: Albania demonstrates strong strategic alignment with EU standards, but preventive integrity mechanisms and institutional coordination still require strengthening.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Bosnia & Herzegovina operates multiple anti-corruption strategies across different levels of government. Entity and cantonal strategies vary considerably in design quality and implementation capacity.

The Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight Against Corruption (APIK) plays an important coordination role, but its operational authority remains limited. Institutional fragmentation across state, entity and cantonal levels continues to create coordination challenges and uneven implementation of integrity reforms.

Diagnostic takeaway: Institutional fragmentation weakens policy coherence and limits the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies.

Serbia

Serbia has adopted national anti-corruption strategies broadly aligned with EU governance standards and has established a range of preventive and investigative institutions. However, implementation challenges remain significant.

The extensive use of acting appointments in public administration undermines institutional stability and reform continuity. Concerns about transparency in state advertising and media influence also affect public oversight of corruption risks. European Commission assessments (2024, 2025) continue to highlight limited enforcement track records in several areas of corruption prevention and investigation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Serbia’s strategic frameworks align formally with EU standards but face implementation challenges related to political influence and enforcement credibility.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces anti-corruption strategy design, EU governance standards, risk-based policy approaches, institutional coordination mechanisms and monitoring frameworks using comparative regional examples.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Strategy diagnostic exercise (30 minutes)

Participants analyse the strengths and weaknesses of a national anti-corruption strategy;

• Institutional coordination mapping (20 minutes)

Participants identify institutions responsible for prevention, investigation and oversight;

• Reform sustainability discussion (10 minutes)

Participants analyse which reforms are most likely to produce long-term governance improvements.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can anti-corruption strategies move beyond policy commitments and become credible governance instruments that change institutional incentives?

Key Takeaway

• Anti-corruption    strategies    translate    political                                     commitments                  into                                     coordinated governance reform;
  • Strategic credibility depends on political commitment, institutional autonomy, resources and enforcement;
  • EU governance standards strongly influence integrity frameworks in the Western Balkans;
  • Risk-based approaches improve the targeting of anti-corruption policies
  • Sustainable reform requires aligning political incentives, institutional capacity and monitoring systems.

List of Literature

Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000). Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption             and     Influence             in                               Transition.                       World Bank                               Institute. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/537461468766474836/pdf/multi-page.pdf

Mushtaq Khan (2010). Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. Growth-Enhancing Government.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265567069_Political_Settlements_and_the_ Governance_of_Growth-Enhancing_Institutions

Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcock (2017). Building State Capability. Evidence, Analysis, Action. Oxford University Press. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/bb540dab-9bbb-45ea-8ef1-4843b24dd432/624551.pdf

World Bank (2020). Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/publication/enhancing-government-effectiveness-and-transparency-the-fight-against-corruption

European Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Council of Europe GRECO. Evaluation and Compliance Reports.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

European Commission (2020). Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enhancing-accession-process-credible-eu-perspective-western-balkans_en

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Module 4: Political leadership and reform practice

Topic 1: Political dialogue and multiparty deliberation

The Objectives

This topic examines how political dialogue and multiparty deliberation function as core governance mechanisms shaping reform processes, policy legitimacy and institutional stability. It equips participants to analyse how political incentives, power asymmetries

and deliberative practices influence the quality of dialogue and the feasibility of reforms in Western Balkan contexts.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will be able to recognise the different forms political interaction can take (for example, dialogue, consultation and negotiation) and understand the distinct role each plays in governance. They will learn to assess the quality and credibility of political dialogue by applying core deliberative principles such as inclusiveness, reason-giving and reciprocity.

Participants will also be equipped to analyse how power relations, incentives and patterns of political competition shape the space for genuine deliberation.

Finally, they will be able to explain how these dialogue dynamics influence the feasibility, durability and overall success of governance reforms.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

To strengthen analytical precision, it is essential to distinguish between the different forms political interaction can take:

1. Dialogue involves an exchange of views without the expectation of agreement;
2. Consultation is a structured process for gathering input before decisions are made;
3. Negotiation, by contrast, is a bargaining process aimed at reaching binding outcomes.

Although these processes often overlap in practice, each serves a distinct governance function. Conflating them can lead to overestimating the depth or effectiveness of political engagement.

Assessing political dialogue also requires attention to its deliberate quality or the extent to which actors offer reasons for their positions, include diverse voices, engage reciprocally and operate transparently. These criteria help participants evaluate not only whether dialogue occurs, but how it unfolds and what impact it has on decision-making.

Political Dialogue as a Governance Function

Political dialogue is not only a democratic norm but a functional mechanism through which governance systems operate. It enables political actors to coordinate decisions, manage conflict and sustain institutional continuity despite competition. Where dialogue is substantive, it allows actors to move beyond electoral rivalry toward collective problem-solving, particularly in complex reform areas. Where dialogue is weak or symbolic, governance becomes fragmented, reforms lose credibility and institutional performance declines.

The key distinction lies not in the existence of dialogue structures, but in whether they produce credible commitments and implementable outcomes.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether political dialogue in their country produces implementable decisions or primarily serves as a formal procedural requirement.

Multiparty Competition and Deliberative Dynamics

Multiparty competition strengthens accountability but may also generate strategic obstruction and zero-sum dynamics when not balanced by institutional safeguards. Effective systems rely on institutionalised opposition, ensuring minority parties have access to information, committee roles and legislative influence. Where such safeguards are weak, competition becomes adversarial and undermines governance. A key distinction emerges between:

1. Constructive competition – policy-oriented engagement;
2. Destructive competition – systematic obstruction.

Western Balkan systems often oscillate between these modes depending on political incentives and external pressures.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether political competition in their country supports policy deliberation or incentivises obstruction.

Deliberation vs Confrontation

High-quality deliberation is based on reasoned argument, inclusiveness and reciprocity, while confrontation prioritises political signalling and adversarial positioning. In many contexts, parliamentary debate becomes performative, aimed at external audiences rather than influencing outcomes. This reduces dialogue to symbolic interaction rather than substantive policy engagement.

When confrontation dominates:

• debate becomes rhetorical rather than evidence-based;
  • compromise is politically discouraged;
  • institutional problem-solving weakens.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether parliamentary debates in their country are designed to persuade political actors or to signal positions to voters.

Institutional Arenas of Political Dialogue

Political dialogue unfolds across both frontstage and backstage arenas. Frontstage spaces such as plenary debates and committee meetings provide visibility, formal structure and public accountability. However, much of the real decision-making often happens backstage, through party negotiations, leadership meetings and informal agreements that shape outcomes long before they reach the floor.

Committees are particularly important for understanding the quality of deliberation. Their effectiveness can be seen in how they handle amendments, whether they draw on expert input and the extent to which they enable genuine cross-party engagement. When dialogue shifts predominantly to informal arenas, transparency tends to decline even if decisions are reached more efficiently.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on where meaningful political decisions are actually made in their system within formal institutions or through informal negotiation channels.

Trust, Credibility and Dialogue Effectiveness

Effective dialogue depends on credible commitment, meaning that actors expect agreements to be honoured.

Trust is asymmetrical. It is built slowly and lost quickly. In low-trust environments, actors avoid compromise and rely on strategic dialogue, using engagement to signal compliance, manage crises or delay reforms. Distinguishing between strategic and substantive dialogue is essential for assessing reform credibility.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether political agreements in their country are consistently implemented or frequently reversed.

Power Asymmetries and Political Incentives

Power asymmetries play a decisive role in shaping political dialogue, largely through agenda controlling. This is the ability to determine which issues are discussed, when they are addressed and under what conditions. Dominant political actors can steer outcomes by controlling the legislative calendar, directing committee work or shaping public narratives through media influence. In response, opposition actors may resort to boycotts, obstruction or extra-institutional pressure, which further erodes the space for substantive deliberation and weakens the overall quality of political engagement.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on how agenda control operates in their own political system and how it affects the opposition’s ability to influence decisions.

Informal Practices and Political Culture

Informal practices often shape political decision-making just as much as formal rules. Strong party discipline, patronage networks and informal veto players can exert decisive influence, sometimes blocking reforms even when formal institutions appear supportive. These dynamics reflect deeper patterns of political culture in which informal authority and personal networks outweigh official procedures, shaping how decisions are made and who ultimately has power.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify the informal actors or practices that influence political decisions in their system beyond what is written in formal institutional rules.

Polarisation and Democratic Functioning

Polarisation has a profound impact on how political dialogue functions. It is important to distinguish between issue polarisation, where actors disagree over policies, and identity or affective polarisation, where opponents are viewed as illegitimate or fundamentally untrustworthy. While policy disagreement is normal in democratic life, identity-based polarisation erodes trust and makes compromise politically costly, turning dialogue into confrontation rather than problem-solving.

As polarisation deepens, its effects ripple through the system: institutions become mistrusted, reforms are increasingly politicised and democratic norms weaken. Even technically sound proposals struggle to gain traction when filtered through entrenched partisan identities.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on whether political divisions in their country stem primarily from policy disagreements or from deeper identity-driven polarisation.

Implications for Reform Processes

The quality of political dialogue has a direct and often decisive impact on the success of governance reforms. When dialogue is inclusive and cross-party, reforms gain broader ownership, enjoy greater legitimacy and are more likely to be implemented consistently over time. Where dialogue is weak or partisan, reforms tend to be reversed, selectively applied or stripped of credibility, contributing to declining trust in institutions. In such environments, even well-designed policies struggle to take root, and some reforms require a degree of insulation from day-to-day political conflict simply to ensure stable implementation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to reflect on recent reforms in their country and consider whether they advanced through broad political agreement or were driven primarily by a single party.

Reform Feasibility and Political Dialogue

Reform feasibility is closely tied to the quality of political dialogue. Some reforms as, for example, those involving limited controversy or technical adjustments, can move forward with minimal coordination. Others require genuine negotiation and cross-party agreement to be credible and sustainable. The most transformative, system-level reforms depend on sustained trust and continuous dialogue, as they challenge entrenched interests and reshape institutional arrangements. When dialogue becomes strategic, polarised or purely performative, even well-designed reforms struggle to advance, revealing that technical soundness cannot compensate for weak political foundations.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to consider which types of reforms in their country are most constrained by weak political dialogue and why.

Self-assessment Tool

Participants reflect:

• Is dialogue substantive or strategic?
  • Is opposition meaningfully included?
  • Are decisions made frontstage or backstage?
  • Are agreements implemented?
  • Does competition enable or block reforms?

Teaching Note

Focus on political dialogue as a practical governance mechanism shaping reform outcomes. Encourage analysis of deliberative quality, trust, power asymmetries and informal practices as well as distinguish between formal dialogue and effective political interaction.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Political dialogue in Albania is shaped by centralised party leadership, with strong control over parliamentary behaviour and limited space for independent deliberation. Parliamentary debates often reflect pre-defined party positions, while committees have constrained influence due to majority control and strong party discipline.

The system has experienced recurrent opposition boycotts (notably in 2019), which disrupted institutional dialogue and shifted political contestation outside formal structures. Dialogue has frequently been externally facilitated, particularly through EU-supported processes such as the 2020 electoral reform agreement, demonstrating that cross-party cooperation is possible under strong external incentives.

At the same time, political dialogue remains episodic rather than institutionalised, alternating between cooperation under EU pressure and periods of polarisation. Informal negotiations between party leaders often outweigh formal parliamentary deliberation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Political dialogue in Albania is institutionalised but leader-driven and externally incentivised, resulting in fragile and intermittent cross-party cooperation.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Political dialogue in Bosnia & Herzegovina is structured by the Dayton constitutional framework (1995), characterised by multiple governance layers, entity-level veto mechanisms and fragmented institutional authority.

Political competition is largely ethno-political, reinforcing identity-based polarisation and limiting cross-party cooperation. Dialogue is structurally necessary for decision-making but is often slow, complex and vulnerable to blockage due to the presence of multiple veto players across governance levels.

Institutional fragmentation leads to high transaction costs for agreement, with reforms frequently delayed or diluted. While dialogue occurs continuously, it often produces limited or incremental outcomes, particularly in systemic reform areas.

Diagnostic takeaway: Political dialogue in Bosnia & Herzegovina is structurally embedded but constrained by fragmentation and veto dynamics, resulting in slow and often ineffective reform processes.

Serbia

Political dialogue in Serbia is formally institutionalised but shaped by dominance of the ruling party, which influences agenda-setting, parliamentary procedures and legislative outcomes. Parliamentary deliberation is often procedural rather than substantive, with limited uptake of opposition amendments and restricted influence of minority parties. Strong party discipline and centralised decision-making reduce the scope for meaningful multiparty engagement.

Efforts to improve dialogue, including OSCE- and EU-facilitated inter-party processes, have led to some procedural improvements, particularly in electoral conditions, but implementation has been uneven. Media dynamics and power asymmetries further limit the effectiveness of political competition and deliberation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Political dialogue in Serbia is formally present but substantively constrained by power asymmetries and limited opposition influence, affecting the credibility of deliberation and reform processes.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces key concepts, including political dialogue as a governance function, deliberative quality, multiparty competition, power asymmetries and polarisation dynamics. Comparative examples from Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia are used to illustrate how dialogue operates in practice.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Political Dialogue Mapping (30 minutes)

Participants map how political dialogue functions in their national context, identifying key actors, arenas (formal and informal) and patterns of interaction;

• Deliberation vs Confrontation Analysis (20 minutes)

Participants assess whether political processes in their system are primarily deliberative or performative, using diagnostic criteria such as inclusiveness, reason-giving and transparency;

• Reform Dialogue Simulation (20 minutes)

Participants simulate a cross-party negotiation on a politically sensitive reform, reflecting on incentives, trust and power dynamics influencing outcomes.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can political systems ensure that competition between parties supports credible, inclusive and problem-solving dialogue rather than reducing it to formal or strategic interaction that weakens reform implementation?

Key Takeaways

• Political dialogue is a core governance mechanism, not only a democratic principle;
  • Dialogue, consultation and negotiation serve distinct but interconnected functions;
  • The quality of deliberation (reason-giving, inclusiveness, transparency) determines effectiveness;
  • Multiparty competition can be constructive or obstructive, depending on institutional safeguards;
  • Power asymmetries, informal practices and agenda control shape dialogue outcomes;
  • Polarisation, especially identity-based, undermines trust and cooperation;
  • Strategic dialogue may simulate reform without producing real change;
  • Sustainable reforms require credible, inclusive and cross-party political engagement.

List of Literature

I. Democratic Governance and Deliberation

Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://teddykw2.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/jc3bcrgen-habermas-between-facts-and-norms.pdf

Fishkin, J. S. (2009). When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/attachments/Fishkin.pdf

Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Christiano, T., Fung, A., Parkinson, J., Thompson, D., & Warren, M. (2012). A systemic approach to deliberative democracy. Political Theory, 40(1), 1- 29.
https://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/25394/excerpt/9781107025394_excerpt.pdf

II.  Political Competition, Institutions, and Power

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

https://moodle2.units.it/pluginfile.php/785418/mod_resource/content/1/Dahl%20Po liarchy001.pdf

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing. https://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Levitsky%20%26%20Ziblatt%2C%20Ho w%20Democracies%20Die_%20What%20History%20Reveals%20about%20Our%20F uture%20%282019%20–%20Penguin%20Books%29.pdf

III. Western Balkans Governance and Reform Context

Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en
Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit 2024: Democracy Scores for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/NIT_2024_Digital_Booklet.pdf SIGMA/OECD
(2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration.
https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Bieber, F. (2020). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. http://reparti.free.fr/bieber2020.pdf

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Topic 2: Negotiation and coalition-building

The Objectives

This topic examines how negotiation, coalition-building and credible commitment function as core political mechanisms shaping agreements, governing capacity and reform sustainability. It equips participants to analyse how incentives, power asymmetries and institutional contexts influence political agreements and coalition dynamics in Western Balkan systems.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will have a grounded understanding of how negotiation, coalition-building and coalition management function as distinct but interconnected political processes. They will be able to evaluate the credibility of political agreements and the factors that contribute to coalition stability. Participants will also be equipped to analyse how power relations, trust levels and informal practices shape coalition dynamics in practice. Finally, they will be able to explain how the capacity to negotiate effectively influences the feasibility, implementation and long-term sustainability of reforms.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic) This topic is structured around a simple but powerful analytical triad:

1. Negotiation produces agreements;
   1. Coalition-building produces governing capacity
   1. Credible commitment determines whether these arrangements are sustained over time.

Rather than treating these as isolated concepts, participants should understand them as a continuous political process. Negotiation is not a one-off event but an ongoing interaction through which actors define interests, exchange concessions and attempt to reach binding outcomes. Coalition-building is the outcome of this process, translating negotiated agreements into political alignments capable of governing. However, the existence of a coalition does not guarantee stability. Coalition management requires continuous negotiation, as actors must adapt to internal tensions, shifting incentives and external pressures.

A key distinction that helps clarify this process is that negotiation is the process, coalition-building is the result, and coalition maintenance is the ongoing dynamic. Many governance failures occur not because coalitions cannot be formed, but because they cannot be sustained.

Participants should also consider how political dynamics vary between transactional arrangements, based on short-term exchanges of benefits, and programmatic cooperation, based on shared policy goals. This distinction is critical for understanding reform sustainability.

Negotiation as a Governance Mechanism

Negotiation transforms political competition into binding agreements that enable governance. In pluralistic systems, it is the primary mechanism through which divergent interests are reconciled and collective decisions are made.

The effectiveness of negotiation depends not on its presence but on its outcomes. Where negotiation produces clear and credible agreements, it supports institutional stability and policy continuity. Where it remains ambiguous or strategic, it leads to fragile compromises, repeated renegotiation or policy stagnation.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether negotiations in their country produce durable agreements or primarily short-term political compromises.

Coalition-Building and Governing Capacity

Coalition-building is the mechanism through which negotiated agreements are translated into governing capacity. It allows political systems to move from fragmented interests to actionable majorities capable of adopting and implementing policies.

In practice, coalitions often combine both formal and informal dimensions. Formal coalition agreements may outline policy priorities and distribution of responsibilities, but real cohesion frequently depends on informal alignments between party leaders, shared political incentives or access to state resources.

The nature of coalitions varies significantly. Programmatic coalitions, grounded in shared policy objectives, tend to support more coherent and durable governance. Transactional coalitions, built on the allocation of positions or benefits, may secure short-term stability but are more vulnerable to internal conflict and fragmentation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether coalitions in their country generate genuine governing capacity or primarily serve as instruments for power-sharing.

Coalition Maintenance and Political Stability

Coalition-building is only the beginning. Coalition maintenance requires continuous negotiation, often under more demanding conditions than initial formation. Once in power, coalition partners must manage competing interests, distribute benefits, respond to external pressures and adjust to evolving political realities.

This ongoing process is particularly challenging in low-trust environments, where actors anticipate opportunistic behaviour and remain reluctant to make concessions. As a result, coalitions may formally persist while internally fragmenting, leading to inconsistent decision-making and weakened policy coherence.

Failures in coalition maintenance often manifest as government instability, policy reversals or stalled reforms. Understanding this dynamic is essential for analysing why agreements that appear stable at the outset may fail over time.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether coalition instability in their system arises more from formation challenges or from failures in ongoing management.

Bargaining Power, Asymmetry and Agenda Control

Negotiation processes are rarely balanced. Power asymmetries shape both the process and outcomes of negotiation, particularly through control over the agenda. Actors who determine what is discussed, when it is discussed and under what conditions exercise significant influence over final outcomes.

In many systems, dominant actors use institutional and political advantages to structure negotiations in their favour, limiting the scope of concessions and reducing inclusiveness. Weaker actors may still influence outcomes, but often through indirect strategies such as coalition leverage, procedural tools or external alliances.

These asymmetries do not eliminate negotiation but define its boundaries. They influence which issues are negotiable, which actors are included and how agreements are ultimately framed.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on how agenda control operates in their political system and how it shapes negotiation outcomes.

Trust, Credible Commitment and Agreement Sustainability

The sustainability of political agreements depends on credible commitment. This is the expectation that agreements will be implemented as agreed. Without this expectation, negotiation becomes a tactical exercise rather than a mechanism for governance.

Trust plays a central role in this dynamic. It develops gradually through consistent behaviour but can collapse rapidly following perceived violations. In low-trust environments, actors hedge against uncertainty by limiting concessions, demanding guarantees or engaging in strategic negotiation. This leads to a cycle in which agreements are frequently revisited, implementation becomes selective and coalition stability weakens. Conversely, high-trust environments enable more ambitious agreements and more consistent implementation.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether political agreements in their country are reliably implemented or frequently renegotiated.

Formal and Informal Institutions in Negotiation

Negotiation unfolds across both formal institutional arenas and informal political spaces, and understanding their interaction is critical for analysing real governance dynamics:

1. Formal institutions such as, for example, parliaments, committees and coalition agreements, provide structure, transparency and legitimacy. However, many decisive negotiations occur informally, through leader-level bargaining, party networks or behind-the-scenes agreements;
2. Informal institutions often include informal veto players, patronage-based relationships and, in some contexts, elements of party-state fusion that shape decision-making outside formal rules. These dynamics explain why formal agreements may not reflect actual power relations or may fail during implementation.

Recognising the interplay between formal and informal institutions allows participants to better understand where decisions are truly made and why formal processes may not produce expected outcomes.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to identify the informal actors and practices that influence negotiation outcomes in their system.

Strategic vs Substantive Negotiation

Not all negotiation is aimed at solving problems. In many political contexts, negotiation is used strategically to signal cooperation, manage crises or delay decisions rather than to reach meaningful agreements.

Strategic negotiation often emerges in environments characterised by low trust, strong political competition or external pressure. It may create the appearance of engagement without producing substantive outcomes. Substantive negotiation, by contrast, is oriented toward problem-solving and implementation, requiring genuine engagement, compromise and commitment. Distinguishing between these forms is essential for assessing whether negotiation contributes to governance or merely simulates it.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether negotiation in their country is primarily strategic or oriented toward problem-solving.

Coalition Dynamics and Reform Processes

Coalition dynamics shape the entire reform trajectory. The relationship between negotiation and reform can be understood as a causal chain: Negotiation capacity → Coalition stability → Reform credibility → Implementation sustainability.

Where negotiation capacity is strong and coalitions are stable, reforms are more likely to be credible, widely supported and consistently implemented. Where negotiation is weak and coalitions are fragmented, reforms tend to be delayed, diluted or reversed.

Cross-party ownership is particularly important for reforms that affect institutional structures or long-term policy directions. Without such ownership, reforms remain vulnerable to political change and lack sustainability.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to assess whether reforms in their country benefit from broad coalition support or depend on narrow political alignments.

Reform Feasibility and Negotiation Capacity

Reform feasibility depends not only on technical design but on the ability of political actors to negotiate and sustain agreements over time.

Different types of reforms require different levels of negotiation. Technical adjustments may proceed with limited coordination, while policy reforms require broader alignment. Systemic reforms, particularly those affecting power distribution or institutional rules, demand sustained negotiation and stable coalitions.

Where negotiation capacity is weak, even well-designed reforms may fail. This highlights that political feasibility is often more decisive than technical quality in determining reform outcomes.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which reforms in their country are most constrained by weak negotiation capacity and why.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

Participants analyse their system across three dimensions:

1. Negotiation Quality
   1. Are interests clearly defined?
   1. Are commitments credible?
   1. Are agreements implemented?
2. Coalition Dynamics
   1. Are coalitions programmatic or transactional?
   1. How stable are coalitions over time?
   1. How are internal conflicts managed?
3. Reform Implications
   1. Which reforms require broad coalitions?
   1. Which reforms fail due to negotiation breakdown?

Teaching Note

Focus on negotiation and coalition-building as inherently political processes shaped by incentives, power asymmetries and institutional constraints. Avoid treating negotiation as a purely technical skill. Emphasise that outcomes depend on who negotiates, why they negotiate and under what constraints. Encourage participants to analyse both formal agreements and underlying informal power structures.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Negotiation in Albania is highly centralised and leader-driven, with strong party discipline limiting intra-party bargaining and reinforcing top-down decision-making. While formal coalition dynamics have become less prominent due to periods of dominant-party governance, informal coalitional arrangements and leader-level negotiations remain critical, particularly for major reforms.

Externally facilitated negotiations, especially in the context of EU integration, have enabled cross-party agreements, such as electoral reforms. However, low levels of trust and high political polarisation contribute to the fragility and reversibility of agreements, with reforms often contested or partially implemented.

Coalition dynamics, even when informal, significantly affect reform sustainability, as agreements lacking broad ownership are vulnerable to political shifts.

Diagnostic takeaway: Negotiation in Albania is centralised, leader-driven and externally influenced, resulting in agreements that are often fragile and vulnerable to reversal.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

In Bosnia & Herzegovina, coalition-building is structurally embedded in the Dayton constitutional framework (1995), requiring continuous negotiation across multiple institutional levels and between ethnically defined political actors.

Negotiation incentives are strongly shaped by veto mechanisms and institutional fragmentation, which allow actors to block decisions rather than compromise. As a result, coalitions are often difficult to form and even harder to maintain, with governance characterised by slow decision-making and frequent deadlock. Coalitions tend to be transactional and highly complex, requiring constant renegotiation. Low trust between actors further constrains cooperation and limits the scope for ambitious reforms. These dynamics significantly affect reform processes, often resulting in incremental or delayed changes rather than comprehensive reforms.

Diagnostic takeaway: Coalition-building in Bosnia & Herzegovina is structurally necessary but constrained by veto dynamics and low trust, leading to slow, complex and often limited reform outcom

Serbia

In Serbia, negotiation and coalition-building operate within a context of dominant-party politics, which reduces the need for broad-based coalition-building and limits the depth of negotiation. While formal coalitions exist, particularly with smaller parties, negotiation is largely internal to the ruling political structure, and opposition actors have limited influence over outcomes. This reduces inclusiveness and weakens the deliberative dimension of coalition politics.

Coalition stability is relatively high, but it is often based on power asymmetry rather than balanced negotiation, which can affect the credibility and inclusiveness of reforms. External efforts to facilitate political dialogue have produced some procedural improvements, but their impact on substantive negotiation dynamics has been limited.

Diagnostic takeaway: Negotiation and coalition-building in Serbia are stable but highly asymmetrical, limiting inclusiveness and reducing the depth of reform-oriented political negotiation.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces key concepts including negotiation, coalition-building, coalition maintenance, credible commitment and informal institutions, with comparative examples from Western Balkan contexts.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Negotiation Mapping (30 minutes)

Participants map negotiation dynamics in their system, identifying actors, arenas and power relations.

• Coalition Stability Analysis (20 minutes)

Participants assess coalition formation and maintenance, identifying risks, incentives and points of fragility.

• Reform Negotiation Simulation (20 minutes)

Participants simulate negotiation around a reform requiring coalition-building, focusing on sustainability, trust and power asymmetries.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can political systems ensure that negotiation and coalition-building generate credible, stable and reform-oriented agreements, rather than fragile arrangements driven by short-term political incentives?

Key Takeaways

• Negotiation, coalition-building and credible commitment form a core governance triad;
  • Coalition-building is only effective if supported by continuous maintenance;
  • Power asymmetries and agenda control shape negotiation outcomes;
  • Informal institutions often determine real coalition dynamics;
  • Trust and credible commitment are essential for sustainability;
  • Strategic negotiation may simulate reform without delivering results;
  • Stable and inclusive coalitions are critical for reform success.

List of Literature

Strøm, K., Müller, W., & Bergman, T. (2008). Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. Oxford University                       Press.                                       https://politicacomparata.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/mueller-strom-coalition-governance.pdf

Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. Inc., Publishers. New York. https://ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/axelrod.pdf

Fearon, J. (1998). Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization,52(2), 269-  305.
https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/5333837.pdf

European Commission (2024-2025). Enlargement Reports.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit 2024: Democracy Scores for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Washington, DC: Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/NIT_2024_Digital_Booklet.pdf

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024)  Principle of Public   Administration.
https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K. External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper, 2024.

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Topic 3: Ethical Political Communication

The Objectives

This topic examines how political communication functions as a core governance mechanism shaping public perception, trust and reform feasibility. It equips participants to analyse how incentives, media environments and communication strategies influence credibility, democratic legitimacy and reform sustainability in Western Balkan contexts.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will develop a grounded understanding of how political communication shapes perception, trust and reform dynamics in practice. They will be able to distinguish between ethical, strategic and manipulative communication, and assess how different communication approaches influence credibility and public trust. Participants will also analyse how media systems, political incentives and digital environments structure communication behaviour, and how these dynamics affect polarisation and democratic functioning. Finally, they will be able to explain how communication capacity directly influences reform feasibility, implementation and long-term sustainability.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic is structured around a causal chain: Communication → shapes perception → perception shapes trust → trust shapes reform feasibility. Political communication is a continuous, incentive-driven process through which political actors construct meaning, shape perceptions and influence behaviour. These perceptions form the foundation of trust, which in turn determines whether reforms are accepted, contested or resisted.

Political Communication as a Governance Mechanism

Political communication enables institutions to explain decisions, justify policies and engage citizens. Its quality directly affects whether governance is perceived as legitimate and whether reforms gain societal support.

Where communication is transparent and consistent, it strengthens both perception and trust. Where it is selective or politically instrumentalised, it weakens credibility and reduces reform space.

Trainer guidance: To what extent does political communication in your system enhance legitimacy through transparency, or undermine it through selective and instrumental messaging?

Communication Incentives and Political Behaviour

Political communication is shaped by incentive structures rather than normative standards alone. Actors respond to electoral pressures, competition dynamics and institutional constraints when deciding how to communicate.

In environments characterised by intense electoral competition and polarisation, communication often shifts toward simplified, emotionally charged or confrontational messaging. Leader-centric party systems reinforce centralised control over narratives, reducing internal diversity of communication. At the same time, international processes such as EU integration may incentivise more reform-oriented and technically grounded communication, though these signals may not always resonate domestically.

As a result, communication practices often reflect a tension between short-term political gains and long-term credibility. Understanding these incentives allows participants to explain why ethical communication is often difficult to sustain in practice.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify which incentives (e.g., electoral, institutional or external) most strongly shape communication behaviour in their system.

Ethical vs Strategic Communication

Political communication operates along a spectrum from ethical to manipulative. Ethical communication prioritises accuracy, transparency and accountability. Strategic communication emphasises persuasion and political positioning. Manipulative communication distorts or selectively presents information to influence behaviour.

This distinction is central because communication that prioritises short-term advantage often undermines trust and reduces reform credibility over time.

Trainer guidance: ask participants where does political communication in they national systems fall on the spectrum between ethical and manipulative, and how does this positioning affect long-term trust and reform credibility.

Narratives, Framing and Public Perception

Political actors shape perception through narratives and framing, which determine how issues are understood and interpreted by the public. Narratives simplify complex realities, making them accessible, but also selectively highlight certain aspects while omitting others.

In reform contexts, narratives can either build support by explaining benefits and trade-offs or undermine reforms by emphasising risks, costs or perceived injustices. Competing narratives often coexist, reflecting political competition and power struggles. Therefore, control over framing is a key source of political influence. It shapes not only public understanding but also emotional responses, which are critical in determining trust and acceptance.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse how the same reform is framed differently by various actors and what effects this has on public perception.

Media Systems, Digital Environments and Power

Political communication is embedded in complex media ecosystems that shape both access to information and the visibility of narratives.

Traditional media structures influence pluralism and accountability, particularly where ownership is concentrated or politically aligned. Digital environments introduce additional dynamics, including algorithmic amplification of emotionally engaging

content, micro-targeting of specific audiences and the formation of echo chambers that reinforce existing beliefs.

Platform governance remains uneven, allowing misinformation and polarised narratives to spread rapidly. Cross-border information flows further complicate national communication environments, especially in the Western Balkans where regional media influence is significant. These dynamics often advantage actors who can mobilise attention and emotional engagement, rather than those who prioritise accuracy and balance.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to reflect on how media ownership, algorithms and digital platforms shape which messages become dominant in their system.

Misinformation, Disinformation and Strategic Manipulation

The distinction between misinformation and disinformation is critical for understanding contemporary communication challenges. Misinformation spreads inaccurate content without intent to deceive, while disinformation involves deliberate manipulation aimed at influencing perceptions and behaviour.

In political contexts, disinformation is often used strategically to weaken opponents, distort public debate or delegitimise institutions. Digital platforms amplify these effects by accelerating dissemination and enabling targeted messaging.

These dynamics contribute to a cycle in which distorted perception undermines trust, which in turn increases the effectiveness of further manipulation.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants to identify recent examples where misinformation or disinformation affected political processes and to assess their impact on trust and institutional credibility.

Trust, Credibility and Communication Effectiveness

Trust is the central link between communication and governance outcomes. It is built through consistent, transparent and accountable communication over time.

Credibility depends not only on the accuracy of individual messages but on the alignment between communication and observable actions. Once trust is eroded, even accurate information may be dismissed, reducing the effectiveness of communication.

In low-trust environments, actors often resort to strategic communication, which further weakens credibility. In high-trust environments, communication is more likely to support cooperation and reform implementation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether communication in their system reinforces or undermines trust, and how this affects governance outcomes.

Communication, Polarisation and Democratic Functioning

Political communication plays a decisive role in shaping polarisation. While democratic systems naturally involve disagreement, communication can transform this into either constructive debate or deep societal division.

When communication emphasises shared issues and policy alternatives, it supports pluralism. When it focuses on identity, delegitimisation or moral superiority, it contributes to affective polarisation, where political opponents are perceived as illegitimate.

Such dynamics reduce the space for compromise and weaken democratic functioning, particularly in reform contexts that require broad support.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether communication practices in their country facilitate dialogue or reinforce divisions, and what implications this has for governance.

Communication and Reform Processes

The relationship between communication and reform can be understood through a causal chain: communication quality → public trust → political space for reform → implementation sustainability.

Reforms require not only technical design but also public understanding and acceptance. Communication plays a central role in translating policy into accessible narratives, managing expectations and building support.

Where communication is inconsistent, unclear or overly political, reforms may face resistance or fail to gain legitimacy. Conversely, effective communication can expand the political space for reform and sustain implementation over time.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on whether reform failures in their system are linked to communication weaknesses rather than policy design.

Reform Feasibility and Communication Capacity

Reform feasibility depends on the ability of political actors to communicate effectively across different audiences and stages of the reform process. Technical reforms require clarity and accessibility, policy reforms require persuasive communication, and systemic reforms require sustained trust-building. Where communication is overly technocratic, disconnected from public concerns or inconsistent, reforms are less likely to succeed. Therefore, communication capacity is a core component of reform governance, not an auxiliary function.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which reforms in their country failed due to communication breakdown and what could have been done differently.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

1. Communication Quality
2. Is communication accurate, transparent and consistent?
3. Does it prioritise public understanding or political advantage?
4. Information Environment
5. Who controls dominant narratives?
6. Who benefits from the current communication environment?
7. How do digital platforms shape visibility and influence?
8. Reform Implications
9. Does communication strengthen or weaken trust?
10. How does communication interact with polarisation?
11. Which reforms fail due to communication breakdown?

Teaching Note

Focus on communication as a political process shaped by incentives, power and institutional constraints. Avoid treating communication as purely technical. Many reforms fail due to technocratic communication which could be overly complex, jargon-

heavy messaging disconnected from public concerns. Encourage participants to prioritise clarity, relevance and credibility.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Political communication remains highly centralised and leader-driven, with strong influence of party leadership over narratives. Media pluralism exists but is constrained by politically affiliated or economically dependent outlets, as well as the growing role of online portals with unclear ownership.

Digital media has expanded communication channels but also increased exposure to unverified content and polarised narratives. EU-related communication campaigns have improved messaging around reforms, but their impact on trust remains uneven due to persistent political polarisation.

Diagnostic takeaway: Communication is centralised and strategic, with mixed credibility and increasing influence of informal and digital media ecosystems.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Political communication is structured along ethno-political lines, with entity-level public broadcasters and politically aligned media reinforcing segmented information environments.

Regional media influences and the use of historical narratives further shape political messaging. Communication is often identity-driven, limiting shared public discourse and complicating reform communication.

Diagnostic takeaway: Communication is fragmented and identity-based, reinforcing polarisation and constraining reform effectiveness.

Serbia

Political communication is shaped by media concentration and dominant-party influence, particularly through pro-government television networks and tabloid media.

Narratives are centrally driven, while opposition voices face limited reach. Social media influencers aligned with political actors increasingly contribute to narrative amplification.

Diagnostic takeaway: Communication is asymmetrical and centrally controlled, affecting pluralism and reform credibility.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Conceptual introduction to communication, trust, narratives, incentives and digital dynamics.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Communication Mapping (30 min)

Participants identify key actors, channels and narrative flows shaping political communication;

• Narrative Analysis (20 min)

Participants analyse how a reform is framed by different actors and assess its impact on perception and trust;

• Communication Strategy Simulation (20 min)

Participants design a communication approach for a reform, balancing credibility, inclusiveness and political constraints.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can political systems ensure that communication strengthens trust and reform capacity rather than reinforcing polarisation and undermining credibility?

Key Takeaways

• Communication shapes perception, trust and reform feasibility;
  • Incentives strongly influence communication behaviour;
  • Digital environments reshape political communication dynamics;
  • Narratives determine public understanding of reforms;
  • Trust and credibility are central to governance effectiveness;
  • Communication can mitigate or intensify polarisation;
  • Reform success depends on credible and accessible communication.

List of Literature

Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. MIT Press. (PDF) Jürgen Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms

Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. Yale University Press.
=https%3A%2 F%2Fd-nb.info%2F124031910X%2F34&usg=AOvVaw32EoxVPg8Zd7zNhBGr9nxv&opi=89978 449

Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera´, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan,B. (2018). Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature. Hewlett Foundation. Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature by Joshua A. Tucker, Andrew Guess, Pablo Barbera, Cristian Vaccari, Alexandra Siegel, Sergey Sanovich, Denis Stukal, Brendan Nyhan :: SSRN

Dem Institute. (2024). Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot. University of Gothenburg. v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf

Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. University of Chicago Press. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy 9780226210735 – DOKUMEN.PUB

EU vs Disinfo. (2024). Disinformation Review Reports. European External Action Service. EUvsDisinfo | Detecting, analysing, and raising awareness about disinformation -EUvsDisinfo

NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. (2023). Annual Report on Information Influence Activities. Riga. StratCom | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Latvia

European Commission (2024 – 2025). Enlargement Reports.
https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en

Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit 2024: Democracy Scores for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/NIT_2024_Digital_Booklet.pdf

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K. External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper, 2024.
https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Topic 4: Digital democracy and disinformation resilience

The Objectives

This topic examines how digital technologies and information ecosystems shape democratic processes, public perception and governance resilience. It equips participants to analyse how digital infrastructure, behaviour and power interact to influence trust, democratic legitimacy and reform sustainability in Western Balkan contexts.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will develop a grounded understanding of how digital environments reshape democratic governance, political behaviour and reform dynamics. They will be able to analyse how digital infrastructure, platform incentives and information flows influence perception and trust, while assessing the risks posed by disinformation, AI-driven manipulation and asymmetrical visibility. Participants will examine how digital power structures and regulatory frameworks shape democratic resilience, and how these dynamics affect polarisation, institutional credibility and reform feasibility. Finally, they will be able to evaluate how strengthening disinformation resilience contributes to sustainable reform implementation.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic) This topic is structured around two reinforcing analytical lenses:

1. Core causal chain: digital information quality → perception → trust → political space

→ reform feasibility → implementation sustainability;

• Three-layer model of digital democracy:

• Digital infrastructure (platforms, algorithms, connectivity, e-governance systems);
  • Digital behaviour (how political actors, institutions and citizens adapt to digital incentives);
  • Digital power (who controls visibility, narratives and data),

Together these layers help participants understand that digital democracy is not only about technology, but about incentives, power and governance choices.

Digital Democracy as a Governance Mechanism

Digital technologies enable new forms of participation, transparency and service delivery. Tools such as e-governance platforms, open data systems and digital consultations can enhance accountability and citizen engagement. However, their effectiveness depends on trust, accessibility and institutional capacity. Where digital tools are inclusive and transparent, they reinforce democratic legitimacy. Where they are unevenly accessible, poorly governed or politically instrumentalised, they may deepen inequalities and mistrust.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to think to what extent do digital governance tools in their national system expand participation, and where do they risk reinforcing exclusion or mistrust.

Digital Incentives and Political Behaviour

Digital environments create incentive structures that reward speed, visibility and engagement. Political actors adapt by prioritising emotionally engaging, simplified or polarising content over accuracy. This shifts communication toward attention-driven logic, where visibility becomes more valuable than credibility. At the same time, external actors may exploit these dynamics to influence domestic political processes. Understanding these incentives is essential to explain why disinformation spreads and why ethical digital communication is difficult to sustain.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which digital incentives such as visibility, speed or engagement most strongly shape political behaviour in the national system.

Information Flows, Algorithms and Visibility

Digital information flows are not neutral. They are structured by algorithmic systems that determine what content is seen, amplified or marginalised. These systems prioritise engagement, often elevating content that provokes strong emotional reactions. As a result, citizens are exposed to curated streams of information that may reinforce existing beliefs and limit exposure to alternative perspectives. Visibility becomes uneven, favouring actors who can generate attention rather than those who provide accurate or balanced information. Therefore, algorithmic amplification reshapes the public sphere by influencing not only what people know, but also what they perceive as important, credible or widely supported.

Trainer guidance: ask participants to reflect who controls visibility in their digital ecosystem, and how does this shape political perception.

Disinformation, Manipulation and Information Disorder

Disinformation represents a deliberate attempt to distort perception and influence behaviour. It operates within a broader ecosystem of information disorder that includes misinformation and malinformation.

Digital environments enable disinformation through rapid dissemination, targeted messaging and cross-border influence. Increasingly, manipulation is reinforced bycoordinated campaigns that combine political messaging, media amplification and digital networks.

A critical emerging dimension is AI-driven manipulation, including deepfakes and synthetic media, AI-generated content at scale, automated influence operations, micro-targeting based on behavioural data etc. These tools accelerate the speed, scale and sophistication of manipulation, making it harder for citizens and institutions to distinguish between authentic and fabricated information. Therefore, disinformation does not only distort facts. It reshapes perception, undermines trust and narrows the space for informed democratic decision-making.

Trainer guidance: ask participants to think how is disinformation evolving in their system, and what role do AI and automation play in shaping its impact.

Trust, Credibility and Digital Resilience

Trust remains the central link between digital environments and democratic outcomes. Digital resilience refers to the capacity of institutions and societies to maintain trust and resist manipulation in complex information ecosystems.

Credibility is shaped by consistent institutional communication, media integrity and citizens’ ability to critically assess information. In high-trust environments, disinformation has limited traction. In low-trust environments, even accurate information may be contested or rejected. Therefore, digital resilience is not only about countering false information, but about strengthening the conditions that sustain trust over time, including transparency, accountability and media pluralism.

Trainer guidance: encourage participants to think whether their system is primarily reactive to disinformation, or does it build long-term trust-based resilience.

Digital Polarisation and Democratic Functioning

Digital environments can intensify polarisation by reinforcing echo chambers and amplifying divisive narratives. Algorithmic systems tend to prioritise content that strengthens identity and emotional engagement, contributing to identity-based polarisation. This reduces exposure to diverse perspectives and limits opportunities for dialogue and compromise. As polarisation deepens, democratic functioning becomes more fragile, and reform processes become more contested.

Trainer guidance: ask participants to reflect if digital communication in their system promote pluralism or reinforce polarised information environments.

Digital Governance, Regulation and Platform Responsibility

Effective digital democracy requires governance frameworks that address platform power while protecting fundamental rights. In the EU context, key regulatory frameworks include Digital Services Act (DSA) that is fully applicable as of February 2024 addressing content moderation, transparency and platform accountability, and Digital Markets Act (DMA) that is fully applicable as of May 2023 addressing market dominance and competition. These frameworks aim to increase transparency of algorithms, strengthen content moderation standards and improve accountability of large platforms. However, challenges remain, particularly in cross-border enforcement, alignment of national legislation with EU acquis and balancing regulation with freedom of expression;

For Western Balkan countries, alignment with EU standards represents both an opportunity and a challenge in strengthening digital governance.

Trainer guidance: encourage participants to think how does their national system regulate platform power, and where do gaps remain in ensuring accountability.

Digital Democracy and Reform Processes

The relationship between digital environments and reform can be understood as: digital information quality → trust → political space → reform feasibility → implementation sustainability.

Digital tools can support reforms by improving transparency and engagement. At the same time, disinformation, polarisation and low trust can constrain reform processes and reduce legitimacy. Therefore, digital environments shape not only how reforms are communicated, but whether they are politically feasible and sustainable.

Trainer guidance: encourage participants to reflect if digital dynamics in their national system expanded or constrained the political space for reform?

Reform Feasibility and Disinformation Resilience

Reform feasibility increasingly depends on resilience to digital risks. Reforms in sensitive areas are particularly vulnerable to disinformation campaigns that distort perception and undermine trust. Where resilience is weak, reforms may be delayed, diluted or reversed. Strengthening resilience requires coordinated approaches combining communication, regulation and public awareness.

Trainer guidance: ask participants to think which reforms in their country are most vulnerable to digital manipulation, and why.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

1. Digital Ecosystem
   1. Who controls visibility and narratives?
   1. Which actors benefit from the current digital environment?
   1. Where are the main vulnerabilities?
2. Disinformation Dynamics
   1. What are the main sources and channels of disinformation?
   1. How do digital risks interact with political incentives?
   1. Who benefits from manipulation?
3. Reform Implications
   1. Does the digital environment support or constrain reforms?
   1. How does disinformation affect trust and polarisation?
   1. Which reforms are most exposed to digital risks?

Teaching Note

Focus on digital democracy as a governance issue shaped by incentives, power and regulation. Avoid technological determinism. Digital solutionism assuming that digital tools automatically improve governance can be misleading. Without trust, institutional capacity and safeguards, digitalisation may amplify vulnerabilities rather than resolve them.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Albania has made significant progress in digital governance, particularly through the e-Albania platform, which has centralised public service delivery. However, digital resilience remains challenged by vulnerabilities in the information ecosystem.

The 2022 cyberattacks exposed weaknesses in cybersecurity infrastructure, highlighting risks associated with rapid digitalisation. The online media space is characterised by numerous portals with opaque ownership, contributing to the spread of unverified content. Social media, including platforms such as TikTok, is increasingly used for political communication, often amplifying simplified or polarised narratives.

Diagnostic takeaway: Strong digital service delivery coexists with vulnerabilities in information integrity and cybersecurity.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Digital ecosystems in Bosnia & Herzegovina reflect and reinforce political fragmentation. Entity-level differences in media and governance structures shape distinct digital environments.

Cross-border disinformation, including influence from regional and external actors, interacts with domestic political narratives. Digital media is frequently used to reinforce ethno-political framing, limiting shared information spaces and complicating democratic dialogue.

Institutional responses to digital risks remain fragmented, reflecting broader governance challenges.

Diagnostic takeaway: Digital environments reinforce fragmentation and are vulnerable to cross-border and identity-driven disinformation.

Serbia

Digital communication in Serbia is shaped by strong media influence and the increasing role of coordinated online networks. Evidence points to organised digital amplification, including bot-like activity and coordinated messaging aligned with political actors.

Pro-government narratives are often amplified through both traditional and digital channels, while social media influencers and targeted messaging play a growing role in shaping perception. The boundary between state communication and party communication is often blurred, raising concerns about pluralism and fairness in the digital sphere.

Diagnostic takeaway: Digital ecosystems are structured and influential, with challenges related to coordination, pluralism and disinformation resilience.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Conceptual grounding on digital democracy, algorithms, AI-driven manipulation, disinformation and governance frameworks.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Digital Ecosystem Mapping (30 min)

Participants identify key platforms, actors and power structures shaping digital information flows;

• Disinformation Case Analysis (20 min)

Participants analyse a real case of disinformation, identifying sources, narratives and systemic vulnerabilities;

• Resilience Strategy Simulation (20 min)

Participants design a policy or communication response to strengthen resilience against digital manipulation in a reform context.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can democratic systems ensure that digital environments strengthen trust, participation and reform capacity, rather than amplifying manipulation and undermining governance?

Key Takeaways

• Digital democracy operates across infrastructure, behaviour and power;
  • Algorithms and incentives shape visibility and perception;
  • AI-driven manipulation is an emerging systemic risk;
  • Disinformation undermines trust and democratic resilience;
  • Platform governance and regulation are critical;
  • Digital environments shape reform feasibility and sustainability;
  • Trust remains central to democratic stability.

List of Literature

Gillespie, T. (2018). Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media. Yale University Press. Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media 9780300235029 – DOKUMEN.PUB

Napoli, P. (2019). Social Media and the Public Interest: Media Regulation in the Disinformation Age. Columbia University Press. Social Media and the Public Interest: Media Regulation in the Disinformation Age 9780231545549 – DOKUMEN.PUB

European Commission. (2024). Digital Services Act: Guidance and Implementation Framework. Brussels.=8&ved=2ahUKEwjBzcaI4rWTAxXD-AIHHQyoD34QFnoECA4QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdigital-strategy.ec.europa.eu%2Fen%2Fpolicies%2Fdigital-services-act&usg=AOvVaw3z66uBRDUnsl4DPL53MzfB&opi=89978449

European Commission. (2024). Digital Markets Act. Brussels.
Digital Markets Act

Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. (2023). The Global Disinformation Order 2023. Oxford Internet Institute.=8&ved=2ahUKEwjFm9aj4rWTAxW-0wIHHcBVBxYQFnoECBoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdemtech.oii.ox.ac.uk%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2Fsites%2F12%2F2019%2F09%2FCyberTroop-

Report19.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0iY6TNr5d_Bwh4oCt-uaJx&opi=89978449

Chesney, R., & Citron, D. (2019). Deepfakes and the New Disinformation Threat. Foreign Affairs. “Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War” by Danielle K. Citron and Robert Chesney

BIRN. (2023). Media Freedom and Digital Rights in the Western Balkans. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network. Reporting Digital Rights and Freedoms – BIRN

SEENPM. (2023). Media Ownership and Disinformation in Southeast Europe. Home – SEENPM

Dem Institute. (2024). Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot. University of Gothenburg. v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf

Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit 2024: Democracy Scores for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/hybridity-and-hybrid-regimes-in-the-western-balkans-in-a-time-of-war-and-increased-geopolitical-tensions/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Hirkic´, M. (2025). Crisis partnership with China? Evidence from a survey experiment in Sarajevo and Tuzla. In: Recalibrating the global compass: China and shared future in a fragmented                              world (Dialogues      on       China,      Vol.      5,                              Article                           28,     pp.             502–524). https://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_ser/iipe_dijalozi_kina/2025-5/iipe_dijalozi_kina-2025-5-ch28.pdf

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Topic 5: Strategic messaging and public leadership

The Objectives

This topic examines how strategic messaging and public leadership function as core governance mechanisms shaping public perception, trust, political legitimacy and reform sustainability. It equips participants to analyse how leaders interpret reform challenges, build relational trust and strategically align messaging with incentives, constraints and governance objectives in Western Balkan contexts.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will develop a grounded understanding of how strategic messaging and public leadership shape perception, trust and reform dynamics in practice. They will be able to analyse how leaders construct meaning, signal commitment and adapt messaging across audiences and institutional contexts. Participants will also be equipped to assess how leadership credibility, behaviour and communication consistency influence trust and reform acceptance. Finally, they will be able to explain how leadership messaging capacity directly shapes reform feasibility, implementation and long-term sustainability.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic is structured around an expanded causal chain: Leadership → messaging → expectations → political risk → political space → reform feasibility → implementation sustainability.

To strengthen conceptual clarity, participants should analyse strategic messaging through three complementary leadership functions:

1. Interpretive leadership – how leaders define problems, frame priorities and shape meaning;
   1. Relational leadership – how leaders build trust, credibility and emotional connection;
   1. Strategic leadership – how leaders align messaging with incentives, constraints and reform goals.

A critical complementary concept is leadership signalling. Leaders communicate not only through narratives, but through signals that convey commitment, resolve, priorities, red lines and openness to compromise. These signals shape expectations and influence how other actors respond to reform processes.

Strategic Messaging as a Governance Mechanism

Strategic messaging is a core leadership function through which political actors translate complex reforms into understandable narratives, manage expectations and sustain political support. It allows leaders to structure public understanding, reduce uncertainty and maintain direction in complex reform environments.

Where messaging is coherent and aligned with policy actions, it strengthens credibility and expands the political space for reform. Where messaging is reactive, inconsistent or disconnected from implementation, it generates confusion and undermines legitimacy.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether political messaging in their system provides clarity and direction or primarily serves short-term positioning.

Leadership Behaviour and Communication Credibility

Strategic messaging cannot be separated from leadership behaviour. Credibility is shaped not only by what leaders say, but by how they act, signal and engage.

Three dimensions are particularly relevant:

1. Performative leadership – visibility, symbolic acts and public presence that reinforce messages;
2. Behavioural credibility – consistency between communication and observable actions;
3. Emotional leadership – tone, empathy and the ability to reassure or mobilise citizens.

Where behaviour contradicts messaging, trust erodes rapidly. Conversely, consistent behaviour reinforces credibility even in challenging reform contexts.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether leadership behaviour in their system reinforces or contradicts public messaging.

Leadership Credibility and Message Consistency

Leadership credibility depends on sustained alignment between messaging, signalling and policy outcomes. In reform contexts, where results may be delayed, consistency becomes a key substitute for immediate success. Frequent shifts in messaging, contradictory narratives or selective communication weaken credibility and increase uncertainty. Over time, this reduces the effectiveness of even accurate communication.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether leadership messaging in their system remains consistent over time or fluctuates with political pressures.

Strategic Framing and Reform Narratives

Strategic framing is central to how reforms are understood and evaluated. Leaders do not simply communicate policies. They interpret reality by defining problems, assigning responsibility and presenting solutions in ways that resonate with public concerns.

Reform narratives operate as cognitive shortcuts that help citizens make sense of complex policy changes. They can emphasise urgency, fairness, national interest or external alignment, depending on political context. At the same time, framing is inherently selective. It highlights certain aspects of reform while downplaying others.

Effective leadership balances simplification with accuracy. It connects reforms to broader societal goals while acknowledging trade-offs and uncertainty. Where framing is inconsistent or overly politicised, competing narratives emerge, often undermining reform credibility and fragmenting public understanding.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to analyse how different actors frame the same reform and how this shapes public perception and support.

Audience Differentiation and Message Adaptation

Strategic messaging is inherently multi-layered, as leaders communicate simultaneously with diverse audiences that interpret messages through different expectations and incentives. Effective leadership requires adapting not only the content but also the tone, timing and purpose of communication.

Messaging operates across several interconnected levels:

• towards citizens, to build understanding and acceptance;
• towards political allies to maintain coalition cohesion and alignment;
• towards bureaucratic institutions to signal direction, priorities and implementation expectations;
• towards international partners (e.g. EU, donors), to demonstrate commitment, credibility and reform progress.

These layers often require different emphases and sometimes involve tensions. Messaging that is persuasive domestically may not signal credibility externally, while technically precise communication for international audiences may fail to resonate with citizens. The challenge for leadership is to maintain coherence across these layers while adapting to audience-specific needs. Failure to do so can result in fragmented messaging, reduced credibility or misaligned expectations.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which audiences are prioritised in their system and which are neglected, and what implications this has for reform implementation.

Ethical vs Strategic Leadership Communication

Leadership communication operates along a spectrum between ethical and strategic messaging. Ethical communication prioritises accuracy, transparency and accountability, while strategic messaging emphasises persuasion and positioning.

Sustainable leadership requires balancing these dimensions. Messaging that consistently prioritises short-term political gain may generate immediate support but erodes long-term trust and reform credibility.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether leadership communication in their system balances persuasion with responsibility.

Expectation Management and Reform Sustainability

Expectation management is a critical but often underestimated function of leadership communication. Reforms frequently involve delayed benefits, uncertainty and uneven distribution of costs, making public expectations a key determinant of success or failure.

Strategic messaging shapes how citizens anticipate reform outcomes, how they interpret delays and how they respond to setbacks. Overpromising or presenting reforms as quick or risk-free creates a gap between expectations and reality. When this gap becomes visible, it accelerates disillusionment and weakens trust.

Effective leadership addresses this by communicating timelines realistically, acknowledging uncertainty and preparing stakeholders for trade-offs. This does not reduce support. It builds credibility by aligning expectations with feasible outcomes. In this sense, expectation management directly influences reform sustainability. It reduces political risk, stabilises public support and creates space for consistent implementation.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether reform communication in their system builds realistic expectations or contributes to future disappointment.

Crisis Communication and Leadership Visibility

Crisis situations place strategic messaging under maximum pressure, as uncertainty increases and public demand for clarity intensifies. In such contexts, leadership visibility becomes a central component of communication effectiveness. Effective crisis communication is not only about information delivery, but about signalling control, responsibility and direction. Leaders must balance speed with accuracy, provide consistent messaging across institutions and acknowledge uncertainty without undermining confidence.

Visibility plays a crucial role. Regular public engagement, clear messaging and visible leadership presence can stabilise perception and maintain trust. Conversely, delayed, fragmented or contradictory communication amplifies uncertainty and fuels speculation.

Therefore, crisis communication reveals the depth of leadership capacity. It exposes whether messaging is reactive or strategically grounded in credibility and coherence.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect on recent crises and assess whether leadership communication strengthened or weakened trust.

Strategic Messaging and Political Incentives

Strategic messaging is deeply shaped by political incentives, including electoral competition, media dynamics, institutional constraints and external pressures. Leaders rarely communicate in a neutral environment. They respond to incentives that reward visibility, emotional engagement and short-term gains. In highly competitive or polarised contexts, messaging tends to become simplified, adversarial and oriented toward immediate political advantage. This may strengthen short-term positioning but often undermines long-term credibility.

At the same time, external incentives, such as EU integration processes, may encourage more structured, reform-oriented communication. However, these signals may not fully align with domestic political incentives, creating tensions between external credibility and internal political positioning. Understanding these dynamics is essential to explain why strategic messaging often diverges from ethical communication and why sustaining credibility over time is challenging.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which incentives most strongly shape leadership messaging in their system.

Strategic Messaging and Reform Processes

The relationship between messaging and reform can be understood as: messaging → expectations → political risk → political space → reform feasibility → implementation sustainability.

Messaging shapes expectations, which in turn influence political risk. High uncertainty or unmet expectations increase resistance and reduce the space for reform. Conversely, clear and credible messaging can reduce perceived risks, enabling broader support and more stable implementation.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether reform outcomes in their system are more constrained by messaging failures or by policy design.

Reform Feasibility and Leadership Capacity

Reform feasibility depends not only on technical design or institutional capacity, but on the ability of leadership to sustain coherent, credible and strategically aligned messaging over time. Different types of reforms require different leadership approaches. Technical reforms depend on clarity and explanation; policy reforms require persuasion and coalition alignment; systemic reforms demand sustained trust-building and narrative consistency.

Leadership capacity becomes particularly critical when reforms face resistance, delays or competing narratives. In such contexts, the ability to maintain direction, adapt messaging without losing credibility and signal continued commitment determines whether reforms remain viable.

Weak leadership messaging leads to fragmentation, declining support and increased political risk. Strong leadership messaging, by contrast, stabilises expectations and sustains reform momentum even in challenging environments.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which reforms in their system succeeded or failed primarily due to leadership communication capacity.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

Participants analyse their system across three dimensions:

1. Messaging and Signalling
2. Is messaging clear, consistent and credible?
3. What signals do leaders send about commitment, priorities and red lines?
4. Is messaging aligned with observable actions?
5. Leadership Capacity
6. Is leadership visible, consistent and responsive?
7. How are expectations managed?
8. How are contradictions between short-term politics and long-term reforms handled?
9. Reform Implications
10. Does messaging strengthen or weaken trust?
11. Which audiences are prioritised or neglected?
12. Which reforms fail due to messaging or signalling gaps?

Teaching Note

Focus on strategic messaging as a leadership function shaped by incentives, behaviour and institutional constraints. Emphasise that communication without corresponding action undermines trust. Excessive messaging without delivery can erode credibility faster than silence. Strategic messaging must be matched by consistent implementation.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Strategic messaging in Albania is highly centralised and leader-driven, with strong reliance on direct-to-public communication channels, including social media, livestreams and personalised communication styles. This enhances visibility and narrative control but reinforces leader-centric communication dynamics.

Government messaging around EU integration and reforms is often clear and proactive, particularly in external communication. However, a persistent challenge lies in the gap between reform messaging and implementation outcomes, which affects public trust over time. Political polarisation further shapes messaging, often prioritising positioning over consensus-building.

Diagnostic takeaway: Strategic messaging is highly centralised, visible and effective in agenda-setting, but faces credibility challenges due to gaps between communication and implementation.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Strategic messaging is deeply fragmented, reflecting the country’s complex institutional structure and ethno-political divisions. Competing historical narratives and identity-based framing dominate political communication, limiting the emergence of shared reform narratives.

The absence of a unified public sphere and the presence of parallel media and political spaces make it difficult to communicate reforms at the state level. Messaging is often directed at specific constituencies rather than broader societal audiences, reinforcing division and limiting trust.

Diagnostic takeaway: Strategic messaging is fragmented and identity-driven, with limited capacity to support coherent, state-level reform narratives.

Serbia

Strategic messaging in Serbia is characterised by strong centralisation and high visibility of leadership communication. Narrative control is reinforced through a combination of traditional media influence and digital amplification, enabling consistent and coordinated messaging.

Leadership communication is highly visible and often effective in maintaining public support. However, the asymmetry of the media environment and limited pluralism raise challenges for credibility and inclusiveness, particularly from the perspective of opposition actors and independent observers.

Diagnostic takeaway: Strategic messaging is structured, centralised and highly visible, but operates in an asymmetrical communication environment affecting pluralism and perceived credibility.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Introduces key concepts including interpretive, relational and strategic leadership, signalling, framing, incentives and reform dynamics.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Messaging and Signalling Mapping (30 minutes)

Participants map leadership messaging, signals and audiences in their system;

• Narrative and Expectation Analysis (20 minutes)

Participants analyse how a reform is framed and how expectations are constructed;

• Leadership Communication Simulation (20 minutes)

Participants design a strategic messaging approach balancing credibility, persuasion and political constraints.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can public leadership ensure that strategic messaging aligns interpretation, trust and incentives to support credible, sustainable reform processes rather than reinforcing short-term political positioning?

Key Takeaways

• Strategic messaging is a core leadership function shaping reform outcomes
  • Interpretive, relational and strategic leadership jointly define messaging effectiveness;
  • Leadership signalling communicates commitment and priorities beyond formal narratives;
  • Credibility depends on alignment between messaging and behaviour;
  • Audience differentiation requires multi-level and coherent communication;
  • Expectation management is critical for reform sustainability;
  • Political incentives strongly shape messaging behaviour;
  • Weak messaging undermines reform feasibility, even with strong policy design;
  • Sustainable reforms require consistent, credible and strategically aligned leadership communication.

List of Literature

Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Platow, M. J. (2011). The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence and Power. New York: Psychology Press. (PDF) The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence and Power by S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platow

Lakoff, G. (2004). Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing. reframing.pdf

Cramer, K. J. (2016). The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwimvfSmn7aTAxVDIBAIHfZ4A_QQFnoECC0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F% 2Fjournals.uwyo.edu%2Findex.php%2Fworkingclassstudies%2Farticle%2Fdownload% 2F6065%2F5375%2F8561&usg=AOvVaw2RSO0e3rFuED6jvd2Benra&opi=89978449

OECD (2021). Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy: Main Findings from the 2021 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions. Paris: OECD Publishing. Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy | OECD

Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

=8&ved=2ahUKEwiBkYndn7aTAxUbGhAIHSR_Il4QFnoECAYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2 Fd-nb.info%2F124031910X%2F34&usg=AOvVaw32EoxVPg8Zd7zNhBGr9nxv&opi=89978 449

Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera´, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan,B. (2018).Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature. Menlo Park, CA: Hewlett Foundation.=8&ved=2ahUKEwjShKjyn7aTAxW6HRAIHTrsJl8QFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2 Fwww.hewlett.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2018%2F03%2FSocial-Media-Political-Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-Literature-Review.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3r4AHJq_qgWktgRKlSfrYs&opi=89978449

Freedom House (2024). Nations in Transit 2024: Democracy Scores for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/NIT_2024_Digital_Booklet.pdf

SIGMA/OECD (2023-2024). Principles of Public Administration. https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/2023/11/the-principles-of-public-administration_5e68f805.html

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours

in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Topic 6: Digital literacy and critical engagement

The Objectives

This topic examines how digital literacy and critical engagement function as core societal and governance capacities shaping perception, trust, democratic resilience and reform feasibility. It equips participants to analyse how individuals, institutions and political actors interpret, evaluate and respond to digital information within complex and increasingly manipulated information environments in Western Balkan contexts.

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this topic, participants will develop a grounded understanding of how digital literacy shapes perception, trust and democratic functioning. They will be able to distinguish between cognitive, behavioural and structural dimensions of digital literacy and assess how each influences information processing and engagement. Participants will analyse how platform dynamics, AI-generated content and information ecosystems shape perception and vulnerability to manipulation.

Finally, they will be able to explain how digital literacy directly affects reform feasibility, political risk and implementation sustainability.

Key Concepts to Be Explored (Guidance for Trainers – Progressive Analytical Logic)

This topic is structured around a reinforced causal chain: Digital literacy → perception quality → trust → political risk → reform space → implementation sustainability.

To strengthen conceptual clarity, digital literacy should be understood through three interdependent layers:

1. Cognitive literacy – how individuals interpret, evaluate and reason about information;
2. Behavioural literacy – how individuals act in digital environment, or sharing, verifying, amplifying or ignoring content;
3. Structural literacy – understanding how platforms, algorithms, media systems and data-driven targeting shape information exposure and visibility.

This tri-layer model emphasises that digital literacy is not an individual trait alone, but a systemic governance competence shaped by incentives, structures and institutional environments.

Digital Literacy as a Governance Capacity

Digital literacy operates as a foundational governance capacity that determines how societies interpret reality, assess credibility and respond to political processes. It shapes not only what citizens know, but how they know it, how they evaluate competing narratives and how they translate information into political behaviour.

In high-capacity systems, citizens are able to critically navigate complex information environments, recognise manipulation and sustain trust even in contested contexts. In low-capacity systems, perception becomes fragmented, easily distorted and highly vulnerable to emotional or identity-based narratives.

Importantly, digital literacy does not automatically follow from access to information. The expansion of digital access without corresponding critical capacity may increase exposure to manipulation rather than reduce it. This creates a paradox in which more information leads to less clarity, and greater connectivity leads to deeper polarisation.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether increased digital access in their system has improved understanding or amplified confusion and mistrust.

Cognitive Biases and Information Processing

Digital literacy is fundamentally shaped by how individuals process information. This process is deeply influenced by cognitive biases. Individuals do not interpret information neutrally. Instead, they filter it through pre-existing beliefs, identities and emotional responses.

Confirmation bias leads individuals to seek and trust information that reinforces their views, while dismissing contradictory evidence. Motivated reasoning allows individuals to reinterpret facts in ways that align with their preferences. Availability bias increases the influence of recent or emotionally salient content, regardless of its accuracy.

Digital environments amplify these tendencies by curating personalised information streams that reinforce existing perspectives. As a result, individuals may develop a strong sense of certainty while operating within a narrow and selective information space.

A critical risk is information overconfidence when individuals with lower levels of digital literacy often overestimate their ability to assess information, making them particularly vulnerable to manipulation.

Trainer guidance: Invite participants to reflect not only on others’ biases, but on how their own information processing may be shaped by similar patterns.

Digital Behaviour and Information Consumption

Digital literacy is expressed through behaviour. It is visible in how individuals consume, interpret and interact with information in everyday digital environments.

In many systems, digital behaviour is characterised by speed rather than reflection, and reaction rather than verification. Users scroll, react, share and comment within seconds, often without assessing credibility or context. This behaviour transforms citizens into active participants in the dissemination of information, not merely passive recipients.

Platform design reinforces these patterns by rewarding engagement. Content that triggers immediate reactions circulates more widely than content that requires careful

interpretation. As a result, behavioural patterns such as unverified sharing or emotionally driven amplification become central drivers of information dynamics. Therefore, digital literacy requires a shift from reactive engagement to reflective interaction, where verification and critical assessment precede amplification.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether digital behaviour in their system reinforces critical engagement or accelerates the spread of unverified information.

Source Credibility and Veri𝑓ication Practices

A central dimension of digital literacy is the ability to assess the credibility of information sources. This involves moving beyond surface-level recognition toward systematic verification practices.

In complex information environments, traditional signals of credibility such as, for example, institutional authority or professional journalism are increasingly blurred. Online portals with unclear ownership, politically aligned media and hybrid content formats (mixing information and opinion) make it difficult to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources.

Effective verification requires practices such as lateral reading, cross-checking across multiple sources and identifying the origin and intent of content. However, these practices are not widespread in many contexts yet. Instead, individuals often rely on shortcuts such as familiarity, repetition or emotional resonance, which can be easily manipulated. As a result, perceived credibility may diverge significantly from actual reliability.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess how often verification practices are used in their system and what barriers prevent their adoption.

Misinformation, Disinformation and User Responsibility

Misinformation and disinformation represent systemic challenges, but their impact is mediated by user behaviour. While disinformation is often strategically produced, it is the everyday actions of users that determine its reach and influence. Unverified sharing, selective belief and algorithmic amplification transform individual behaviour into collective vulnerability. In this sense, digital users are not only exposed to manipulation, but also contribute to its diffusion.

A critical emerging dimension is the role of AI-generated content and synthetic media. Deepfakes, synthetic audio and AI-generated text enable highly convincing forms of manipulation that are difficult to detect. Automated influence operations and micro-targeted messaging further increase the precision and scale of disinformation. These developments shift the challenge from identifying false information to navigating an environment where authenticity itself becomes uncertain.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether users in their system are aware of AI-driven manipulation and how this affects their trust in digital content.

Emotional Engagement and the Attention Economy

Digital environments operate within an attention economy where visibility is driven by emotional engagement rather than informational quality. Content that provokes strong emotional reactions (e.g., fear, anger, identity affirmation etc.) is more likely to be amplified. This creates a structural imbalance in which emotionally charged content spreads rapidly, while nuanced and evidence-based information struggles to gain visibility. Over time this dynamic shapes perception by prioritising intensity over accuracy.

Emotional engagement is not inherently negative. However, when it dominates information flows, it reduces space for critical reflection and increases susceptibility to manipulation. Digital literacy involves recognising emotional triggers and developing the capacity to pause, reflect and evaluate before reacting.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to analyse how emotional content influences political perception and polarisation in their system.

Platform Dynamics, Algorithms and Digital Power

Digital literacy must also include an understanding of how platforms structure information environments. Algorithms, recommender systems and data-driven targeting determine what content is visible, amplified or marginalised. These systems prioritise engagement, often reinforcing existing beliefs and limiting exposure to diverse perspectives. Cross-platform dynamics further amplify narratives, allowing content to migrate rapidly across different channels and audiences.

Platform governance has become a central regulatory issue, particularly within the EU through frameworks such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). These aim to increase transparency, accountability and oversight of platform practices. However, implementation challenges remain, particularly in candidate countries. Understanding these structural dynamics is essential for moving beyond individual responsibility toward systemic analysis of information environments.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants who controls visibility in their system and how platform dynamics shape political perception.

Digital Literacy and Democratic Participation

Digital literacy directly shapes the quality of democratic participation. Citizens who critically engage with information are better equipped to evaluate policies, hold institutions accountable and participate meaningfully in public life. Where digital literacy is weak, participation may become reactive, polarised or manipulated. Citizens may base decisions on distorted perceptions, contributing to the erosion of democratic legitimacy. Conversely, strong digital literacy supports informed participation, reduces susceptibility to populist or misleading narratives and strengthens democratic resilience.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants whether digital participation in their system enhances informed engagement or amplifies polarisation.

Institutional Role in Digital Literacy

Digital literacy is not solely an individual responsibility. It is shaped by institutional frameworks, policies and investments. Education systems play a critical role in developing critical thinking and media literacy from an early stage. Public institutions contribute through transparent communication and accessible information. Media organisations influence standards of credibility and accountability. Civil society organisations often act as intermediaries through fact-checking and awareness initiatives.

Where institutional support is fragmented or underdeveloped, digital literacy gaps persist. Effective approaches require coordinated strategies that combine education, regulation, communication and public awareness.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which institutions in their system actively promote digital literacy and where structural gaps remain.

Digital Literacy and Reform Processes

The relationship between digital literacy and reform can be understood as: digital literacy

→ perception quality → trust → political risk → reform space → implementation sustainability

Reforms depend not only on technical design but on how they are understood by citizens. Misinterpretation, misinformation or lack of understanding can generate resistance, even when reforms are well-designed.

Digital literacy shapes whether citizens interpret reforms as credible, necessary or threatening. In low-literacy environments, reforms are more vulnerable to distortion and politicisation. In high-literacy environments, citizens are better equipped to engage with complexity and sustain support over time.

Trainer guidance: Encourage participants to assess whether reform challenges in their system are driven by policy weaknesses or by perception and literacy gaps.

Reform Feasibility and Critical Engagement Capacity

Reform feasibility increasingly depends on the capacity of citizens to critically engage with information. This capacity determines how political risk is distributed and how sustainable reform space is maintained. For example, technical reforms require understanding, policy reforms require evaluation whereas systemic reforms require sustained trust and resilience to manipulation.

Where critical engagement is weak, political risk increases, reform space narrows and implementation becomes unstable. This highlights that digital literacy is not an auxiliary factor, but a core determinant of governance effectiveness.

Trainer guidance: Ask participants which reforms in their system failed due to misinterpretation or lack of public understanding.

Practical Diagnostic Tool

Participants analyse their system across three dimensions:

1. Individual Level
2. Do citizens understand how algorithms shape their feeds?
3. How prevalent are verification practices such as lateral reading?
4. What is the level of awareness of AI-generated content and synthetic media?
5. Information Environment
6. Who benefits from low digital literacy?
7. How transparent is media ownership?
8. How prevalent are coordinated online networks and cross-platform amplification?
9. Reform Implications
10. Which reforms are most vulnerable to misinterpretation?
11. How do literacy gaps interact with political incentives?
12. What institutional mechanisms support critical engagement?

Teaching Note

Focus on digital literacy as a systemic governance capacity shaped by cognitive biases, behavioural patterns and structural dynamics. Avoid reducing it to technical skills. Highlight the risk of information overconfidence, where individuals with lower literacy levels overestimate their ability to assess information, increasing vulnerability tomanipulation. Emphasise that without critical engagement, digital environments may amplify distrust, polarisation and reform resistance.

Country Context Applications

Albania

Digital engagement in Albania has expanded rapidly, driven by widespread use of social media and government digitalisation efforts such as e-Albania. However, digital literacy remains uneven, particularly across age groups and rural-urban divides.

Political communication increasingly relies on platforms such as TikTok and Facebook, where simplified and personalised messaging gains traction. The proliferation of online media portals with opaque ownership contributes to the spread of unverified content, while limited verification practices increase vulnerability to misinformation. Cybersecurity incidents, including major cyberattacks in recent years, have also affected trust in digital systems and state capacity.

Diagnostic takeaway: High digital engagement combined with uneven critical literacy and opaque media ecosystems creates structural vulnerabilities in perception and trust.

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Digital literacy in Bosnia & Herzegovina is shaped by highly fragmented and ethnically segmented information environments. Citizens often consume information within parallel media ecosystems aligned with political and identity divisions.

Cross-border disinformation, including influence from regional actors and external sources such as Russia, interacts with domestic narratives. The absence of a unified digital education framework and uneven institutional responses further limit the development of critical engagement. Diaspora communities also play a role in shaping digital narratives, contributing to cross-border information flows.

Diagnostic takeaway: Fragmented information environments and limited institutional coordination constrain digital literacy and reinforce polarisation.

Serbia

Digital ecosystems in Serbia are characterised by strong media influence and increasing evidence of coordinated online activity, including bot-like amplification and orchestrated commenting.

Pro-government narratives dominate both traditional and digital media spaces, while influencer-based political messaging is becoming more prominent. Although awareness of misinformation is growing, critical evaluation practices remain uneven. These dynamics create asymmetrical information environments where visibility is structured and narrative diversity is limited.

Diagnostic takeaway: Digital literacy is evolving but operates within a highly structured and asymmetrical information environment that shapes perception and limits critical engagement.

Methodology

This topic follows a blended learning approach combining conceptual grounding with applied institutional analysis.

Lecture Component (40%)

Conceptual grounding on digital literacy, cognitive biases, platform dynamics, AI-driven manipulation and governance implications.

Seminar Component (60%) – Indicative Exercise Sequence

1. Content Verification Exercise (30 min)

Participants evaluate real content, including AI-generated examples;

• Bias and Behaviour Reflection (20 min)

Participants analyse how cognitive biases influence interpretation;

• Reform Misinterpretation Case (20 min)

Participants examine how literacy gaps distort reform perception.

Integrative Closing Reflection

How can democratic systems ensure that citizens develop the critical capacity to navigate increasingly complex and manipulated digital environments in ways that strengthen trust, democratic participation and reform sustainability?

Key Takeaways

• Digital literacy is a systemic governance capacity;
  • Cognitive, behavioural and structural literacy jointly shape perception;
  • AI-generated content introduces new risks of manipulation;
  • Platform dynamics determine visibility and influence;
  • Emotional engagement drives information diffusion;
  • Weak literacy amplifies misinformation and polarisation;
  • Institutional support is essential for resilience;
  • Reform success depends on critical public engagement.

List of Literature

Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., & Cook, J. (2017). The Debunking Handbook 2017. Brisbane: University of Queensland. DebunkingHandbook2020.pdf

Chesney, R., & Citron, D. K. (2019). Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War: The Coming Age of Post-Truth Geopolitics. Foreign Affairs, 98(1), 147 – 155. Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War | Foreign Affairs

Paris, B., & Donovan, J. (2019). Deepfakes and Cheapfakes: The Manipulation of Audio and Visual Evidence. New York: Data & Society Research Institute. Data & Society — Deepfakes and Cheap Fakes

Gillespie, T. (2018). Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media 9780300235029 – DOKUMEN.PUB

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjm8Yi1rbaTAxWiJhAIHUwBHI8QFnoECBkQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdn790002.ca.archive.org%2F0%2Fitems%2FDanielKahnemanThinkingFastAndSlow%2FDaniel%2520Kahneman-Thinking%252C%2520Fast%2520and%2520Slow%2520%2520.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0vA dRLFDWbnNOYA9lUlJSD&opi=89978449

Wineburg, S., & McGrew, S. (2017). Lateral Reading and the Nature of Expertise: Reading Less and Learning More When Evaluating Digital Information. Stanford History Education Group Working Paper.

=8&ved=2ahUKEwi_sYbDrbaTAxUjQFUIHfHyFkUQFnoECBgQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2 Fstacks.stanford.edu%2Ffile%2Fdruid%3Ayk133ht8603%2FWineburg%2520McGrew_ Lateral%2520Reading%2520and%2520the%2520Nature%2520of%2520Expertise.pdf &usg=AOvVaw23fC_vluYp7xPX8y2ogQd6&opi=89978449

European Commission. (2023). Digital Services Act: A Safer Digital Space for Users. Brussels: European Commission. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act

European Commission. (2023). Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets. Brussels: European Commission. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-markets-act

OECD. (2021). Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy: Main Findings from the 2021 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy | OECD

OECD (2024). Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity. Paris: OECD Publishing. Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity | OECD

European Commission (2024). Guidelines under the Digital Services Act for Providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes. Brussels. Communication from the Commission – Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065

Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., Silajdzˇic´, L., Hirkic´, M., Besˇirovic´, B., Kapidzˇic´, D., Turcˇalo, S., & Kadic´, V. (2025). Trust, social cohesion, and EU democracy promotion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Working paper, Deliverable D6.4). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Petrovic´, V. Pantelic´, I. (2025). Trust, Social Cohesion and EU Democracy Promotion in Times of Acute Political Crisis. RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/trust-social-cohesion-and-eu-democracy-promotion-in-times-of-acute-political-crisis-the-case-of-serbia/

Filipovic´, L., Hide, E., Mishkova, D., Petrovic´, V., Repovac-Niksˇic´, V., & Turcˇalo, S. (2024). Hybridity and hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans in a time of war and increased geopolitical tensions (Deliverable D6.1). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe (Grant Agreement No. 101132314). https://re-engaging.eu/

Filipovic´, L. Hide, E. Hirkic´, M. Kapidzˇic´, D., Mishkova, D. Petrovic´, V. Niksˇic´, R., V. Turcˇalo, Sead. Xharo. K (2024). External Engagement in the Western Balkans; Background paper (Deliverable D6.2). RE-ENGAGE – Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions, Horizon Europe. Available at: https://re-engaging.eu/external-engagement-in-the-western-balkans/

Xhaferaj, A., & Hide, E. Selective Europeanisation and Conditional Trust: EU Democracy Promotion in Hybrid Albania. https://re-engaging.eu/selective-europeanisation-and-conditional-trust-eu-democracy-promotion-in-hybrid-albania/

Hirkic´, M. (2025). Crisis partnership with China? Evidence from a survey experiment in Sarajevo and Tuzla. In: Recalibrating the global compass: China and shared future in a fragmented  world (Dialogues on China,Vol. 5, Article  28, pp. 502–524). https://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_ser/iipe_dijalozi_kina/2025-5/iipe_dijalozi_kina-2025-5-ch28.pdf