External actors’ engagement in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe

Chinese President Xi Jinping, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other participants in the outreach/BRICS Plus format meeting pose for a family photo during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia October 24, 2024. Photo: picture alliance/ALEXANDER NEMENOV/Pool via REUTERS

Summary:

This study analyses the main interests and modes of engagement of the dominant EU’s actual and potential competitors and other external actors in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The paper specifically zooms on four such actors – Russia, China, Türkiye, and the U.S. – and outlines their long-term goals, their perceptions of the two regions in which they are involved, including their relations to the EU and each other, the tools they use to realise their interests, and the outlook for their future engagement. An underlying focus of the paper is on how these actors engage with hybrid regimes in the two regions and how they work with channels of political, economic, social or cultural influence, which might impact the horizontal and vertical trust among the populations. In conclusion, the study compares different interests and modes of engagement of the chosen external actors and highlights the need for nuanced understanding that these play in both regions.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has found itself in an increasingly contested environment in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. While Russia has openly embarked on a path to contest and challenge the regional order and the EU’s role in it already in 2014 with its annexation of Crimea and doubled down on its revisionism with its aggression against Ukraine in 2022, new competitors have appeared in both regions in the past decade. This could be China with its promise of an alternative, Chinese- led international order backed by economic incentives and ability to sway local economic elites, Türkiye with its outreach to various substate communities, or, on a substantively lower scale, the U.S. under the Trump administration with its unilateral initiatives that counter long-time EU policy positions. Needlessly to say, while the EU has a range of policies and instruments to react to these challenges, it has struggled to make full use of them and support a meaningful change and sustainable democratic and rule of law reforms in the regional hybrid regimes (see Bolkvadze et al. 2024; Buras et al. 2024; Mishkova et al. 2024).

This study aims to map this complex environment by analysing the basic interests of the EU’s actual and potential competitors and other external actors, their long-term goals, their perceptions of the two regions in which they are involved, the tools they use to realize their interests, and the outlook for their future engagement. The four external actors examined here – Russia, China, Türkiye, and the U.S. – were chosen for the durability and extent of their role in the two regions and their potentially confrontational relationship with the EU. Although including the U.S. in the study might seem controversial as it usually acts in unison with the core EU interests, the experience with the previous Trump administration and the potential of a second Trump presidency warrants its inclusion. The second Trump administration might not turn the U.S. into an outright competitor and spoiler, but it might leave the EU with an important global player that does not necessarily share its preferences and interests on the key regional issues.

The analysis specifically builds on previous conceptual work done in the re- ENGAGE. In particular, it seeks to understand how the competing actors in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans engage with local hybrid regimes and societies in the region, how they target their sense of belonging, and in extension, the horizontal and vertical trust among the respective populations (see Osland et al. 2024; Giske et al. 2024). At the same time, it aims to provide background material for future studies, namely those focusing on foresight scenarios of external and competing actors’ involvement in the two regions and those focusing specifically on the reactions of local hybrid regimes and societies to external engagement.

The study proceeds by zooming in on the perceptions, interests, tools and modes of future engagement of the chosen external actors. First, it focuses on Russia as a key spoiler and aspiring hegemon in the European neighbourhood. Subsequently, it turns to China as the key economic partner of the EU and regional states but also a political competitor of the EU, Türkiye with its policy of balancing influence-building and relations with the key regional actors, and the U.S. with its policy of limited and reluctant involvement. The paper concludes with a brief comparison of these actors and the main modes of their involvement in the two regions.

Spoiler and hegemon: Russia’s strategies in the EU neighbourhood

Martin Laryš

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has left a group of “in-between” countries—Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia—caught in between Russia and the EU, building ties with the latter even as the former seeks to maintain its influence in these targeted states in what it considers an existential struggle with the ‘collective West’ (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024). It is tempting to think about Moscow’s foreign policy as reducible to rational self-interest, a demand for “spheres of influence” articulated in a sober logic of security of a modern power (Mälksoo 2023; Oksamytna 2023). However, Russia should be rather viewed as an archaic power seeking an empire status through brute violence and colonial expansion in the neighboring countries driven by anti-Western resentment and an inferiority complex in relation to the West (Etkind 2023; Medvedev 2023; Oksamytna 2023). This translates into support for illiberal, anti-Western and often also separatist forces and the employment of actions seeking to undermine trust in the governing authorities as well as horizontal trust in the target countries.

For Putin’s regime, foreign policy is an extension of its domestic policy, with domestic developments, such as the recent shift to a semi-totalitarian system, impacting its foreign policy strategy and goals (Kolesnikov, 2022; Domańska, 2023). The anti-Western resentment, combined with Russian exceptionalism, is a cornerstone of the regime, promoting a messianic vision of Russia as a great power and a civilizationist state (Snegovaya, Kimmage, and McGlynn 2023). This translates into an aggressive foreign policy toolkit combining military power with the coercive use of economic (especially energy) ties and reaching out to anti- Western and conservative parts of local societies.

The core long-term interests and goals in the respective regions

For Russia, the ‘collective West’ is perceived as the primary security and existential threat, with its relationships to the two regions (the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus) shaped by their countries’ ties with the EU, NATO, and the USA. The former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are constantly viewed by Moscow as its exclusive sphere of influence, which requires a defence against the ‘collective West,’ which Moscow accuses of supporting the so- called colour revolutions and imposing liberal values (see the chapter on the USA).

According to key figures in Putin’s regime, such as Nikolai Patrushev or Yuriy Kovalchuk, these countries are seen as non-sovereign and considered either as part of the Russian orbit or as Western puppets in a zero-sum game (Milov 2022; Zygar 2024b). This imperial view has been constant in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this respect, the Gorbachev and Yeltsin era, though considered by some as the “normal” state of Russia, could be considered an exception rather than a norm. However, this period was not driven by a genuine belief in democracy but by Russia’s economic and political weakness, which prevented it from fully asserting its great power and imperial ambitions. Many within Russia view this as a source of humiliation and a root cause of strong anti-Western resentment (Tsygankov, 2015; Kassymbekova and Marat 2022; Smith-Peter 2022; Akopov 2022). This is also connected with anti-western ultra-conservative values that have constantly been present in parts of Russian political thinking since the 19th century (Laruelle 2023).

Geography matters when distinguishing between Russian interests in these two regions. Moscow opposes pro-European and democratic forces in Eastern European and Caucasian countries. While Belarus and Azerbaijan remain authoritarian, and Georgia aligns more closely with Russia, the main battlegrounds for countering Western influence are Ukraine (in a literal sense) and Moldova and Armenia (in a figurative sense). However, Georgia and Armenia are far from the EU borders, while Moldova’s two neighbours are Romania—a friendly EU country—and Ukraine, a fellow candidate for joining the union. The support of both neighbours has allowed Moldova to make the EU rather than Russia its leading gas supplier since 2022, and to begin accession negotiations with Brussels without suffering (so far) a major backlash from Russia (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024).

Moscow’s agenda in the Western Balkans is aimed at obstructing EU and NATO efforts to integrate the region into their institutions as a spoiler, not at establishing Russia as a political, diplomatic, and economic hegemon as in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Thus, Russia sees the Western Balkans as yet another arena in greater competition with the USA and its allies (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024). The Western Balkans are not part of the area where Russia’s vital national interests are at stake in its pursuit of its imperialist expansive policy. Russia’s approach to the Balkans is, by and large, a function of its relations with the U.S. and Europe. Whenever Russia and the West are on a collision course, Moscow acts as a spoiler of Western initiatives in the region. Although Russia opposes the advancement of NATO expansion in the Balkans, it does not pragmatically expect the region’s incorporation into its own organizations, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (Bieber and Tzifakis 2019).

Moscow attempts to exploit the disillusionment with the EU and lack of trust in it among the societies in the region, particularly their disillusionment regarding the slow pace of enlargement, and enhance its anti-Western political projects, even though the EU is not seen as being at the same threat level as NATO. The Western Balkans, unlike the Eastern European Slavic Orthodox countries, have never been considered a part of the Russian identity and have never been part of the Russian empire. However, pan-Slavism and historical symbolism play a significant role in the way identities are framed, and even if they do not necessarily play a role in the formation of core Russian interests, they open a way for potential influence (Russell-Omaljev 2016). Russia has a history of being seen as ‘the liberator’ of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans due to its role in the wars against the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and Russia often reminds its Balkan partners of these deep emotional ties. According to this narrative, Russia always comes to the rescue of Southern Slavs and Orthodox Christians, whoever the adversaries might be: the arrogant West, radical Islam, the Vatican, or godless liberalism (Bechev 2017, p. 3- 4).

The main target groups and tools of the Russian influence

Russia engages with various local partners and clients, often channelling its support through proxies. This approach is typically driven by a blend of material and political interests in the target states (Avdaliani 2024). Moscow focuses on both state structures and societies in the Western Balkans and former Soviet countries of Eastern Europe, making use of and actively supporting the regional hybrid regime structures. It has been seeking to gain influence in the studied countries by exploiting a range of existing political and social cleavages and targeting the trust in the government as well as trust in other (ethic or social) groups (see Osland et al. 2024; Bolkvadze et al. 2024; Mishkova et al. 2024). In particular, Russia emphasizes the following topics and works on the following societal cleavages in its strategy:

Socio-economic conditions: Russia’s information warfare targets ordinary people by exploiting their existential fears regarding socio-economic conditions. This particularly affects those who feel they have been on the losing side of economic transitions and reforms and believe their governments have neglected them. These narratives fuel populism and anti-elitism, turning people against their governments and pro-Western actors. Pro-Russian political actors (e.g. those in Moldova) benefit from such sentiments and try to capitalize on them for votes and political power (De Waal, Bechev and Samorukov 2024; Całus 2024).

Anti-liberal and conservative values and beliefs: Moscow focuses on conservative segments of societies and supports political actors who amplify conservative beliefs among the population (Avdaliani 2024). Russia’s turn to “traditional values” positioned Putin’s regime as an international leader in the fight against progressive ideas, including LGBTQ rights and the so-called “gender ideology”—a derogatory catch-all term used to describe everything from abortion and sex-ed in schools to trans rights and same-sex marriage. Such a moral ultra- conservatism resonates in traditionally conservative societies (Edenborg 2022).

Ethnic cleavages: Moscow frequently works with local identitarian tensions and seeks to dissolve the trust of other ethnic and social groups. It incited a fear of Romanization in Transnistria, historically fuelled anti-Georgian sentiments in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and stirred anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Crimea and eastern Ukraine before 2014. In Moldova and Ukraine, however, the issue is more about cultural divisions—there was a Soviet nostalgia among the Russian speakers there, who felt insecure and lost in the post-Soviet transition, which made them receptive to paternalistic Russian propaganda (DeSisto and Pop-Eleches 2024; Koldomasov and Pylypenko 2024). In the Western Balkans, Russia stokes nationalist feelings among the Orthodox populations against Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians to create chaos and destabilization, which would pose more problems for the EU and hinder the integration of these countries (Koldomasov and Pylypenko 2024).

Russia plays on these cleavages with a wide range of tools, which will be divided into diplomatic/political, information, military, economic, and intelligence tools in the following section.

The main tools of Russian influence

Diplomatic/Political tools

On the diplomatic and political level, Russia provides diplomatic support and political favours to states central to its foreign policy goals. For instance, Moscow has supported Serbia diplomatically since the 1990s, opposed the international war crimes tribunals for Serbian leaders, and blocked the UN recognition of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence. Russia has boosted its popularity by positioning itself as a defender of Serbian territorial integrity, while Serbia has been pursuing friendly relations with Russia as a foreign policy strategy that allows it to leverage its relations with the EU regarding Kosovo (McBride 2023; Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023). Russia uses the opportunity to expand its presence while Serbia plays the card of Russian support to show the EU and the U.S. that it has an alternative (Metodieva 2019).

Russia has also used breakaway regions as political tools for political leverage over target states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. However, their relevance has recently declined. The puppet ‘people’s republics’ in eastern Ukraine were formally annexed by Russia in 2022, the Azerbaijani army seized Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, and the incumbent pro-Russian Georgian government controlled by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili has lessened Russia’s need to use South Ossetia and Abkhazia against Tbilisi. The importance of Transnistria as a leverage also declined after Ukraine closed its borders with the region in 2022, which means its imports and exports are now fully controlled by Chișinău, which increases the Moldovan leverage (Gavin 2024; Całus 2023).

Aside from breakaway regions, Russia stokes pro-Russian sentiments and a lack of trust in regions that have a special identitarian status (yet remain under the control of central governments) and uses them to pressure the target states. Gagauzia in Moldova and Republika Srpska (RS) in BiH are clear examples of this. Gagauzia has traditionally leaned towards Russia, and the Gagauz people, making up about 5 percent of Moldova’s population, vote as a bloc for pro-Russian parties. Russia can exploit the Gagauzian autonomy to destabilize Moldova, potentially encouraging demands for increased autonomy to destabilize Chisinau further (Ibragimova 2024; Deen and Zweers 2022; Socor 2024). A similar situation on a larger scale exists in Republika Srpska (RS) in BiH. Russia has supported Bosnian Serb separatism, both officially through RS and informally through various cultural, religious, educational, and paramilitary groups. Russia has financed Milorad Dodik’s election campaigns and is a major investor in RS, although it is not reflected in official statistics (McBride 2023; Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023). With RS holding wide-ranging powers within the loose federation, the entity can act as a quasi-state and pursue its own external policies. For example, the RS veto has prevented BiH from joining the Western sanctions against Russia in response to the re-invasion of Ukraine. In addition, RS and its representatives can block decisions in central BiH institutions such as the cabinet and the federal parliament (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024).

In the social sphere, Russia acts through proxy actors, mostly Orthodox churches and anti-western ultra-nationalists (Laryš 2024). The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a key ally in propagating ultra-conservative messages of the Kremlin and a key actor in connecting with conservative and religious parts of local populations. Several Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe are either directly affiliated with or have close relations with the ROC, which allows Moscow to bypass governments and local media to spread pro-Russian messages in hundreds of parishes. The Moldovan Orthodox Church is in direct communion with the ROC. The Georgian Orthodox Church is close to Russia (at least closer than much of the Georgian general public) and has taken a relatively soft position on the war as it tries to maintain relations with the ROC (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024; Lutsevych and Pasha 2024). Although the church is constitutionally separate from the Russian state, it has become a de facto bureaucratic structure dependent on the state (Zygar 2024b). The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) looks to the ROC to support its claims in Kosovo, which contains some of the holiest sites. Russian Orthodox charity groups, the largest of which is run by pro-Kremlin billionaire Konstantin Malofeev, operate in Serbia and throughout the Balkans, promoting the idea of a pan-Slavic civilization opposed to the West (McBride 2023). The SOC echoes many Russian narratives, thereby spreading ultra-conservative values, pro-Russian political viewpoints, Serb nationalism, and anti-Western agendas in Serbia, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska in BiH (Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023). In these countries and regions, large parts of the populations are SOC members. On the other hand, these churches are not monolithic entities. For example, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) encompasses a wide range of perspectives, from Serbian ethnic nationalists to priests and congregations that hold much more liberal views on interethnic and interfaith relations.

Far-right and ultra-nationalist groups are among Russia’s favourite vehicles for spreading its influence (Rekawek, Renard and Molas 2024). These groups align ideologically with the Putin regime’s worldview and can destabilize and challenge the sovereignty of certain countries, particularly in the Western Balkans. This amplifies local tensions and historical grievances, fostering polarization and anti-Western sentiment (Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023). Putin’s Russia leverages its far-right credentials in regions where Russia and Russian Orthodoxy have historically had a strong presence—such as Serbia, Georgia, and Moldova. Putin’s far-right positioning is a form of statecraft, showcasing an alternative to democracy that disregards human rights and international law in favour of “traditional values” and hostility to progressive agendas. This strategy positions him as a figurehead for an informal international ultra-conservative alliance (Zygar 2024a; Luchenko 2024).

Russia actively interferes in other countries’ elections by backing pro- Russian political parties and figures, portraying them as alternatives to what it labels as “illegitimate” governments, thus seeking to lower the trust in state and democratic processes. Two examples of such parties are the Oppositional Platform- For Life (OPZZh) in pre-2022 Ukraine and the (now banned) Shor Party in Moldova. As, at the time of writing of this paper, Georgia and Moldova prepare for their elections in 2024, the Russian propaganda in those countries is expected to intensify while employing anti-Western rhetoric to sway public opinion and diminish support for Ukraine (Luchenko 2024). Such contestation between pro-Russian and pro- Western parties, with Russia’s involvement, was typical for Moldova in previous elections and for Ukraine prior to 2014.

Furthermore, Russia supports so-called “parties of peace,” like the MAN party in Moldova led by Ion Ceban and the ruling Georgian Dream party. Despite their ostensibly pro-European stance, these parties advocate for maintaining neutral relations with Russia, even amid the re-invasion of Ukraine. In a policy indicative of the strategies of such parties, the Georgian Dream party has formally promoted EU accession while expanding various forms of cooperation with Russia, merely paying lip service to the goal of joining the EU (Chedia 2024; Bechev 2024). In another example, in Armenia, Moscow funds pro-Russian opposition forces rallying around figures like the former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, aiming to destabilize the government by blaming it for conceding the territory in Karabakh to Azerbaijan (Shenkman 2023). Local Russian proxies in Moldova, led by the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, have been buying votes, staging anti-government protests, running disinformation campaigns, and spawning a plethora of new political parties to promote a pro-Russian agenda. Moscow views the upcoming elections in 2024 and 2025 as an opportunity to thwart Moldova’s EU ambitions and bring pro-Russian forces back to power (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024; Lutsevych and Pasha 2024).

Serbia’s government under Aleksandar Vučić has become a key channel for Russian interests in the region and an important source of pro-Russia propaganda (Metodieva 2019). Additionally, Moscow extends its support to pro-Russian opposition movements in the Western Balkans, such as the For the Future of Montenegro movement led by Andrija Mandic and Milan Knežević, which secured a significant portion of votes in Montenegro’s 2023 elections. Also, a considerable segment of the political landscape in Serbia has established robust connections with Russia, furthering its regional influence (Zweers, Drost and Henry 2023).

Information

The most public manifestation of the confrontation between Russia and the West in the two targeted regions lies in the ideological sphere and Moscow’s anti-Western information warfare. After 2022, Russia has focused more intensively on providing an alternative pole to the West and the United States’ “global hegemon.”

Russia targets governments pursuing pro-Western foreign policies or accused of doing so and seeks to undermine the public trust in them. Kremlin propaganda blames Nikol Pashinyan for Armenia’s defeat by Azerbaijan in Karabakh, claiming that his alignment with the West has destabilized the South Caucasus. Moscow aims to tarnish Pashinyan’s reputation, presenting him as an anti-Russian asset controlled by Washington (Shenkman 2023; Avetisyan 2023). In Moldova, despite the official ban on Russian state media, Moscow still manages to reach a wide audience by using the local networks of the pro-Russian Gagauzia autonomous region and social media. Moscow portrays Moldova’s integration with the EU as a smokescreen for the country’s absorption by Romania (Ibragimova 2024; De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024).

Russia accuses the EU and NATO of using empty promises of Euro-Atlantic integration to subdue the Orthodox nations and settle Balkan conflicts at their expense. The EU, Moscow insists, will make Serbia recognize Kosovo without granting any reciprocal concessions and will turn North Macedonia into a semi- Albanian state (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024). In another recent example, Moscow recently abolished visa requirements for Georgians. At the same time, the direct flights between the two states were restored in the belief that Moscow’s greater engagement with Tbilisi would help undermine Georgia’s EU candidate status (Krusch 2024).

Russian propaganda varies significantly across different contexts and populations, with varying degrees of receptivity. Although the anti-Western values and sentiments disseminated by Russia’s information warfare are generally similar (but with a greater emphasis on religion in Orthodox countries), the tactics differ for each target state and each segment of society within these target states. The emphasis on “traditional values” and gender and LGBTQ+ issues, in particular, is designed to enlist the support of Orthodox conservative constituencies in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, often with the help of the local Orthodox churches and other conservative social actors (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov 2024, Wilkinson and Dekanosidze 2023).

Through its information warfare, Russia promotes anti-Western, anti- democratic, homophobic, and ultra-conservative values. The primary goals of these disinformation campaigns are to sow distrust in the West, democratic institutions, the EU, and NATO, thereby paving the way for pro-Russian radical populist political actors. Russia’s information warfare questions the benefits of joining Western organizations, aims to weaken its opponents and seeks to fuel political, cultural, and ethnic conflicts within the targeted societies. In this respect, Russia incites chaos and seeks to leverage the resulting instability. This allows Moscow to exploit the EU’s challenges, including the waves of migration, crime, and violence in its neighbouring regions (Fedyk 2021; Galeotti 2017).

Ukraine is the primary target of Russia’s information warfare, which operates on two narrative tracks: one aimed at Western audiences and the other at domestic audiences. The narrative for Western audiences focuses on corruption (claiming that Ukraine is a corrupt failed state, and any assistance and funds for it will be embezzled) and “peace rhetoric” (arguing that Ukraine cannot win and an immediate peace, dictated by Moscow, is the only solution). For the audience in Ukraine, the narrative centres on the alleged illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government and president, and persuading Ukrainians that Europeans will never accept them while Russia is ready to accept them as they are. A similar approach is applied to Moldova.

Anti-West/pro-Russia narratives resonating in the Western Balkans are facilitated by local networks of disinformation proxies (Metodieva 2019). Their central themes include portraying Russia as the defender of Christian-Orthodox traditional values, emphasizing a pan-Slavic link between Russia and the Western Balkans, criticizing the degeneration of the collective West, and using territorial integrity to support Serbia’s position on Kosovo. These narratives resonate with some segments of society in the Western Balkans due to the identity links, the alignment with conservative values promoted by Putin’s regime, and the disappointment with the EU integration process after what many perceive as 20 years in the EU ‘waiting room’ (Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023).

However, these narratives are ineffective against Albanians and Bosnians, who see Russians as key allies of Serbian Orthodox nationalists in the Western Balkans. The West’s backing of Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians has reduced the likelihood of anti-Western sentiment among these communities, which stands in contrast to the prevailing attitudes found among the Slavic Orthodox populations in the Western Balkans. Instead, Albania and Kosovo are frequent scapegoats in Russian propaganda, and are portrayed as instruments of the “Western masters” against Russia and its local allies, and as solely responsible for the destabilizing of the Balkans (Hysi 2024; Koldomasov and Pylypenko 2024). Nevertheless, there remains some fatigue in these countries concerning the ongoing EU enlargement process.

Military

The most recent display of Russia’s military means is the re-invasion of Ukraine, which has triggered the most severe security crisis in Europe since World War II. Military means are the primary tools in Moscow’s hegemonic policy regarding the former Soviet countries of Eastern Europe, as they serve to ward off what it considers external threats, secure its regional supremacy, and limit the manoeuvrability of other actors. The re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022 aimed to showcase the return of a strong, hegemonic Russia with a privileged status in the former Soviet neighbourhood that is maintained through military aggression (de Waal 2024; Klein 2019). Russia’s military presence is a key strategy for Moscow in these targeted countries, often resulting from wars where Russia had intervened previously (e.g., Georgia, Moldova) or policies aimed at reducing the sovereignty of the targeted country (e.g., Armenia, Belarus). This strategy is supplemented by the Moscow-led CSTO, which is partly modelled on NATO. Despite its being based on the principle of mutual defence, the CSTO’s support is highly arbitrary and based on Russian interests, as was the case in the intervention in Kazakhstan in 2022 and the non-intervention in other cases, such as the pogroms in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 or the war in Karabach in 2020 (Krivosheev 2024; Shenkman 2023; de Waal 2024).

Other military means used by Russia include joint military exercises and arms supplies, notably those with Serbia (although Serbia has also participated in other exercises with NATO members and partners). The arms market involves more than just sales; it includes long-term contracts for servicing equipment and supplying components and spare parts, often under agreements made years prior. However, purchasing Russia’s equipment ties the customers to Moscow in terms of security and politics. These activities are meant to demonstrate the military cooperation between Russia and Serbia, but their scope is limited. In general, non- CSTO member states in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans are reluctant to buy arms from Russia or conduct military exercises in cooperation with it.

Some experts call the CSTO a zombie—an undead creature shambling around the former Soviet Union and lacking a pulse but continuing to go through the motions of still being alive (Ambrosio 2024). Meanwhile, Armenia has frozen its CSTO activities, and Pashinyan even threatened that Armenia would exit from the CSTO (Radio Liberty 2024). Thus, the integrationist policy, arms supply, and military exercises are relevant primarily for a few CSTO members (Belarus, Central Asian states) and, to a lesser extent, Serbia with its Janus-faced foreign policy.

Economics/Finances

Russia’s primary tools in the economic sphere involve weaponizing economic and energy dependencies and promoting integrationist policies. A favoured tactic is leveraging other countries’ gas dependency on Russia. Since the 2000s, Moscow has pressured post-Soviet countries to cede control of their gas infrastructure by using both incentives, such as gas price discounts, and threats, like trade bans or price hikes. For example, Moldova had been highly dependent on Russian energy, and amid Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom reduced the gas supplies to Moldova. By cutting the gas supply and increasing consumer prices, the Kremlin aimed to undermine Moldova’s pro-EU leadership and boost support for pro- Russian alternatives (Litra 2023). However, Moldova has achieved independence from Russian gas in 2023 and maintained it since then. In an opposing example, Armenia’s economy, unlike Georgia’s, is heavily reliant on Russia, as it imports Russian natural gas and has its power grid, distribution networks and nuclear plant as well as its key transport infrastructure controlled by Russia or pro-Russian oligarchs (Avetisyan 2023; Krivosheev 2024).

The Russian market’s dominance is also evident in specific commodities, particularly in agriculture, and this position has been used for political gains, for example, in Moldova and Georgia. Russia employs state regulatory bodies, primarily Roskomnadzor and Rosselkhoznadzor, for political purposes, particularly to ban products from the targeted countries from accessing the Russian market (Svoboda, 2019). In late 2023, Russia banned imports of agricultural produce from Armenia and Moldova, supposedly on sanitary grounds (De Waal, Bechev, and Samorukov, 2024). Another significant tool in the economic sector is Russia’s promotion of integrationist projects. Putin’s first design for a regional economic organization was formalized as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015. The EAEU is criticized for being designed to serve Russia’s interests, as its economic rationale is intertwined with security concerns, and Russia views the other members as an ideological and political buffer against the West (de Waal 2024).

In the Western Balkans, Russia maintains an economic influence, particularly in the energy sector. Russia supplies nearly all the gas imports for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Gazprom owning critical energy infrastructure there (Zweers, Drost and Henry 2023). In May 2022, Serbia renegotiated a favourable three-year gas contract with Gazprom during the Ukraine war and the international sanctions on Russia, which helped Serbia resist the EU pressure to join the anti- Russian sanctions (Zweers, Drost and Henry 2023; McBride, 2023). The new deal links gas prices to crude oil and ranges between US$310 and US$408, which enables the Russian price to maintain its competitive position as one of Europe’s lowest import prices.

In general, Russia has a weak economic footprint in the Western Balkans when compared with the EU, including in terms of direct investments. Considering Russia’s limitations in delivering economic support, it seeks to leverage alternative low-cost or asymmetrical instruments of influence. Financial challenges restrict Russia’s ability to provide substantial financial aid or large-scale investments in the way that the EU can provide grants or infrastructure projects. However, Russia compensates for these economic constraints by supplying cheap energy resources, such as oil and gas, to Serbia and RS while also relying on other tools of influence (Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023). Unlike the EU, Russian indirect financial support and aid, provided through cheap energy resources, comes without conditions related to reforms on the rule of law or good governance. The only requirement is that the recipient states’ foreign policies align with Russia’s geopolitical interests. Bieber and Tzifakis noted that Russia’s economic involvement in the region should not be underestimated for three main reasons: It is frequently masked, as Russian capital flows are transferred through third countries; it is strategically focused and concentrated on a few key economic sectors (e.g., energy and banking), and the Russian state exerts substantial influence over the decisions of the countries’ private corporations (Bieber and Tzifakis 2019).

In contrast to Eastern Europe or the South Caucasus, there is no evidence that the wealthiest oligarchs in the Western Balkans—such as Miroslav Mišković, Miodrag Kostić, Dejan Čakajac, or Petar Matijević and others—are openly involved in political affairs by leading and financing political parties or have publicly declared close ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Intelligence

Moscow targets state structures through the recruitment of high-ranking military and intelligence officers (both active and former) and other officials and authorities. For instance, Armenia has a network of “friends of Russia” embedded in various state structures, including the government, the parliament, the special services, and the Foreign Ministry (The Insider 2020b). Such operations are conducted by Russian intelligence agencies and the Russian President’s Office for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Upravlenie prezidenta Rossii pomezhregionalnym i kulturnym svyazyam s zarubezhnymi stranami). Active and former intelligence officers staff this office.

By buying off these individuals and other relevant actors, Russian intelligence infiltrates and influences the targeted countries. They create and support influential informal groups, such as pro-Russian oligarchs and their political parties in Armenia and Moldova, and these groups are to pressure pro- Western governments (Wesolowsky 2022; Krivosheev 2024; The Insider 2020b; Kononczuk, Cenusa and Kakachia 2017; Galeotti 2019a; Shenkman 2023). However, to prevent pro-Western foreign policy shifts or integration with NATO and the EU, Russian intelligence services have allegedly planned coups in several countries, specifically Moldova, Armenia, and Montenegro (Zweers, Drost, and Henry 2023; McBride 2023).

Pro-Russian oligarchs have been an ideal Russian proxy actor for creating influence networks and lobbyist groups, and managing specific tasks, such as corrupting politicians, psychological operations, or political diversions. Politically powerful oligarchs are more typical for Eastern European and Caucasian countries than for the Western Balkans. Examples in this respect range from Armenia (the MP and leader of the Prosperous Armenia party Gagik Tsarukyan, the former president Robert Kocharyan) and Moldova (Ilon Shor) to pre-2022 Ukraine and Georgia with Bidzina Ivanishvili as the wealthiest and most powerful oligarch in the latter country (Krusch 2024).

Russia’s view of other competing powers and the EU

Putin’s regime perceives any engagement of the EU in its “exclusive sphere of influence” as a direct challenge and threat to Russia’s interests, security, and even its very existence. The regime’s elites simplify the intricate landscape of global politics by depicting it as a relentless competition among major powers (Milov 2022). They view Russia as an exceptional, autocratic, self-sustaining “state- civilization” with a unique historical mission consisting of protecting “traditional values” and promoting its own alleged superiority (Kragh and Umland, 2023; Genis, 2022). In this worldview, the EU embodies Russia’s historical adversary, the “collective West,” and the events in Ukraine are portrayed as just another chapter in this perpetual struggle between good (Russia) and evil (the “collective West”) (Pynnöniemi and Parppei 2024; De Waal, Bechev and Samorukov 2024).

The EU is generally more popular than NATO in the ‘contested countries’ as in Serbia, BiH, Armenia, and Moldova only about 30% of all citizens want to join NATO, but up to 60% want to join the EU as the October 2024 referendum demonstrated. In Russia’s view, however, it doesn’t matter, as Moscow sees the EU as a vassal of the USA and NATO as an organization where the US, as the true global hegemon, dominates and the rest are the US ‘satellites’ (De Waal, Bechev and Samorukov 2024). Putin’s inner circle views the EU’s policy in the so-called ‘near abroad’ as anti-Russian plots posing an existential threat to Russia. It is related to Russia’s inferiority complex in relation to the West, as it aspires to be in the “major league” but never succeeds (Schneider 2023; Volkov and Kolesnikov 2023). Furthermore, Putin’s regime portrays the independent, sovereign, and pro- European Ukraine as another existential threat, accusing the West, including the EU, of using Ukraine as a tool to dismantle the Russian state. It is qualitatively different from the other targeted countries, as Russia does not challenge the distinct national identities of Georgians, Armenians, and, to some extent, Moldovans as it does that of Ukraine. While Russia expects these nations to be subservient, Moscow does not aim to erase their national identities or claim they are part of the Russian identity, and therefore the Russian perception of their relations with competing powers is different from that of the Ukrainian relations (Smith-Peter 2022).

This contrasts with the cases of China and Türkiye. Türkiye seeks to bolster its influence among selected states and communities in the Western Balkans and Azerbaijan, often specifically focusing on areas not central to Russia’s interests. Russia does not openly challenge Türkiye’s influence there. Similarly, China, as the only potential ally capable of significantly aiding Russia in overcoming the effects of the sanctions, is not contested by Russia in its efforts in the regions.

Outlook for future engagement

As Putin’s regime tightens its grip, it is poised to adopt a more aggressive stance. While Putin was previously seen as an authoritarian and assertive yet rational leader, he now appears to have transitioned into a state of paranoia, exhibiting traits of a messianic dictator surrounded by like-minded individuals who reinforce his worldview. Violence has become ingrained in Russian society, permeating all levels of interpersonal relations and governmental policy, both domestically and internationally. That’s why Russia’s engagement in the two regions will likely be more intense, with even less regard for international law in the future.

Russia’s entrenched 19th-century geopolitical mindset, characterized by an archaic and illiberal outlook, is expected to persist unless the country undergoes significant changes and abandons its imperial vision. In all likelihood, the Kremlin will persist in interfering in the political affairs of the targeted regions by funding pro-Russian parties, demonizing the EU and democratic values as threats, and accusing pro-European governments of dragging their countries into the war. Once the poster child for progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration and democracy, Georgia is a reminder that a country’s ‘progress’ and pro-European development are neither linear nor inevitable (Niyex 2024). Pro-Russian forces may exploit socioeconomic challenges to gain traction in elections within these two regions, with the ultimate goal of internally destabilizing them, thwarting their integration with the EU, and removing pro-Western leaderships through upcoming elections, coups, or other means with the assistance of local proxies.

The future application of Russia’s influence tools will largely depend on the outcome of its re-invasion of Ukraine. This outcome will shape Moscow’s strategies and approaches towards its neighbouring countries, the Western Balkans, and the broader “collective West.”

China: Economic partner, political competitor

Jan Švec

China’s role in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans is driven by economic, political, and strategic interests. China’s investments in the region are concentrated in strategic sectors like infrastructure, energy, and natural resources, often financed by loans from Chinese state-owned financial institutions. From a strategic perspective, China has focused on building new and alternative trade routes, such as the Thessaloniki-Budapest railway and the “Middle Corridor,” which reduce its reliance on maritime routes to Europe. Access to strategic transport infrastructure, natural resources, and the energy sectors of the countries in the region provides China with important leverage that can be utilized for political and diplomatic aims, while they do not necessarily aim to target the respective societies and their sense of trust and belonging in the same way as Russia does it. However, the Chinese assets can be utilized in a larger geopolitical conflict, including for military purposes.

Chinese investments are realized and financed by Chinese state-aligned organizations and are often the results of high-level political negotiations. It might be thus expected that they align with Beijing’s global strategy. With investments and loans, China gains the loyalty of local elites, who benefit from the public support these investments might create but also through the related personal profit. Chinese investment projects were criticized for lacking transparency, potential corruption, their negative environmental impact, and infringement of labour rights, but often without much follow-up investigation or legal action.

Despite receiving considerable public attention, Chinese investments are still significantly lower than those of the EU. The EU and its member states provide more money than China in loans, aid, and private foreign direct investments (FDIs). Chinese investments, as opposed to the EU ones (Buras et al. 2024), are not tied to the conditions of sustainability, transparency and democracy and they do not seek to actively support democratization and rule of law. On the contrary, Chinese investors benefit from a regional deficit in trust and adjust to and reinforce regional neo-patrimonial structures and hybrid regimes (Giske, Bøås, and Rieker 2024; Bolkvadze et al. 2024; Mishkova et al. 2024). Thus, the local elites can prefer Chinese investments as they help them to acquire personal stakes and maintain the status quo. Public opinion polls and civil society responses show that China is not seen as a major preferred partner, unlike the EU. However, due to the weak institutions and extensive patronage networks in the region, the elite might support Chinese investments. In contrast, these are criticized by civil society and the wider public, in some cases widening the gap and decreasing the level of trust between the two. The relations with China, which depend primarily on personal relations, are considerably fragile. Many countries in the region reassess their cooperation with China due to unmet promises, increased awareness of the related risks, and a recent combination of countermeasures and better alternative options from the EU.

Long-term interests and goals

The role of China in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans stems from its economic interests, political interests and geostrategy. Many of China’s regional investments are carried out under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013. While the original idea of the BRI was related to the original Silk Road and was focused on developing new China-Europe routes, it has gradually developed into a global strategy involving various types of investments. The BRI currently consists of hard infrastructure such as transportation and energy, as well as alignment of policies and regulatory standards and people-to-people connections.

While it was officially presented as a project for global economic development, China gains many advantages, including political ones, from its existence. The BRI helps China to globally expand its influence, improve its international image (Liu and Ding 2024), globally diffuse its norms (Garlick and Qin 2023), gain political and diplomatic support, and acquire access to critical infrastructure and resources (Patey 2021, 120). Constructing alternative transport routes allows China to lower its dependency on maritime routes, which might be prone to disruption in the event of a natural disaster or a military conflict in the South China Sea (Patey 2021, 93). Furthermore, China can potentially utilize the BRI infrastructure for military purposes in the future (Patey 2021, 56).

The Balkans and Eastern Europe are important to China in several ways. First, China attempts to build alternative routes for delivering its goods to Europe, and these can lead through the region. Second, China gains access to the region’s natural resources, including copper, ferroalloys, timber and corn (Krstinovska and Vuksanovic 2023, 5). Third, it expands the markets for its production, including manufactured goods, but also resources for infrastructural construction, thus partially addressing its overcapacity (Nugent and Lu 2021). Fourth, through the region, China acquires easier access to the EU market and gains related know how and experience (Krstinovska and Vuksanovic 2023, 5). Fifth, China attempts to improve its public image and coopt local elites, thus enhancing its soft power and build its network of trust and influence. It thus legitimizes its political regime and builds a basis for diplomatic support (Patey 2021, 91). China might also misuse the increased interdependence to force the countries to stand up against the West on controversial issues (Keaten 2021). As the countries in the region are on various levels of integration with the Western structures, including the EU and NATO, China benefits from the related access to these organizations. At the same time, it attempts to weaken the region’s further alignment with the West by presenting incentives for cooperation with China and alternatives to cooperation with the West Albania was the first Balkan country to develop a stronger relationship with communist China, after its split away from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s (Marku 2017). While the Chinese relationship with Albania worsened in the 1970s, China developed a new key friendship developed with Yugoslavia. After the conflicts in Yugoslavia erupted at the beginning of the 1990s, China continued its support for the Serb-dominated regime. The crucial moment for the mutual relations came when NATO forces bombed Belgrade and hit the Chinese embassy, killing three Chinese citizens (Ponniah and Marinkovic 2019). Until now, Serbia remains the only one of the analysed countries whose ties with China reach beyond pragmatism and economic benefits, as they were formed with the narrative of a “shared victimhood” (Y. Zhou 2022). There is an evident sympathy towards Serbia in official Chinese discourse (Y. Zhou 2022). This “ironclad friendship”, said Xi Jinping during his visit to Serbia in May 2024, was “forged with the blood of our compatriots” and will “stay in the shared memory of the Chinese and Serbian peoples” (Xinhua 2024d). In Belgrade, Xi visited the China Cultural Center, built by China’s government on the site of the collapsed embassy after the NATO bombing, together with a monument to the citizens killed in the bombing (Xinhua 2024a). On a diplomatic level, China serves as “the protector of Serbia’s national sovereignty,” standing against the independence of Kosovo, including in the UN (Mitrović 2023).

Tools of Chinese influence

Politics/diplomacy

China has successfully developed cooperation with current and former politicians and other influential individuals for cooperation, often making use of hybridity of local regimes. The motives for their cooperation with China are bolstering their popularity through increased investments and balancing the perceived dominance of the “West” but also personal gains. Chinese companies have proved to be efficient in understanding local patronage structures and taking advantage of weak social cohesion (Bolkvadze et al. 2024; Mishkova et al. 2024; Giske, Bøås, and Rieker 2024), including corrupting practices and establishing strong networks with local elites, who are prone to prefer Chinese investments even despite scandals and public criticism.

Leaders from Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina tend to support China, also due to their shared anti-Western sentiment. They keep active, regular ties with Chinese representatives and visit China (International Department CPC 2022). Serbia even established a special office for cooperation with Russia and China. It is the only country in the region visited by Xi Jinping. President Vucic publicly praised China and even attempted to speak Chinese (TV Studio B 2019). Except for Serbia, the high level political and diplomatic contacts between China and Eastern European countries are limited and conducted unequally, manifesting China’s position as a dominant partner. Often, China’s vice-ministerial representatives meet with the corresponding countries’ highest representatives. As in the case of other regions, many political interactions with China are realized through the International Liaison Department of the CCP (International Department CPC 2024). Despite their lack of formal positions in the governmental structures, representatives of the CCP are welcomed in the countries as legitimate representatives of China (Xinhua 2024c).

Eastern European politicians’ meetings with China’s highest representatives are typically held in China as side events to larger gatherings (Xinhua 2023b), which probably reflects a lack of dedication from the Chinese side. In 2019, China created the position of the special envoy for Eurasian Affairs, primarily in relation to the developing conflict in Ukraine. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the envoy served as China’s nominal mediator in efforts to settle the conflict (Shumilin 2024).

Chinese actors made use of hybrid features of the Georgian state. The Chinese primarily have ties related to the circle of the former prime minister and oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. In the past, this concerned the Chinese conglomerate CEFC, which directly coopted and paid the local elites, including former Georgian prime minister Irakli Gharibashvili (Standish and Pertaia 2023). As the company went bankrupt in 2020, its possessions were taken over by a company which is allegedly indirectly controlled by Ivanishvili (Pertaia and Wesolowsky 2024). In another example, a former Serbian minister of foreign affairs was also a consultant for the CEFC and founded a think-tank promoting China through events and publications (CIRSD 2024, Karásková et al. 2020).

Economy and finances

The influence of China in the region is largely defined by its economic activities. First, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) receive contracts for huge transport and energy infrastructure deals financed mostly by loans from Chinese state-owned financial institutions, such as the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank). With these investments, China gets contracts for its construction companies and a market for its construction materials. The Chinese companies thus also acquire experience from a region close to the EU, which might be utilized for their further projects, including those in the EU itself, as was the case with the Peljesac Bridge in Croatia (Kirby 2022). Some of the projects realized in the region by Chinese companies are even financed by EU funds through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Xinhua 2023).

Second, Chinese SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs) invest in the mining industry and natural resources in the region. Despite the economic benefit, China thus gains access to important resources, including those for diversifying risks to its imports, but also those resources which are further imported into the EU (Krstinovska and Vuksanovic 2023), and might be potentially leveraged in the future. Third, Chinese POEs invest in local manufacturing and services. This is still conducted on a limited scale but the proposed plans for the BRI expect more investments in advanced and green technology (State Council 2023).

China is the second-largest trade partner in the Western Balkans but remains far behind the EU. China’s share of the Western Balkans’ exports has been increasing since 2000, but it remained below 4% in 2021 (see Table 1). China’s share of imports in the Western Balkans is higher, yet it stayed below 12% in 2021. In comparison, the EU’s share of the Western Balkans’ exports was 81% and its share of imports was 58% in 2021 (Eurostat 2022).

As shown in Table 2, apart from Ukraine, China remains a negligible export destination for Eastern European countries. Surprisingly, this includes Georgia, which exported less than 5% of its total goods to China in 2021. Trade with Belarus has been gradually increasing, but in 2021, exports to China still accounted for less than 10% of Belarus’s total exports. Corn, iron ore, and sunflower oil were Ukraine‘s primary exports to China. However, following the onset of the war, the exports to China were reported to drop significantly, with some data suggesting that China accounted for less than 8% of Ukraine’s exports in the first half of 2024 (TrendEconomy 2024).

Compared to the EU, the overall level of Chinese investment in the region is significantly lower. For example, the share of Chinese investments in Ukraine made up only 0.05% of Ukraine’s total investments between 2010 and 2017 (Gerasymchuk and Poita 2018). Among the analysed countries, Serbia is the only one which receives most of its investments from China since 2022, after years of having a marginal role behind the EU and Russia (Xinhua 2024b). China invests primarily in infrastructure, energy and mining industries, with most of this money being provided through loans conditional on the participation of Chinese SOEs.

Unlike China, the EU links investment and aid to conditions relating to sustainability, transparency and democracy (Buras et al. 2024). This may lead local politicians, who are entangled in neo-patrimonial structures (Giske, Bøås, and Rieker 2024) and may wish to benefit personally from the deals, to prefer Chinese investments over the EU’s funding. For example, the local company participating in the Chinese overhaul of the power plant in Montenegro was headed by the son of Montenegro’s president, Milo Dukanovic (Krstinovska and Vuksanovic 2023).

Furthermore, most of the analysed countries receive negligible amount of FDIs from Chinese private-owned companies, but there are cases where the investments are more significant. One of the most important Chinese investments was that for the Linglong vehicle tire factory in Serbia (Krstinovska and Alexandris 2023). In Georgia, one Chinese company, Hualing Group, has a prominent role. Most of its investments are in the construction of hotels and resident buildings in Tbilisi, but the recipients also include the Kutaisi Free Industrial Zone and several timber processing factories (BasisBank 2021). Chinese private investments have been a focus of con siderable public scrutiny and have also received criticism from the EU for their negative environmental impact and inhumane labour conditions (European Parliament 2021). Nevertheless, China’s ties with high representatives help to protect Chinese investments. When the European Parliament condemned the inhumane conditions of the workers building the Linglong factory, the Serbian Prime Minister referred to the criticism as being organized intentionally to sabotage Chinese investments (Associated Press 2021).

Infrastructure

From a geopolitical perspective, the most important transport infrastructure projects are those that form alternative routes for China’s trade and serve to gain access to and control over crucial points. These are primarily the Thessaloniki Budapest railway and the “Middle Corridor” with the Anaklia Port. With Chinese investments, the first part of the Serbian railway between Belgrade and Novi Sad was completed in 2022 (Global Times 2024a). North Macedonia and Greece signed an agreement to join the project (RailTech 2023; Dimoski 2024). The railway should be a part of China’s trade route from Asia to Europe, and it will pass through Greek ports. The Chinese state-owned giant COSCO already owns a majority share in the Greek port of Piraeus, the main entry point for Chinese goods to Europe, and a minority stake in the Budapest train terminal (Zeneli 2023).

The “Middle Corridor”, linking China with Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, should be an alternative to the traditional maritime route through the Strait of Malacca and the Red Sea. The Anaklia Port is being built by several Chinese companies, including the CRBC, and it will be owned at 49% by the Chinese Singaporean consortium (Standish and Chkareuli 2023b). However, the project is yet in an early stage of development with the future results unknown.

Chinese SOEs constructed several highways in the analysed regions, including those in Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia. Most of these projects were financed with loans provided by Chinese financial institutions, and the contracts were won by Chinese state-owned conglomerates. The most infamous example is the construction of the A1 motorway in Montenegro, connecting the Adriatic Sea with Serbia, which, being one of the most expensive highways per kilometre in the world, significantly increased the country’s debt (Krstinovska et al. 2023). However, there are also other examples of problematic projects. The highway between Kichevo and Ohrid, built by a Chinese company, is the largest and most expensive infrastructure project in North Macedonia, with the contract criticised for its lack of transparency (Vangeli 2021). The contract for Banja Luka Prijedor highway in Republika Srpska was similarly criticised, as it included not only the construction costs, but also a concession to the Chinese company to operate the highway for 33 years, with the government paying it an annual fee (SPIN Info 2023). Despite the criticism, Chinese companies continue to win contracts for road construction in these countries, including for projects financed by EU funds (Xinhua 2023).

The Chinese infrastructure investments have been less frequent in most Eastern European countries. Moldova negotiated with Chinese companies to build a highway, but the project has not moved on (Harper 2021). Ukraine has not implemented any significant road or railway infrastructure projects with China’s participation, and its negotiated projects have been halted after Russia’s invasion. In Georgia, the Chinese attracted local elites connected to the influential oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and his circle. Chinese companies won several contracts for infrastructural projects in Georgia, some of which are financed with EU loans (Standish and Chkareuli 2023a). The investments in Ukraine and Moldova primarily target food production and the related port infrastructure, thus enhancing China’s food security. In 2015, Ukraine became the main supplier of corn to China. The main investor in this case is the state-owned COFCO, which also owns sunflower seed processing facilities, and invested in a port terminal in Mykolaiv on the Danube River (Gerasymchuk and Poita 2018). In 2015, the Chinese SOE signed a contract to operate a terminal in the Moldovan port of Giurgiulesti on the Danube River, which allowed for an increase in Moldova-China trade, including the trade in Moldovan food products (Davi 2020).

Energy and mining

Chinese companies are also involved in the energy sector and mining industry and have been at the forefront of several high-profile projects in the Western Balkans and Georgia. These projects have a similar modus operandi to that of infrastructural projects, and are mostly realized by Chinese SOEs and financed with Chinese loans. The first Chinese-backed energy projects in these countries included the hydropower plants (HPPs) in North Macedonia, Albania and Georgia in the early 2000s. In Serbia, Chinese companies have been involved in constructing a thermal power plant, and the operation of a coal mine, a steel mill, a copper and gold mine and a smelting plant (Jajcanin 2024). In Albania, a Chinese company acquired a stake in a joint venture operating copper mines and plants (Zeneli and Mejdini 2022). Chinese companies are the largest extractors of copper in both Albania and Serbia (Krstinovska 2023), and the Chinese company Geo-Jade Petroleum produces 95% of Albania’s crude oil, which accounts for more than one-tenth of its overall exports, and the company is allegedly also the largest employer in Albania (Zeneli and Mejdini 2022).

Even Chinese energy and natural resources investments met with criticism due to concerns about corruption and negative consequences. For example, the expansion of the coal mine in Serbia was contracted without a public tender, and allegedly no EIA was conducted (Just Finance 2023). In Serbian cities near Chinese- operated mines and processing plants, high levels of environmental pollution were reported, which led to several citizen protests (Krstinovska and Vuksanovic 2023). Also, several Chinese energy projects have been halted, probably also due to a backlash from the public, civil society and the EU (Zeneli and Mejdini 2022).

Aid

China’s provision of grants to countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe is significantly lower than the aid provided by the EU. Between 2000 and 2020, China granted approximately 135 mil. EUR to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia (Krstinovska 2022). In comparison, the EU paid more than 5 billion EUR to these countries just between 2007 and 2020 (European Commission 2021). Despite their low relative significance, the Chinese projects often receive high media coverage, both locally and in Chinese media. They are often directed towards high-visibility sectors like healthcare, education, and cultural projects and are strategic tools for fostering goodwill, strengthening bilateral relations and developing trust in Chinese activities.

During the Covid 19 pandemic, China applied the so called “vaccine diplomacy” when it supplied vaccines and medical products to countries that had difficulties in obtaining Western medical supplies. While most of these supplies were sold, some were donated, and the latter included vaccines going to Moldova, Georgia and Montenegro (Xinhua 2021; Reuters 2021). Georgia received the largest support for dealing with the pandemic as the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provided it with loans of 136m EUR (Brattberg et al. 2021). After the invasion of Ukraine, China promised to provide some humanitarian aid to Ukraine (AFP 2022) and smaller financial aid to Moldova for dealing with Ukrainian refugees (Moldpres 2022).

China might leverage these ties to influence countries’ diplomatic and political stances. In June 2021, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine withdrew their signatures from the statement criticizing China’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs allegedly after China’s pressure on them related to a shipment of vaccines (Keaten 2021).