Skip to main content

How Moldova’s democracy prevailed over Russian interference

Russian influence characterized the election campaign in Moldova, both in the form of disinformation and control over access to energy. Nevertheless, democracy withstood the pressure. The explanation lies in the trust between people and between the people and the state. This should be taken into account in the assessment of European aid and cooperation.

News 5 min read 2025-10-27

MOLDOVA Posters from political parties before the parliamentary election. MOLDAVIE Affiches des partis politiques avant les elections legislatives. The protests come amid heightened political tensions in Moldova, where Prime Minister Maia Sandu’s pro-European PAS party faces strong opposition from pro-Russian factions ahead of the upcoming election. Ces manifestations surviennent dans un climat de tensions politiques accrues en Moldavie, oÃ" le parti pro-europeen PAS de la Premiere ministre Maia Sandu affronte une forte opposition des factions pro-russes à l’approche de l’election.//DZAPAUL_sipa.1744/Credit:PAUL DZA/SIPA/2509262019

(Panorama News): The election campaign in Moldova in September was marked by disinformation, cyberattacks, and smear campaigns against incumbent President Maia Sandu and her party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Nevertheless, PAS won ahead of the Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP).

This raises the question: Why did the disinformation campaigns have so little effect in Moldova?

In theory, Moldova should be a country where such influence is successful. The country is one of Europe’s poorest, characterized by regional conflicts, an energy crisis, and high emigration—conditions that normally provide fertile ground for discontent, low voter turnout, and foreign influence.

Elections in headwinds

There were many attempts to influence the election. In the run-up to the election, we saw massive disinformation campaigns and electoral fraud in favor of the BEP, which has a more Russia-friendly profile and is open to closer cooperation with Moscow.

These were led by actors with an interest in delaying Moldova’s path to EU membership and/or ensuring that Moldova moves closer to Russia. The campaigns focused on vote buying and smear campaigns against key PAS politicians.

Ironically, it seems that the campaigns had an unintended consequence. Instead of undermining confidence in the system, they helped to put the election more clearly on the agenda and reinforce the perception that this was a fateful choice between Europe and Russia.

The result was higher voter turnout and mobilization in support of PAS. The protests after the election results were small, despite attempts at mobilization before election day, and the disinformation therefore failed to mobilize widespread opposition once the votes had been counted.

Transnistria and the energy shock

Transnistria and the energy shockThe Transnistria issue cannot be completely ignored, but it did not have a major impact either.

The Russian-backed breakaway region supplied the rest of Moldova with energy and is home to the country’s largest gas-fired power plant. When the gas transit agreement between Kyiv and Moscow expired on January 1, 2025, Russian gas deliveries through Ukraine to Transnistria were halted. Previously, the region had received gas free of charge, while the bill was sent on to Chisinau. The result was a serious energy crisis that continues to affect Moldova.

The EU responded with a comprehensive aid package, which was well received in Transnistria. At the same time, Russia has failed to secure alternative energy sources for the region, forcing Moldova to import gas from elsewhere – at much higher prices. This directly affects ordinary Moldovans through increased costs.

The uncertainty surrounding the energy crisis could have had a significant impact on the election. However, the outcome suggests that, like the disinformation campaigns, it did not have a decisive effect.

Influence without a change of power

The most interesting question is why disinformation actors have had so little impact.

Moldova appears to be a country where such campaigns should succeed, but the level of trust in Moldova is not only higher than in several of its neighboring countries, it is also far higher than one would expect in such a poor country with many regional conflicts.

We work with trust and hybrid threats in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans. Of these countries, Moldova stands out as the country with the highest level of trust.

People have confidence in the political system and public institutions, and less than 10 percent are seriously dissatisfied with important sectors of society such as health, education, infrastructure, and security.

Trust exists both vertically (between citizens and institutions) and horizontally (between people in general) – even with Transnistria and other regional conflicts in the picture.

Trust as preparedness

A society’s resilience to hybrid threats – such as disinformation campaigns – therefore depends on trust, both between ordinary people and between people, public institutions, and the political elite that governs them.

This does not necessarily mean that people must agree on everything they do and that they cannot be dissatisfied with individual issues. Not everyone who voted for PAS necessarily agrees with Sandu on everything, and similarly, there is no reason to believe that those who voted for BEP are necessarily victims of disinformation or want to sever ties with the EU altogether and move closer to Moscow.

Given the election results, people have voted based on how they themselves have defined their interests.

The most important lesson to be learned from the election in Moldova is therefore that the cure for disinformation is trust, and trust is maintained if the majority of the people feel that the political system delivers on what is important to their everyday lives.

People encounter the state and politics through health, education, the economy, infrastructure, and security. Some will always have a high level of distrust. But according to our research, this group in Moldova is less than 10 percent—there is little to fish for in terms of disinformation.

There are simply too few people who are affected.

Almost everyone has heard the various stories that have been spread through these campaigns. Some have shaken their heads in disbelief, others may have laughed at them and used them to make jokes online – but there are hardly many who let it influence their vote.

For the majority of the population, the campaigns have appeared implausible. People did not recognize themselves in stories of betrayal and destruction, because they are not dissatisfied enough with their everyday lives.

What does this mean for us?

Trust is built in everyday life. If we are to strengthen trust in Norway and elsewhere in Europe, we must work over time with the parts of the state that people encounter most often – health, education, financial benefits, infrastructure, and security.

This is long-term work. If trust falls too low, it will be too late; then the storms of disinformation cannot be stemmed. The dam must therefore be built before the storm hits.

This time it held in Moldova, but we have no guarantee for next time – either here at home or in other countries that may find themselves in the eye of the storm if trust slips away.

This article was first published in Panorama Nyheter on October 27, 2025. 

Subscribe to our newsletter

Subscription Form